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“James Johnson’s timely book draws attention to the increasing danger of military 
conflict between China and the United States. Johnson draws on an impressive 
array of Chinese and Western sources to provide a well-documented account of the 
current military-security situation and to highlight warning signs about where it is 
likely headed in the coming decades.”
—Avery Goldstein, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International 
Relations, University of Pennsylvania, USA
“Clear and consistent in its argument and analysis and it offers excellent insight 
into the US–China ‘Security’ relationship under Obama, with also some flavour of 
how this relationship will play out under Trump in the Conclusion.”
—George Christou, Professor of European Politics and Security, 
University of Warwick, UK
“This path- breaking analysis of US perceptions and misperceptions of China’s new 
capabilities shape their mutual security dilemma provides important new insights 
into processes of strategic assessment and policy-making in Washington. This book 
is a must-read for anyone interested in the US–China security relationship in the 
contemporary world.”
—Ian Hall, Professor of International Relations, School of Government and 
International Relations, Griffith University, Australia
“The book offers an important new angle to explain the deterioration of Sino–US 
security relationship during the Obama administration. Instead emphasizing the 
typical structural dynamics favored by the power transition theory, which is exem-
plified by the Thucydides Trap narrative, this book points out the centrality of 
perceptions in the making of great power relations. The book thus represents a 
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The last decade has demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in 
their causes and manifestations and that they invite interest and demand 
responses from the social sciences, civil society, and a very broad policy 
community. In the past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective, 
but with the end of the Cold War the retention of military defense as the 
centrepiece of international security agenda became untenable. There has 
been, therefore, a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional 
approaches to security to a new agenda that talks of the softer side of 
security, in terms of human security, economic security, and environmental 
security. The topical New Security Challenges series reflects this pressing 
political and research agenda.
More information about this series at 
http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14732
major contribution to the study of security dilemma, which is a central phenome-
non of great power relations.”
—Zhang Baohui, Director, Centre for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan 
University, Hong Kong
“This book rightly re-establishes the central role of misperceptions in International 
Relations and strategic studies in general. But much more than that, James 
Johnson’s masterful study of recent US–Sino relations gives us an empirically rich 
and theoretically informed understanding of the specific ways in which security 
dilemma dynamics can shape a bilateral relationship. This is first-rate analysis and 
therefore will be essential reading for scholars and policymakers alike.”
—Benjamin Zala, Research Fellow, ANU College of Asia 
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The United States–China Military and Defense Relationship during the 
Obama Presidency grows out of a broader intellectual desire to grapple 
with the causality and nature of misperceptions—especially about a rival’s 
military capabilities and intentions—of international affairs. In particular, 
in cases where rival states have radically disparate strategic cultures, histo-
ries, and political systems, which in turn may impede effective diplomacy, 
complicate efforts by policy-makers to accurately assess the military bal-
ance of power, and communicate strategic intentions to allies and 
adversaries, in extremis can lead to deterrence failure and conflict.
To this end, this book offers a timely and compelling explanation for 
the deterioration of Sino–American security relations during the Obama 
presidency. The United States–China relationship has become one of the 
(if not the most) vital features of contemporary world politics, which sits 
at a precarious and dangerous crossroads. How important were misper-
ceptions in the deterioration of Sino–American security relations? What 
role did emerging military technologies play in shaping ‘new’ security 
challenges in the Asia-Pacific region? The core argument laid out in this 
book is that the presence of a ‘security dilemma’ in important ways influ-
enced Washington’s strategic calculations and military policies vis-à-vis 
China in the Asia-Pacific. This book contends that the failure of the United 
States to treat the distinction between China’s capabilities and intentions 
with the requisite attention intensified strategic competition and mistrust 




The following are some of the initial reactions I got from colleagues 
when I explained my plans for this book: Not another book on United 
States–China relations! Have not we sufficiently dealt with the idea that 
China and the United States are caught in a Thucydides trap and are 
destined for war? Is not it just another Western-centric realist account of 
the threat posed by a rising hegemonic power to a status quo one? At first 
glance, these reactions are not unreasonable. However, rather than 
simply offering a generic historical account of Sino–American relations, or 
indeed extrapolating from such an account the likely trajectory of this 
dyad, this book systematically unpacks the policy rhythms, drivers, and 
dynamics that defined the course of United States–China military and 
defense relations under the Obama administration. In addition, the book 
offers a nuanced and innovative military cross-domain comparative 
approach that adds analytical depth and rigor to the existing literature. It 
also lends itself to a conceptual discussion on broader ideas: the existence 
of parallel security dilemmas, of varying degrees of intensity, inherent to 
particular military domains (or spheres); and, ipso facto, the idea that the 
collective effect of these individual domains could lead to an intensification 
of the overall security dilemma, and thus more than the sum of its parts.
The book builds on several themes I explored during my PhD project 
including the dangers conflating states’ military capabilities and strategic 
intentions; the implications of emerging military-technological develop-
ments (especially those with ‘dual-use’ features) for Sino–American rela-
tions; and, related, the intersection of these emerging military technologies 
with the shifting military balance in the Western Pacific. My recent research 
projects and interests also influenced and shaped the evolution of these 
original ideas and themes. In particular, emerging military technologies 
and ‘new’ security challenges for the Asia-Pacific (e.g. cyberspace, artificial 
intelligence, robotics, autonomous systems, and quantum computing); 
emerging cross-domain security threats and implications for nuclear policy, 
deterrence, strategic stability, and arms control; and, related, the militari-
zation of the cyber domain (and related technologies) and future 
warfare.
The case study chapters incorporate new archival research on Chinese 
thinking and approaches to emerging military technologies. In contrast to 
China’s conventional weapons, far less analytical attention has thus far 
been paid to the development of the critical systems and support 
architecture, which enables and enhances China’s broader war-fighting 
capabilities. This book will examine the implications of this emerging 
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technological paradigm shift for future warfare in the Asia-Pacific region, 
and whether such a shift could harbinger a new military revolution, on a 
par with  previous transformative technologies—nuclear, biotech, and 
aerospace? To be sure, these defense innovations will have significant 
implications for a myriad aspects of future warfare including deterrence 
(peace and wartime); the intersection of these technologies with tradi-
tional military domains; human–machine collaboration; and, not least, the 
disparities that exist between Western and Chinese thinking and approaches 
to these fields. These issues, however, remain undertheorized in the litera-
ture, in particular, those that relate to contemporary Sino–American stra-
tegic competition. This study will investigate how the relationship between 
these parallel efforts will likely evolve, and in what ways this ‘new’ military 
paradigm could influence the future character and conduct of war.
The core argument laid out in this book is that the presence of a ‘security 
dilemma’ in important ways influenced Washington’s strategic calculations 
and military policies vis-à-vis China in the Asia-Pacific. The book proffers 
a mid-level theory-building approach, which develops on the empirical 
base that has applied the security dilemma concept to elucidate Sino–
American bilateral relations. The book argues for the continued relevance 
of the security dilemma concept to understand contemporary United 
States–China security relations, and elicits evidence of action–reaction 
policies, arms racing dynamics, and increased levels of mutual mistrust, 
which are closely associated with an intense and intractable security 
dilemma. The case studies chapters draw upon a wide array of English and 
Chinese sources—on military doctrine, strategic culture, offense–defense, 
and deterrence theory, and cognitive subfields—to build a clear picture of 
the main sources of United States–China misperceptions, which is a crucial 
step for understanding the problems these assessments can cause for the 
conduct of statecraft across strategically competitive dyads.
Viewed through a ‘security dilemma’ theoretical lens this book builds 
on an existing international relations (IR) empirical base, which has used 
the dilemma concept to elucidate Sino–American relations. The four case 
studies will contextualize this theoretical framework with contemporary 
Sino–American relations, to critically examine several theoretical puzzles 
including the following: To what extent does the intensity of security 
dilemma vary between the military domains, and what accounts for these 
variations? Are there particular features unique (or mutually exclusive) to 
a particular domain, which makes the security dilemma more or less 
relevant? Finally, does an integrative (or holistic) analytical approach to 
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view various military spheres generate a particular set of security dilemma 
dynamics, which may not otherwise have existed? Admittedly, these  studies 
do not provide a comprehensive analysis of all the military domains (and 
especially cross-domain issues) relevant to this competitive bilateral rela-
tionship. Rather, the selection criterion for the studies reflects both the 
availability and integrity of empirical sources, and to what extent the evi-
dence elicited the kinds of dynamics associated with a security dilemma.
I believe The United States–China Military and Defense Relationship 
during the Obama Presidency contains sufficient empirical and theoretical 
rigor to make it a useful resource for students of U.S. foreign policy; East 
Asia studies; China studies (and ‘rising powers’); military and military 
sociology; diplomatic studies; and more broadly, security, warfare, and 
strategic disciplines. Beyond academia, the book’s target audience also 
extends to policy-making, intelligence, and think-tank communities. By 
contextualizing the latest developments in emerging military technologies 
in the Asia-Pacific with a wide use of sources on military doctrine, strategic 
culture, and IR theory the book builds a sobering picture of the United 
States–China security relationship, which will appeal to specialists and 
generalists alike with an interest in future conflict, military studies, arms 
control, and foreign policy issues in Asia more broadly.
The book is organized as follows. The first chapter outlines the book’s 
overarching arguments, rationale, and contribution to the broader litera-
ture. By introducing the reader to the key debates and issues surrounding 
the military dimensions of the ‘pivot’ (or rebalance) to Asia policy, this 
chapter frames the discourse in preparation for a deeper exploration of the 
themes in the case studies that follow. Chapter 2 contextualizes the secu-
rity dilemma concept with contemporary United States–China relations, 
and in particular the emergence of the ‘China rise’ discourse. By advanc-
ing a clear and straightforward analytical tool kit (or theoretical lens) to 
interpret the research findings, the book avoids the common trap of using 
the ‘security dilemma’ concept in an overly accommodative or expansive 
manner.
Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 provide a deep-dive analytical examination of 
four cases. The sequencing of the case studies reflects my desire to high-
light and weave these research puzzles with the empirical materials—espe-
cially those pertaining to emerging military technologies and future 
conflict, and the shifting military balance in the Asia-Pacific. The first 
explores U.S. misperceptions of Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) 
capabilities and intentions and finds that U.S. capacity-based assessments of 
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Beijing’s strategic intentions confounded by the existence of cognitive bias 
exacerbated U.S. misperceptions. The next three studies focus the theoreti-
cal lens on three individual military domains: cyberspace (and related mili-
tary technologies); long-range precision-strike munitions (especially 
Chinese antiship ‘carrier killers’); and Chinese nuclear weapons for war-
fighting (or ‘victory-denial’) missions. I originally conceptualized these 
studies as independent original research bodies of work, which their respec-
tive length, observations, findings, and empirical scope reflect. However, in 
an effort to enhance the book’s overall flow, cogency, and accessibility the 
individual cases remain firmly tethered to the core themes and conceptual 
framework presented in the opening chapters. To this end, the sequencing 
of the studies reflects my desire to highlight and build on several interre-
lated issues germane to the strategically competitive United States–China 
dyad, most notably, emerging military-technological developments and 
future conflict, asymmetric challenges to America’s ‘ways of war’, and the 
shifting military balance in the Western Pacific. I hope the reader derives 
some benefit and intellectual enjoyment from this approach. Finally, the 
concluding chapter draws out the book’s key findings and themes, high-
lights several implications that follow from the findings of the book, and, 
finally, reflects on the future direction of United States–China relations in 
the military and defense arena under the new Trump administration.
It is my pleasure to acknowledge the friends and colleagues who 
improved this book in innumerable ways throughout its development. I 
would like to register the support and engagement I have received from 
my home institution, the University of Leicester—including my head of 
department, George Lewis, and my fellow researchers and strategists 
Andrew Futter, Benjamin Zala, David Strachan-Morris, Adam Quinn, 
Wali Aslam, Oliver Turner, Ian Hall, and Zhang Baohui—for their dedica-
tion, commitment, and invaluable insights. Without their mentoring and 
sage advice, this book would not have been possible. The themes of this 
book were initially presented at various academic conferences whose hosts, 
fellow panelists, and audiences provided an invaluable source of feedback 
and support. Also, the reviewers for Palgrave Macmillan made very help-
ful suggestions for revision, which substantially improved both the sub-
stance and style of the book. Finally, I thank my family members for their 
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Obama’s ‘Pivot’ to Asia 
and Air–Sea Battle
This book applies the security dilemma concept to elucidate the 
deterioration in United States–China military and defense relations in the 
Asia- Pacific region during Barack Obama’s presidency. It builds upon 
the existing International Relations (IR) empirical literature that has used 
this concept to understand United States–China security relations and, in 
particular, the impact of this condition upon Washington’s strategic think-
ing and military policy responses vis-à-vis China in Asia.1 The book 
constructs a robust theoretical framework of analysis to validate the exis-
tence of a genuine United States–China ‘security dilemma’.2 Next, it 
applies this framework to the empirical research to highlight incidences of 
Washington’s misunderstandings of Beijing’s strategic intentions caused 
by misinterpretations and misperceptions, to explain the deterioration of 
Sino–American security relations. Chapter 2 addresses several conceptual 
and analytical gaps in the existing literature, in particular, the under-
theorized discourse that relates to the security dilemma and the United 
States–China asymmetric military balance of power in Asia. While the 
overriding objective of this book is to build upon the existing discourse, it 
also generates important theoretical conclusions and implications for secu-
rity dilemma theorizing itself.
A key finding of this book is that under the Obama administration U.S. 
military strategy, policies, and postures in the Asia-Pacific were in important 
ways influenced by the presence of a United States–China security dilemma. 
jamessjohnson@hotmail.com
2 
The empirical research elicits clear evidence of action–reaction policies, and 
spirals of mistrust and arms racing, which are closely associated with intense 
security dilemmas, conflict, and war. A central theme that runs through the 
case study chapters of this book is Washington’s tendency to underutilize 
(or cherry-pick) Chinese empirical sources; and, instead, overemphasize 
preexisting and familiar frameworks of analyses to assess Chinese military 
capabilities, to determine Beijing’s strategic intentions. This analytical 
approach often overlooked and neglected important (or new) information, 
and conflated an operational military capability as explicit proof of the exis-
tence of malign Chinese intentions vis-à-vis the United States.
Background and Context: The ‘Pivot’ (or ‘Rebalance’) to Asia
In late 2011, the Obama administration, through the promulgation of 
a series of official announcements, laid out a plan for the long-term realign-
ment of the center of gravity of U.S. foreign policy, national security, and 
economic interests toward Asia—and away from Afghanistan and Iraq.3 
The central objective underlying this ‘rebalance’ was to devote an increas-
ing American political capital, resources (especially military), and strategic 
interest toward the Asia-Pacific. Specifically, this shift was designed to 
increase U.S. credibility and influence upon the regions’ alliances, rules, 
and norms as China emerges as a regional (and potentially revisionist) 
power.4 President Obama stated in 2011 that the ‘United States will play 
a larger and long-term role in shaping this region [the Asia-Pacific] and its 
future’.5 Similarly, then U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton reiterated 
that the ‘Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics’, and 
Clinton asserted that the purpose of the ‘pivot’ was to ‘sustain our [U.S.] 
leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values across the region’.6
Four key developments drove the Obama administration to intensify its 
focus on the Asia-Pacific7:
• First, the increasing economic importance of the region (especially 
China) to the United States.8 Between 1973 and 2010, Asia’s share 
of the global trade doubled to just over 30 percent, and by 2010, 
China overtook the United States to become the world’s largest 
exporter. The extent of this meteoric rise took on greater promi-
nence in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial crisis.
• Second, China’s rapidly expanding military capabilities (especially 
associated with the anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] strategy) and 
assertive foreign policy, and, in particular, the implications for U.S. 





• Third, the reduction of U.S. military operations and presence in the 
Middle East.10
• Fourth, to counter the perception among U.S.  Asia allies’ and 
partners’ effort that domestic-political pressures to cut the U.S. 
federal budget (especially the Department of Defense [DoD]) could 
undermine America’s security commitments to the region.
Then U.S. National Security Adviser Tom Donilon stated that the ‘pivot’ 
policy was built around five key pillars: (1) closer coordination with U.S. 
treaty allies in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines); (2) deepening cooperation and building capacity with the 
region’s ‘emerging powers’ (India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar); 
(3) forming a ‘constructive relationship’ with China; (4) increasing levels 
of engagement with Asia’s multilateral institutions (especially the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] and the East Asia 
Summit [EAS]); and (5) concluding negotiations on new trade and invest-
ments, most notably, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement.11 
Since the proclamation of the ‘pivot’ (or rebalance), the Obama adminis-
tration took several significant steps to implement each of these pillars12:
• In its relations with Japan, the United States convened its first ‘two- 
plus- two’ dialogue to revise the Guidelines for the United States–
Japan Defense Cooperation, and reaffirmed that the mutual defense 
treaty covered the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, which 
China also claims as a ‘core’ sovereign interest.
• In its relations with India, the United States outlined a series of 
streamlined defense industrial cooperation guidelines, and expanded 
arms sales and technology transfer arrangements.
• With Vietnam, it announced major expansions of U.S. defense con-
tracts, new logistical access arrangements, and closer maritime rela-
tions, especially in the South China Seas.
• In Myanmar, the United States commenced the process of limited 
opening and diplomatic engagement; for example, Hilary Clinton’s 
state visit in 2011, followed by Obama’s in 2013 and 2014.
• In the economic arena, the United States encouraged Japan to join 
the TPP discussions in 2013; ratified a Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) 
with South Korea in 2011; and committed the United States to fully 
joining the EAS.
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• In the military sphere, the United States announced new troop 
deployments to Australia, naval deployments and a Strategic 
Framework Agreement (SFA) with Singapore, and expanded 
rotational access to military facilities in the Philippines.
• In its relations with China, Washington increased the level of contact 
and engagement with Beijing. For example, an expanded role for the 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED); the establishment of a 
Strategic Security Dialogue to discuss cyber, space, and nuclear con-
cerns; increased military-to-military contact; and during the 2013 
Obama–Xi ‘shirtsleeves’ summit in California, a joint commitment 
was made toward achieving stable bilateral relations.
The ‘FirsT PaciFic PresidenT’? areas oF conTinuiTy 
and change in u.s. asian Policy
Many aspects of the ‘pivot’ described earlier represented continuity with 
America’s long-standing Asia strategy and policies, as opposed to a radical 
departure from previous administrations. Since the end of World War II, 
the United States has sought to underwrite stability and security in Asia, by 
combining a large forward military presence with a pivotal diplomatic 
role.13 Several observers argued that the Obama administration exagger-
ated the transformative nature of the ‘pivot’.14 In the military arena, for 
example, many of the administration’s policies merely built on those 
undertaken by the Bush administration, which increased America’s strategic 
focus on Southern and Western Asia through deployments of rotational 
forces.15 Furthermore, President Obama expanded other Bush-era policies 
that were widely accredited to the ‘pivot’, including initiating negotiations 
for a TPP agreement; promoting a broad-based maritime coalition (against 
China) in the South China Sea; strengthening strategic partnerships with 
India, Vietnam, and Indonesia; expanding defense cooperation with 
Australia, the Philippines, and Japan; and increasing U.S. troop presence 
in South Korea.16
Therefore, the ‘pivot’ is best understood as more a change in means 
(i.e. resources, time, and attention devoted to Asia by U.S. policy-makers) 
rather than representing a major reorientation of the key pillars of American 
‘grand strategy’ in Asia—freedom of navigation, military primacy, an open 
and free market place for U.S. trade, and the promotion of democracy and 




Obama administration. The ‘pivot’ sought to strike an appropriate balance 
in managing the Sino–American security relationship through a ‘two- 
pronged strategy’: engaging and cooperating with China to integrate it 
further into the global rules-based system (or become ‘responsible stake-
holders’); while simultaneously asserting U.S. military preeminence in the 
region to reassure U.S. allies and deter Chinese regional hegemonic aspira-
tions.17 An overarching argument this book makes is that the Obama 
administration failed to find the right balance in managing United States–
China relations.18 The administration’s preoccupation with sustaining 
U.S. military primacy in Asia, in a response to the perception of a destabi-
lizing and potentially revisionist ‘rising’ power, evinced a classic security 
dilemma. Chapter 3 explores in detail the nature, strategic rationale, and 
assumptions underlying U.S. military policies vis-à-vis China during this 
period.
MiliTary and deFense diMensions oF The ‘PivoT’: 
air–sea BaTTle concePT
In spite of the protestations of several policy-makers within the Obama 
administration, the military (or hard-power) elements of the ‘pivot’ 
received an outsized amount of attention from both the scholarly and 
policy-making communities—within the United States and China.19 In 
addition to the relatively small-scale and largely symbolic marine deploy-
ments to Australia and Singapore, the administration stressed that not-
withstanding the cuts in overall levels of U.S. defense spending—as a 
result of the Budget Control Act of 2011—the United States remained 
committed to maintaining its military presence in Asia. As President 
Obama asserted in 2011,
[a]s we end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make 
our [U.S.] presence and mission in the Asia-Pacific a top priority. As a result, 
defense spending will not—I repeat will not—come at the expense of the Asia- 
Pacific.20 [Emphasis added]
Elaborating on this strategic ‘priority’, then U.S.  Secretary of Defense 
Leon Panetta stated that ‘[t]he U.S. military will increase its institutional 
weight and focus on enhanced presence, power projection, and deterrence 
in the Asia-Pacific’.21 Specifically, Panetta announced plans to increase the 
proportion of U.S. naval assets in the region from 50 to 60 percent, 
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together with a desire for building closer maritime relations with U.S. 
allies and partners in the region—especially in the South China Sea.22 In 
addition to these broad policy statements several features of this renewed 
strategic focus were noteworthy.23 First, a broader distribution of U.S. 
forces (especially to South East Asia and Guam) compared to the Bush 
era; second, a more flexible approach to troop deployments in the region 
(i.e. smaller, more agile, and self-sustaining) from a hitherto emphasis on 
permanent basing; and third, enhancing the capabilities of American 
regional allies and partners (including India, Indonesia, New Zealand, and 
Vietnam) to ensure the ‘capacity for securing common interests’.24
A crucial driving force behind the administration’s identification with 
the Asia-Pacific as a ‘top priority’ region was the rapid expansion of 
Chinese military capabilities and Beijing’s increasingly assertive foreign 
policy in the South and East China Seas—especially from 2009 to 2010.25 
The DoD stated in 2011 that China’s rise is likely to stand out as ‘a 
defining feature of the strategic landscape of the twenty-first century’, and 
that China’s military is ‘now venturing into the global maritime domain, 
a sphere long dominated by the U.S. Navy’.26 In particular, U.S. threat 
assessments concluded that China had developed capabilities (e.g. long- 
range precision missiles, antisatellite weapons, and cyber-warfare capabili-
ties) designed to exploit U.S. military vulnerabilities in the region, which 
through ‘asymmetric attacks’ could target vital U.S. military assets—
especially U.S. command, control, communications, computers, intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (C4ISR).27 In response to 
these emerging military-technological challenges, the Pentagon promul-
gated several initiatives that were (albeit implicitly) attributed to China’s 
A2/AD ‘strategy’28; the most prominent of which was the air–sea battle 
(ASB) operational concept.29 Chapter 3 examines in depth the ASB versus 
A2/AD debate, and, in particular, the implications of this dangerous 
dynamic for United States–China strategic stability, military escalation 
control, and future warfare in the Western Pacific.
sowing The seeds oF an inTense securiTy dileMMa
Opponents of Obama’s ‘pivot’ raised three main objections: first, despite 
frequent statements from Washington that the ‘pivot’ did not target at 
any particular nation, critics argued that the ‘pivot’ (especially in the 




States–China relations.30 Moreover, the widespread perception (in the 
United States and China) that the ‘pivot’ was designed to contain and 
weaken China militarily created several risks. Above all, the ‘pivot’ ampli-
fied Beijing’s insecurities and encouraged a more assertive Chinese 
foreign policy, which undermined regional stability.31 Moreover, the 
policy risked strengthening the hand of China’s military hardliners who 
long harbored suspicions of U.S. military intentions in the region.32 
Also, stoking China’s fear of containment (or encirclement) complicated 
Washington’s effort to coax Beijing to cooperate on major geopolitical 
issues such as Iran, North Korea, and, above all, managing tensions in 
the South China Seas.33 Finally, an argument was made that further 
deterioration in United States–China strategic trust could make Beijing 
less amenable toward maintaining market access for American businesses 
operating in China.34
Second, it would be unwise for the United States, at a time of increas-
ing instability in the Middle East, to shift (or pivot) its attention and 
resources away from this geopolitically fragile region. To be sure, one of 
the main reasons the administration replaced the term ‘pivot’ with 
‘rebalance’ was an attempt to assuage concerns (especially U.S. allies in 
Europe and the Middle East) that the ‘pivot’ represented a fundamental 
reordering of U.S. global priorities.35 Third, pressure from U.S. Congress 
to reduce the defense budget would likely undermine the credibility of the 
‘pivot’.36 That is, insufficient resources to implement the ‘pivot’ would fail 
to reassure U.S. regional allies, and simultaneously encourage (rather than 
deter) Beijing to pursue a revisionist foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific.37
In sum, critics of the ‘pivot’ argued that the conceptualization and 
implementation of the policy were inconsistent (even contradictory), 
piecemeal, poorly communicated and coordinated (especially with U.S. 
allies), and, ultimately, damaging to United States–China relations and 
regional stability.38 Herein lies the paradox of Obama’s signature strategic 
turn: a policy designed to deter a rising China instead encouraged Beijing 
to pursue a more assertive and belligerent course, which in turn reduced 
the prospects for United States–China cooperation, and, arguably, dam-
aged long-term U.S. security interests in the Asia-Pacific. The case studies 
in Chaps. 3, 4, 5, and 6 explore the nature and implications of this paradox 
for United States–China military and defense relations during the Obama 
presidency.




Chapter 2 contextualizes the security dilemma concept to view contempo-
rary United States–China security relations. It begins with a brief 
theoretical overview of the security dilemma theory, which includes the 
concept’s shortcomings, misuses, and contemporary revisions. Next, it 
contextualizes the application of the security dilemma by scholars and 
policy-makers to elucidate United States–China security relations, and in 
particular the emergence of a ‘China rise’ (or ‘China threat’) discourse. 
Finally, it proffers a conceptual framework of analysis (or theoretical lens) 
for applying the dilemma concept to view Sino–American military and 
defense relations during the Obama era and addresses several gaps in the 
existing literature.
Chapter 3, the first of four case studies, builds on the current (albeit 
limited) literature that examines the key driving forces behind U.S. assess-
ments of the Chinese A2/AD challenge in East Asia. That is, the Obama 
administration became increasingly concerned that China’s A2/AD 
capabilities would put at risk U.S. military assets operating in the Western 
Pacific, which could allow China to deter, delay, and deny U.S. interven-
tion in future regional conflict and crises. This study demonstrates how 
U.S. perceptions of Chinese A2/AD influenced U.S. decision-making and 
defense planning in the Asia-Pacific. In particular, it focuses on the strate-
gic ambiguities associated with A2/AD, which provided fertile ground for 
U.S. misperceptions of Chinese strategic intentions to grow. This chapter 
concludes that the analytical baseline (or framing assumptions) used by 
defense analysts to interpret Chinese A2/AD were overly reliant on 
material (i.e. military) capacity-based assessments to determine Beijing’s 
strategic intentions that overlooked the evolution of Chinese operational 
and doctrinal preferences. Specifically, defense analysts frequently, and 
often erroneously, conflated a Chinese operational capability with an 
underlying strategic intention, which conceptualized the United States as 
its primary (if not sole) target. This study demonstrates that strategic 
ambiguities and opacity associated with China’s A2/AD capabilities rein-
forced Washington’s reliance upon capacity-based assessments, which 
confounded by cognitive bias exacerbated misperceptions of Beijing’s 
strategic intentions.
Chapter 4 examines the intersection of China’s evolving C4ISR mili-
tary support ‘systems of systems’ with the cyber, space, and electronic 




future network-centric battlefield. Compared to China’s conventional 
weapon systems, far less ink has been spilled on Chinese thinking in the 
development of the critical support architecture that enables and enhances 
China’s technologically advanced war-fighting capabilities. A central argu-
ment this chapter makes is that China’s war-fighting capabilities fused by 
C4ISR systems posed greater threats to the United States than the sum of 
its parts. It describes a discourse within the U.S. defense community which 
interpreted Chinese ‘systems of systems’ as specifically designed to exploit 
U.S. military vulnerabilities in the Western Pacific. The emergence of a 
‘systems of systems’ military paradigm increased the incentives for both 
sides to strike first and preemptively against the other C4ISR systems, 
which perceptibly worsened strategic stabilizing in the Asia-Pacific during 
the Obama presidency.
Chapter 5 builds on this military-technological theme and explores the 
strategic implications of a new generation of stealthier and increasingly 
survivable Chinese antiship missiles (ASMs) for U.S. naval carrier strike 
groups operating in the Western Pacific, in particular, the ability of these 
weapons to evade U.S. missile defenses. This chapter argues that the 
proliferation of China’s maturing precision-strike missile (PSM) regime 
could presage a new military-technological paradigm on the future net-
worked battlefield in the Western Pacific. It finds that the development 
and diffusion of these asymmetric weapons increased the risk of military 
miscalculation, deterrence failure, inadvertent escalation, and ultimately 
war in this highly contested and strategically competitive arena.
Chapter 6 explores a relatively under-researched discourse which relates 
to recent indications that Chinese leaders are considering the deployment 
of nuclear weapons for ‘war-fighting’ (or victory-denial) missions. It 
argues that the continued lip service paid to passive and static conceptual-
izations of Chinese thinking on nuclear and conventional deterrence is no 
longer appropriate. Recent evidence indicates that these postures are far 
more integrated, flexible, and dynamic than Beijing’s official rhetoric has 
suggested. Over the past decade, a de facto shift toward a limited nuclear 
war-fighting posture has already taken place, which has prompted a closer 
alignment of China’s nuclear force posture with its more offensively 
configured conventional stance. Moreover, as many of the barriers imped-
ing a limited nuclear war-fighting doctrine are removed, the long-standing 
doctrine–capabilities gap between China’s nuclear capabilities and the 
aspirations of many Chinese strategists will likely be reconciled. This 
chapter also posits that strategic ambiguities and opacity associated with 
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Chinese nuclear policies and doctrine reinforced Washington’s reliance 
upon worst-case scenario defense planning to determine Beijing’s—invari-
ably malign—intentions. Finally, it reflects on the implications of an 
intense security dilemma in the nuclear domain for Sino–American 
strategic stability, United States–extended deterrence commitments, and 
the future nuclear balance in the Asia-Pacific.
The final chapter draws out the books’ major findings, themes, and 
contribution to the literature. It begins with a brief review of the overarch-
ing arguments made by each of the case studies. Firmly grounded in the 
experience of the case studies, this chapter returns to the gaps in the litera-
ture (highlighted in Chap. 2) and underscores the book’s contribution to 
the scholarly understanding of United States–China security relations. As 
a corollary, it affirms the continued relevance of the security dilemma 
concept to understand worsening United States–China security relations 
during the Obama presidency. Next, the chapter reflects on possible future 
directions for United States–China relations in the military arena under 
the new Trump administration. Early indications do not bode well for the 
trajectory of this vital competitive security dyad; nor for future strategic 
stability in the increasingly volatile, contested, militarized, and crisis-prone 
Asia-Pacific region. Finally, it highlights several implications that follow 
from the findings of this research and suggests viable directions future 
research might take from where this book leaves off.
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CHAPTER 2
Conceptualizing the United States–China 
Security Dilemma
IntroductIon
The challenge states face in attempting to disentangle and interpret others’ 
motives and intentions in the international political system has confounded 
policy-makers and scholars alike.1 Some of the most basic security chal-
lenges include the following issues: At what point does the legitimate 
defense of a state’s interest become aggressively motivated?2 When do the 
actions of states driven by the desire to sustain the ‘status quo’ become 
‘revisionist’?3 At what stage, and under what circumstances, do state actors 
motivated by ‘benign’ (or peaceful and nonthreatening) intentions 
become ‘malign’ (or aggressive and expansionist)?4 These analytical chal-
lenges touch on a broader set of empirical and theoretical issues depicted 
by the ‘security dilemma’ concept.5 Central to these challenges are the 
various material and psychological human conditions in international rela-
tions (IR) that influence states’ security policy decisions and preferences, 
which comprise the core theoretical foundations of the security dilemma.6
The ‘material’ conditions refer to the ambiguous nature of the employ-
ment of military force, and, above all, the type(s) of weapons used by states 
for this purpose. That is, an adversary may interpret weapons used by states 
for defensive purposes as nonetheless potentially aggressive and expansion-
ary. The ‘psychological’ conditions refer to the complex challenges facing 
policy-makers in attempting to get into the minds of others, and determine 
states’ (especially future) motives and intentions.7 In short, the ambiguous 
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nature of weapons, together with the structural conditions of anarchy and 
uncertainty in the international system, heightens states’ threat perceptions, 
which if not mitigated (or ameliorated) through cooperative policies can 
lead to spirals of mistrust, arms racing, insecurity, and ultimately war.8 John 
Herz (1950) coined the term ‘security dilemma’ in IR.9 According to Herz,
[w]herever … anarchic society has existed … there has arisen what may be 
called the ‘security dilemma’ of men, or groups or their leaders. Groups or 
individuals must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from 
being attacked, subjected, dominated or annihilated. … Striving to attain 
security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more power in order to 
escape the impact of the power of others. This in turn renders them more 
insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst … and the vicious circle of 
security and power accumulation is on.10
In ‘preparing for the worst’, Herz’s implied that, even states which 
committed to maintaining the status quo may nonetheless feel ‘compelled’ 
to resort to aggression, as a means to attain ‘security’, which can lead to 
preventative and preemptive war. Although Herz conceded that under 
certain circumstances states could escape the dilemma, he stressed that 
such an escape was not the norm, and that ‘ultimately, somewhere, the 
conflicts caused by the security dilemma are bound to emerge among 
political units of power’.11
Building on Herz’s theoretical foundations, Hubert Butterfield 
explained how spirals of mistrust develop between states in situations 
where neither side harbors aggressive intentions toward the other12:
For you to know that you yourself mean him no harm, and that you want 
nothing from him save guarantees for your own safety; and it is never 
possible for you to realize or remember properly that since he cannot see 
the inside of your mind, he can never have the same assurances of your inten-
tions that you have … neither party see[s] the nature of the predicament 
he is in, for each only imagines that the other party is being hostile and 
unreasonable.13
From Herz’s and Butterfield’s seminal work several conceptual assump-
tions can be highlighted: (1) states’ inherent uncertainty and fear of oth-
ers’ present and future intentions; (2) the unintentional and defensive 
nature of the security dilemma; (3) the self-defeating and self-reinforcing 
outcome of a deteriorating dilemma; and (4) the condition can cause wars, 




This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it provides a brief theoretical 
overview of the security dilemma concept including contemporary revi-
sions and criticisms; the ways in which the condition can be mitigated (or 
alleviated); the prospects for cooperation and strategic stability in the pres-
ence of the dilemma; and common misuses, ambiguities, and confusing 
semantics associated with the use of the concept in the literature. Second, 
it contextualizes the use of the security dilemma by scholars and policy- 
makers to characterize contemporary United States–China security rela-
tions, in particular, from the perspective of the ‘China rise’ (or ‘China 
threat’) discourse. Finally, it proposes a robust conceptual framework of 
analysis (or theoretical lens) to apply the ‘security dilemma’ to view United 
States–China security relations, and describes the gaps in the existing lit-
erature this book will address.
PercePtIons, MIsPercePtIons, and the securIty 
dIleMMa
Robert Jervis contributed a significant amount of theoretical depth and 
intellectual rigor to the security dilemma concept. Jervis broadly agreed 
with Herz and Butterfield that the security dilemma is fundamentally 
structural in nature, but that additional ‘nonstructural’ factors (espe-
cially psychological and cognitive) interplay with the core structural reg-
ulators, and can intensify (or mitigate) the dilemma—making conflict 
and war more or less likely to occur.14 According to Jervis, ‘one state’s 
gain in security often inadvertently threatens others’.15 These ‘nonstruc-
tural’ factors are best understood as ‘regulators’ of the security dilem-
ma’s intensity, as opposed to underlying causes of the condition.16 That 
is, one state’s security gain can inadvertently cause another state to feel 
less secure due to the structural conditions of anarchy and uncertainty in 
the international system. Jervis’s ideas and insights related to decision-
makers’ perceptual biases, and attempt to signal strategic intentions in 
IR will feature prominently in the theoretical framework of analysis 
applied in this book to view contemporary United States–China security 
relations.17
By emphasizing the importance of perception and misperceptions of 
state intentions in shaping the states’ foreign policy decisions, Jervis dif-
ferentiated himself from the main schools of realism at the time. Scholar 
Jack Snyder highlighted three of Jervis’s most durable contributions to 
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security dilemma theorizing.18 First, Jervis demonstrated how the intensity 
of the security dilemma is conditioned by two key considerations: (1) 
whether defense is easier and cheaper (or defensive-dominant) compared 
to the offense (or offensive-dominant); and, closely related, (2) the extent 
to which the offensive and defensive weapons are distinguishable.19 That 
is, in situations where it is cheaper and easier for states to emphasize the 
defensive, and where this posture is clearly distinguishable from offensive 
alternatives, the dilemma is less intense. Conversely, where the offense is 
dominant the security dilemma is more intense and conflict is more likely.20
Second, and inspired by the insights of Thomas Schelling, Jervis’s 
research into ‘strategic bargaining’ played an important role in the wider 
discourse pertaining to signaling and perception bias, in particular, the 
impact of these factors on the nature and intensity of the security dilemma.21 
According to Jervis,
[j]ust as actors need to predict what others will do, so they also want others 
to make desirable predictions about their own behavior; actors not only 
perceive others, they signal in order to project images, which may be either 
true or false.22
In a recent interview Jervis opined that ‘signaling doesn’t have any impact 
except for perception … you have to design your signals in terms of how 
you think others will perceive them’.23 Or put another way, as a result of 
perceptual biases actors are prone to overestimate the extent to which an 
adversary’s aggressive behavior is a manifestation of malign intent, and 
underestimate the extent to which these actions are a reaction to their own 
policies and postures.
Third, a seminal insight from Jervis’s work on perceptions in interna-
tional politics is that while a state’s words and deeds may reveal (or infer) 
something important about the state, it is often not clear ‘exactly what is 
being revealed, what is intended to be revealed, and what others will think 
is being revealed’.24 Thus, the failure of actors to accurately ‘get into the 
minds of others’ often causes states to misperceive how others are likely to 
interpret their words and deeds. Jervis described this phenomenon as the 
inability to ‘recognize that one’s own actions could be seen as menacing 
[or malign intent] and the concomitant belief that the other’s hostility can 
only be explained by its aggressiveness’.25 As a corollary, while states tend 
to view their own actions as perfectly reasonable and benign, others may 
perceive them as otherwise.26 Put another way, policy-makers tend to see 




a familiar analytical prism of preexisting beliefs, informed by stereotyped 
lessons of history, analogies, and other routine scripts—which offer short-
cuts in making determinations under uncertainty.
aMelIoratIng and MItIgatIng securIty 
dIleMMa dynaMIcs
Scholars of various theoretical stripes have generally agreed that the secu-
rity dilemma is an inescapable condition in world politics, and at best can 
only be ameliorated or mitigated.27 Defensive realists broadly agree that 
the condition does not necessarily result in conflict and war between states; 
rather a variety of ‘material regulators’ can alleviate the dilemma, and, in 
turn, increase the prospects for cooperation and stability.28 These ‘material 
regulators’ include the offense–defense balance (and ability to differenti-
ate between them); geographical proximity; access to raw materials; global 
economic balances; regional and bipolar military balances of power; and 
the ability of states to extract resources from territorial expansion.29 We 
can supplement this core list with an additional three regulators: (1) the 
‘asymmetric’ distribution of military power; (2) external allies and alli-
ances; and (3) the mixing of ethnic groups.30
It is noteworthy that there has been limited research conducted on the 
implications of a security dilemma under the conditions of an asymmetrical 
(or unequal) distribution of military power between states.31 The idea of an 
asymmetrical distribution of military power as a regulator of the security 
dilemma features prominently in this book to elucidate the United States–
China asymmetric military relationship during the Obama presidency. 
Before explaining this discourse we must first delineate the underlying 
causes of the security dilemma, from the various (material and psychologi-
cal) regulators of the condition. These ‘regulators’ in important ways can 
affect the intensity of security dilemma; in isolation, however, they cannot 
cause a ‘security dilemma’. Ipso facto, the absence of these regulators does 
not necessarily mean that a security dilemma is not present.32
MIsuses, aMbIguItIes, and confusIng seMantIcs
While this book makes the case for the continued relevance of the security 
dilemma to explain the deterioration in United States–China security rela-
tions during the Obama presidency, it remains cognizant of the various 
theoretical limitations associated with the use of this concept to interpret 
contemporary interstate relations. Scholars have warned of the analytical 
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hazards associated with the liberal usage of the security dilemma, including 
the concept of ‘security’ itself.33 Arnold Wolfers argued that ‘security’ is an 
inherently ambiguous concept that encompasses objective and subjective 
elements.34 Theoretical discourses on the nature of ‘security’ in IR have 
generally centered on several key themes: What is the object of a particular 
security policy (states, individuals, and regimes)? What values do these 
various objects consider most important? And, what is required to make 
states feel secure enough?
Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler highlighted several analytical conun-
drums to illustrate the challenges faced by scholars in conceptualizing the 
security dilemma35: What state (even defenders of the status quo) given 
the opportunity and means is not expansionist (or ‘greedy’)? Given the 
complexities and uncertainties in actors’ motives, together with the likeli-
hood of misperception in IR, how can one know for sure whether a state 
is a genuine ‘security seeker’? Under the conditions of structural anarchy 
in IR, how can states be truly benign? And, related to this, how can schol-
ars reconcile situations in IR where states behave as predominately ‘status 
quo’, and simultaneously pursue expansionist policies?36 To be sure, 
historically few states have been completely satisfied with any particular 
status quo and have generally sought ways and means to improve their 
relative position within the international political system—especially when 
the perceived costs of doing so are low.37 Indeed, states may pursue expan-
sionist policies as a means to achieve security-seeking ends; thus, these 
strategic goals are not necessarily diametrically opposed. Furthermore, 
other factors will likely complicate the ability of states to determine 
whether a predominately ‘security-seeking’ state simultaneously harbors 
malign intentions; for example, if the defender of the status quo perceives 
that an adversary’s relative power is on the rise; if there are military- 
technological advancements; and if diverging opinions exist on what con-
stitutes the prevailing ‘status quo’—all of which were present in the 
Sino–American security relationship under the Obama administration.
the securIty dIleMMa and unIted states–chIna 
relatIons
The application of the security dilemma by scholars and policy-makers to 
elucidate United States–China security relations in the post–Cold War era 




discourse.38 This discourse can be traced back to the early 1990s, and is 
closely correlated to China’s rapid economic and military capacity expan-
sion that marked this period.39 During this time, it became conventional 
wisdom among Western-centric scholars that once its military and 
economic power had sufficiently matured, China was intent on becoming 
a regional hegemonic power.40 For example, in 2000, the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DoD) stated that China ‘wants to become the preeminent 
Asian power … among regional states in East Asia’.41 Scholar John 
Mearsheimer predicted that in an effort to force the United States out of 
Asia, Beijing would likely implement its own version of the Monroe 
Doctrine.42
In the immediate aftermath of the 2008–2009 financial crisis, refer-
ences to the ‘China threat’, and especially to a ‘new assertiveness’ in 
Chinese foreign policy, noticeably increased.43 The global financial crisis 
did appear to mark a key turning point in Beijing’s conceptualization of 
China’s ascending position within the hierarchy of global powers,44 giving 
rise to a bolder and more confident foreign policy posture, especially in 
regional maritime disputes.45 Several observers attributed this apparent 
aggressive policy shift to a perception in Beijing that China’s relative 
power (or polarity) vis-à-vis the United States in the Asia-Pacific had sig-
nificantly narrowed in the aftermath of the financial crash. Chinese 
President Xi Jinping’s ‘new model of great power relations’ clearly reflected 
this perception, and Beijing’s broader efforts to legitimize its rise to global 
(or at least regional) great power status—or a Chinese ‘grand strategy’.46 
Notwithstanding the existence of debate as to the extent and magnitude 
of this apparent revisionist lurch, the notion of this shift became widely 
accepted currency within the U.S. defense and scholarly communities.47 
Irrespective of whether the emergence of this ‘new assertiveness’ meme 
accurately reflected the prevailing relative United States–China power par-
ity, perception, in this case, became ‘reality’.48 That is, there was irrefut-
able evidence that China had become simultaneously the key engine of 
economic growth in Asia, as well as one of the region’s major sources of 
strategic insecurity.49
From the evolution of the ‘China rise’ discourse, we can identify three 
broad themes which typified the use of the security dilemma to character-
ize contemporary United States–China security relations. First is the 
narrowing of the public discourse on Chinese foreign policy caused by the 
amplification (or arguably exaggeration) of the ‘China threat’, which 
reduced Washington’s diplomatic flexibility in managing complex bilateral 
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relations with Beijing, and created a self-fulfilling security dilemma.50 
Moreover, exaggerated characterizations of China as a revisionist power 
harboring aggressive and expansionist regional ambitions could also 
heighten levels of uncertainty and anxiety in the Asia-Pacific, worsen 
strategic instability, and trigger spirals of mistrust, arms racing, and secu-
rity dilemmas.51 Therefore, it behooves Washington to ensure that these 
characterizations are grounded in clear evidence and not made errone-
ously, lightly, or irresponsibly.52 Arguably, the United States–China security 
dilemma deteriorated not because of events and situations both sides 
actually faced, but rather because of the promulgation of these kinds of 
amplified memes. IR scholars have described this situation as the inability 
of states to ‘signal type’, that is, the inability of states to signal benign 
strategic intentions through reassurances or conciliation, due to the pro-
pensity of actors to reject or simply ignore these gestures.53
A good case in point was the U.S. think-tank community’s’ analysis of 
China’s alleged ‘militarization’ of the South China Sea.54 Specifically, 
suppositions inferred from Chinese construction projects that deploy-
ments of military assets (e.g. combat aircraft and mobile missile launchers) 
to the disputed islands (especially the Spratly Islands) could be expected in 
the near future, which implied that Beijing intended to use these strategic 
outposts as a means to extend its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zone 
(or exclusive zone) to achieve aggressive and expansionist ends. In his 
congressional testimony, U.S. Pacific Command’s Commander Admiral 
Harry Harris asserted: ‘China has fundamentally altered the physical and 
political landscape in the South China Sea through large-scale land recla-
mation and by militarizing these reclaimed features.’55 For China did not 
consider deployments of ‘defensive’ military installations as ‘militariza-
tion’, but rather a necessary response to U.S. naval Freedom of Navigation 
(FONOPs) exercises, and other provocative intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) activities close to China’s coastline. In short, the 
amplification of United States–China divergences over what was meant by 
‘militarization’ caused both sides to perceive the other as engaging in 
 ‘militarizing’ activities, which in turn increased regional strategic instability 
and intensified the United States–China security dilemma.
Second, scholars have debated the extent to which Washington or 
Beijing recognized (or even acknowledged) the presence of a ‘security 
dilemma’.56 The dilemma is intensified when states fail to recognize one 




demonstrate empathy—or ‘security dilemma sensibility’.57 Scholar Alastair 
Iain Johnston argued that he problem for Asia-Pacific security was not only 
about China’s rise. Rather, the problem is the existence of a United States–
China ‘security dilemma’, and thus the solution, lies in understanding the 
‘mutual constitution’ of the ‘China threat’ (perceived by the United 
States) and the ‘U.S. threat’ (perceived by China).58
Third, since the late 1990s, several prominent IR scholars have applied 
the security dilemma to explain how several geopolitical flashpoints in the 
Asia-Pacific evolved and deleteriously impacted United States–China secu-
rity relations; for example, Beijing’s so-called new assertiveness in the dis-
puted East and South China Seas59; A2/AD strategy in China’s near sea; 
Beijing’s hostility toward U.S. missile defense program in Asia; and the 
dichotomous interpretation of what constituted the ‘status quo’ in the 
Taiwan Straits.60 Scholars broadly agreed that the existence of a security 
dilemma led to the promulgation (by both sides) of military policies that 
worsened United States–China strategic stability, and elicited the kind of 
arms racing and worst-case scenario (and zero-sum) defense planning 
closely associated with a deteriorating security dilemma.61
a concePtual fraMework to VIew unIted states–
chIna relatIons: ‘the bhJ forMulatIon’
Firmly grounded in the seminal insights of the security dilemma theory’s 
founding fathers—Hubert Butterfield, John Herz, and Robert Jervis (or 
‘The BHJ Formulation’)—the case study chapters synthesize the con-
cept’s core assumptions and features.62 By rigorously defining the essen-
tial features (or preconditions) and the key nonessential features (i.e. 
causes, regulators, and possible outcomes) of the security dilemma, this 
framework enables us to validate the existence of a genuine United 
States–China security dilemma, and, in turn, elucidates the nature and 
causality of this competitive (yet pivotal) security relationship. The con-
ceptual framework applied in the studies assumes that the security 
dilemma is conditional; that is, no matter how powerfully other (nones-
sential) features operate, if all of the essential features are not present, a 
‘genuine’ security dilemma cannot exist.63 As a corollary, in a situation 
where either one of both states harbor malign intentions toward the 
other, a security dilemma is not present.64
 CONCEPTUALIZING THE UNITED STATES–CHINA SECURITY DILEMMA 
jamessjohnson@hotmail.com
24 
Essential Features of a Security Dilemma
• Structural anarchy in IR: the inescapable uncertainties that exist 
under structural anarchy in IR, which causes fear, uncertainty, and 
‘self-help’ (e.g. bandwagoning) responses by states.
• Accumulation of power: states respond to the uncertainty and fear in 
IR by accumulating ‘power’ (especially weapons) as a means of self-
protection (or defense). These capabilities will invariably contain 
offensive elements, which due to the prevalence of ‘dual-use’ technol-
ogies may not be easily distinguishable from defensive capabilities.
• Nonmalign strategic intentions: the security dilemma is uninten-
tional in nature, and thus can only exist between states that both 
desire security, and without the intention of threatening others with 
expansionist and aggressive words or deeds.
Nonessential Features: Or Security Dilemma Dynamics
• Under structural anarchy in IR, actors cannot be certain of others’ 
present or future intentions, which tends to exacerbate states’ threat 
perceptions.
• The security dilemma is often self-reinforcing and self-fulfilling, and 
may lead to arms racing and war.
• These dynamics also have a tendency to produce self-defeating out-
comes: states formulate policies designed to increase their own ‘secu-
rity’, which inadvertently shifts the relative distribution of power 
between states (or polarity), and reduces the security for all.
• Arms racing dynamics may lead to inadvertent and accidental con-
flict and war.
• Structural (or material) and psychological regulators can affect (or 
mitigate) the intensity of the security dilemma, but cannot eliminate 
the condition entirely.
concePtual caVeats and lIMItatIons
Notwithstanding the robustness of the ‘BHJ Formulation’, the itineration 
of a few important caveats at this stage is, however, beneficial. First, given 
that structural anarchy and some accumulation of power usually (if not 
always) is present in IR, ipso facto the existence of nonmalign intent on 
both sides constitutes the key variable in determining whether a situation 




analytical conundrum of how decision-makers can accurately determine 
the real nature of states’ intentions—or the problem of ‘getting into the 
minds of others’. Moreover, the fact that states’ motives and intentions 
will likely shift over time, influenced by the ebb and flow of domestic- 
political agendas, compounds this issue. In addressing this problem, IR 
scholars have identified several means by which states can determine the 
strategic intentions of others.66 The most obvious is simply to observe 
how a state behaves (its words and deeds) in response to events or policies, 
and extrapolating from these responses to recognize its underlying inten-
tions. Alternatively, an actor may signal benign intent (e.g. policies of reas-
surance or conciliation) and use responses to these signals as a baseline to 
determine an adversary’s intentions.67
The security dilemma concept has proven highly accommodative to a 
broad range of related IR situations and theories, including deterrence, 
offense–defense, arm racing, arms control, power transition, and polarity 
theories; accidental, inadvertent, preemptive, preventative, and ‘asymmet-
ric’ (or hybrid) warfare68; ethnic conflict; social constructivism; foreign 
policy analysis; and psychological and cognitive IR subfields. Scholar 
Lawrence Freedman cautioned against inconsistent and over-expansive 
use of concepts and theories to accommodate situations in world affairs, 
which risks draining these ideas of any meaning or specificity.69 In the case 
of the security dilemma, scholars and policy-makers have often omitted 
one or more of the concept’s essential features (especially nonmalign 
intent), confusing the possible outcomes of the dilemma (i.e. spirals of mis-
trust, arms racing, and war) with its causes.70 Cognizant of these kinds of 
conceptual pitfalls, the case studies approach Sino–American security rela-
tions during the Obama presidency with a clear understanding of the secu-
rity dilemma’s causes, assumptions, regulators, possible outcomes, and 
interplay with other IR theoretical approaches.
addressIng gaPs In the exIstIng lIterature
This book extends and builds on the empirical base used in the security 
dilemma concept to view United States–China security relations under the 
Obama administration; in particular, it contributes to the scholarly under-
standing of how this approach is relevant for security dilemma theorizing. 
Furthermore, this book also builds on the relatively under-theorized 
discourse that considers the United States–China ‘asymmetric’ military 
balance of power (and ‘asymmetric’ weapons) in the Asia-Pacific as a 
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possible regulator of the security dilemma.71 Specifically, the book 
addresses the several empirical and theoretical gaps in the literature:
• To what extent does the intensity of security dilemma vary between 
the military domains, and what accounts for these variations?
• Are there particular features unique (or mutually exclusive) to a par-
ticular domain, which make the security dilemma more or less 
relevant?
• Finally, does a more integrative (or holistic) analytical approach to 
view the various military arenas generate a particular set of security 
dilemma dynamics, which may not otherwise have existed?72
The literature in security and strategic studies that have empirically 
tested material with the security dilemma concept has been relatively lim-
ited, in particular, that which has used Chinese sources.73 This book 
engages widely with Chinese sources to establish a robust understanding 
of how Beijing perceived its strategic environment, which crucially influ-
enced the evolution of China’s military doctrine and strategic goals. Next, 
the case studies contextualize these perceptions to highlight and explain 
Washington’s misunderstandings of Beijing’s intentions, caused by misin-
terpretations and misperceptions—in the presence of a security dilemma. 
In addition to expanding the empirical base that pertains to the security 
dilemma, this book also builds on the relatively under-theorized discourse 
that considers the United States–China asymmetric military balance of 
power in the Asia-Pacific as a possible regulator of the dilemma. Finally, 
the studies reflect on the implications for the security dilemma of the fail-
ure of states to treat the distinction between others’ military capabilities 
and intentions for the requisite attention.
notes
1. The terms ‘motives’ and ‘intentions’ have generally been used in an inter-
changeable manner by IR scholars, but in the context of the security dilemma 
states’ motives refer to the actual drivers of their responses to events, while 
states’ intentions relate to the actual behavior or policy prescriptions.
2. Throughout this book the terms ‘states’ and ‘actors’ together with ‘adver-
sary’ and ‘defender’ (or ‘status quo state’) are used to refer to the relation-
ship between states in the international system. These terms do not 
necessarily imply a state of conflict or that war is imminent, or that a par-




3. The ‘status quo’ (or a ‘status quo state’) is a term frequently used by Power 
Transition Theory (PTT) IR scholars to describe states that consider the 
international system of states (and international law) as integral features of 
the international system which need to be upheld and defended. Actors 
who hold the opposite view are termed ‘revisionists’ (or revisionist states). 
The term can also relate to a broad range of nonsecurity areas such as eco-
nomic and trade relations. To be sure, states may be dissatisfied with the 
status quo in the ‘security’ domain, while they are satisfied with ‘nonsecu-
rity’ relations. This book will focus specifically on the concept of ‘status 
quo’ (and ‘status quo states’) in the context of the United States–China 
military balance in the Asia-Pacific.
4. The ‘benign’ and ‘greedy’ or nongreedy concept in this context refers to 
particular states’ behavior within the international community, and, specifi-
cally, whether a state intends to expand and accumulate power motivated 
by security seeking; or instead driven by aggressive and expansionist for-
eign policies and military doctrines. See, Glaser, C. (1997). The security 
dilemma revisited. World Politics, 50(1), 171–201.
5. For the purposes of clarity, this book differentiates between the ‘security 
dilemma concept’ (or the security dilemma theory and theorizing) and 
‘security dilemma dynamics’. The former denotes a particular condition in 
IR, while the latter, the various possible causes, conceptual assumptions, 
regulators, and implications of this condition between states. Tang, S. 
(2009). The security dilemma: A conceptual analysis. Security Studies, 
18(3), 587–623.
6. Booth, K., & Wheeler, N.J. (2008). The security dilemma: Fear, coopera-
tion, and trust world politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan, Chap. 2.
7. During his pioneering research on the subject in the 1960s, Thomas 
Schelling highlighted the significance of this subtle interplay, which con-
ceptualized the ‘power to hurt’ and as ‘a kind of bargaining power’. 
Schelling, T.C. (1966). Arms and influence. London; New Haven: Yale 
University Press.
8. From a political science perspective, the use of the term ‘anarchy’ refers to 
an absence of an international political authority that is separate from and 
superseding sovereign states. There has been some debate among IR theo-
rists relating to the nature of the link between anarchy, the security 
dilemma, and war. Several scholars have challenged the notion that anarchy 
in IR necessarily results in security dilemmas and conflict. See Trachtenberg, 
M. (1991). History and strategy. Oxford; Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press; Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The 
social construction of power politics. International Organization, 46(2), 
391–425. Kydd, A. (1997). Sheep in sheep’s clothing: Why security seek-
ers do not fight each other. Security Studies, 7(1), 114–155.
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9. Security dilemmas also exist in other non-IR contexts where anarchical 
conditions have been established such as environmental climate debates; 
ethnic conflicts; and even some areas of International Political Economy 
(IPE), for example currency wars and tariff negotiations. See Posen, B.R. 
(1993). The security dilemma and ethnic conflict. Survival, 35(1), 22–47; 
Brown, M.E. (1993). Ethnic conflict and international security. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press; Wheeler, N.J. (2014). Interview with 
Robert Jervis. International Relations, 28(4), 479–504.
10. Herz, J.H. (1950). Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma. 
World Politics, 2(2), 157–180.
11. Herz, J.H. (1951). Political realism and political idealism: A study in theo-
ries and realities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 15.
12. Butterfield, H. (1951). History and human relations. London: Collins, 20. 
Herz originally posited that security dilemmas were all pervasive, but in his 
later writings, he refuted Butterfield’s position that the security dilemma 
was the root cause of all human conflict. Thus, for Herz the security 
dilemma was a cause, but not the only possible cause of war.
13. Ibid., 21.
14. Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception international politics. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chap. 3. In this pioneering 
text, Jervis discusses the interaction between the structure features that 
exist in the international system (especially anarchy and uncertainty), with 
the perceptions held by actors in the system.
15. The conceptual framework used by Jervis in this seminal paper on the secu-
rity dilemma draws on Rousseau’s ideas on the ‘Stag Hunt’ and ‘Prisoner’s 
Dilemma’ games. Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security 
dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214.
16. Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception international politics 
(pp. 74–77). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
17. Several scholars have noted, however, that Jervis did not adequately address 
the issue of the extent to which these cognitive and perceptual factors out-
weigh, or offset, the structural anarchical ones. See Glaser, C. (1997). The 
security dilemma revisited. World Politics, 50(1), 171–201.
18. Snyder, J.L. (2014). Both fox and hedgehog: The art of nesting structural 
and perceptual perspectives. In J. Davis (Ed.), Psychology, strategy and con-
flict: Perceptions of insecurity in international relations (pp.  13–24). 
New York, NY: Routledge.
19. Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 
30(2), 167–214.
20. See Glaser, C. (1992). Political consequences of military strategy: 
Expanding and refining the spiral and deterrence models. World Politics, 




critics. Security Studies, 4(4), 660–691; Lieber, K. (2000). Grasping the 
technological peace: The offense-defense balance and international 
security. International Security, 25(1), 71–104.
21. Snyder, J.L. (2014). Both fox and hedgehog: The art of nesting structural 
and perceptual perspectives. In J. Davis (Ed.), Psychology, strategy and con-
flict: Perceptions of insecurity in international relations (pp.  13–24). 
New York, NY: Routledge. Jervis distinguished between actors whose per-
ceptions are either emotionally driven (‘motivated’) or more cognitively 
influenced (‘nonmotivated’). He stated that ‘the former derive from the 
need to maintain psychological well-being and a desired self-image; the 
latter from the need for short-cuts to rationality … [conditioned by] com-
plex and ambiguous information’. In his more recent research, Jervis 
added a caveat: the influences and drivers of motivated and cognitive influ-
ences are hard to separate. Jervis, R. (2002). Signaling and perception. In 
K.R. Monroe (Ed.), Political psychology (pp. 293–314). NJ: Earlbaum.
22. Ibid., 202.
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24. Jervis, R. (2002). Signaling and perception. In K.R.  Monroe (Ed.), 
Political psychology (pp. 293–314). NJ: Earlbaum.
25. Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception international politics. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 75.
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War to illustrate self-images and perceptual bias in IR. See Garthoff, R.L. 
(1994). Detente and confrontation: American-soviet relations from Nixon to 
Reagan. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
27. Neoliberal IR scholars argue that the existence of ‘democratic political 
structures’ can maintain peace between states, precisely because they are 
able to alleviate the security dilemma. See Weinberger, S. (2003). 
Institutional signaling and the origins of the cold war. Security Studies, 
12(4), 80–115. Constructivist IR theorists argue that the dilemma is just 
one of the available avenues by which states—through a process of shifting 
identities—can influence the nature of anarchy in IR.  See Wendt, A. 
(1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power 
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CHAPTER 3
Washington’s Perceptions and Misperceptions 
of China’s Anti-access Area Denial ‘Strategy’
IntroductIon
This chapter builds on the current (albeit limited) literature that elucidates 
the driving forces behind Washington’s perceptions and interpretations of 
the Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenge in East Asia.1 In 
particular, it focuses on the strategic ambiguities associated with A2/AD 
that provided fertile ground for U.S. misperceptions of Chinese strategic 
intentions to grow. A central contribution of this case study is to demon-
strate Washington’s perceptions of Chinese A2/AD-operated and A2/
AD-influenced U.S. defense planning in the Asia-Pacific. The conclusions 
reached in this chapter, in particular, U.S. misperceptions and strategic 
ambiguities associated with Chinese A2/AD, are framed by the theoretical 
assumptions associated with the security dilemma concept, as well as sev-
eral closely related cognitive psychology subfields used by scholars to fur-
ther their understanding of contemporary United States–China security 
relations.2
Since the 1990s, China’s military has been transformed into a more 
professional and capable fighting force. U.S. defense analysts have become 
increasingly concerned that the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) newly 
acquired A2/AD capabilities could put at risk vital U.S. military assets and 
platforms (or the U.S. ‘infrastructure of command’) in the Asia-Pacific 
region, which U.S. forward forces require to bring its force projection 
power to bear.3 China’s multifaceted and increasingly integrated and 
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sophisticated A2/AD capabilities have been interpreted by several defense 
analysts as a harbinger of a broader strategic challenge to Washington’s 
power projection capacity, its military freedoms (or its ‘command of the 
commons’), and the ‘American way of war’.4 As international relations 
(IR) scholars have opined, the security dilemma between states is more 
intense when one side significantly increases its defense spending and 
capabilities, and, simultaneously, acquires enhanced force projection 
capabilities—both of which China has done since the late 1990s.5
This chapter provides a rigorous assessment of the key driving forces 
behind U.S. perceptions of Chinese strategic intentions related to A2/
AD. What is Beijing seeking to achieve through its military modernization 
efforts, and why is it seeking to achieve it? What are the key assumptions, 
drivers, and strategic calculations underlying Beijing’s military goals? 
Scholars, defense analysts, and policy-makers alike have actively sought 
answers to these questions. To be sure, responses to these questions, and 
in particular the critical assumptions underlying these responses, will have 
significant implications for the future of U.S. strategic calculations and 
force postures in Asia, United States–China relations, and regional peace 
and stability.
Washington’s military response to the perceived challenges and strate-
gic ambiguities posed by A2/AD has been most closely associated with 
the air–sea Battle (ASB) operational concept (renamed JAM-GC in 2015), 
which was calibrated to signal deterrence to Beijing, secure the regional 
status quo, and hedge against the risk that Washington’s worst-case 
scenario expectations could actually be realized.6 However, in prescribing 
a battle plan specifically designed to address the A2/AD ‘military problem 
set’, the ASB authors’ implicitly cast China as a revisionist rising power 
harboring ‘malign’ (i.e. expansionist or aggressive) intent. The action–
reaction policy dynamics and spirals of mistrust, and arms racing attributed 
to ASB perceptibly worsened United States–China security relations—and 
reduced the security for both sides.7
This case study elucidates the propensity of the U.S. defense community 
to conflate Chinese A2/AD capabilities with explicit proof of the existence 
of a coherent and homogeneous strategy and doctrine underwriting these 
weapons, to fulfill the requirements of particular missions—and that con-
ceptualized the United States as the primary (if not the only) target. It 
argues that defense analysts by overlooking (or deemphasizing) Chinese 




pure material capabilities, have reinforced U.S. bureaucratic biases and 
‘mirror-imaging’ propensities. Extrapolations from Chinese A2/AD 
capabilities—grounded in a fundamentally non-Chinese framework of 
analysis—constituted a critical component in Washington’s assessment of 
the trajectory of Beijing’s strategic intentions. As a corollary, the critical 
assumptions underlying these assessments has resulted in misperceptions 
of the nature and evolution of Chinese military doctrine and strategic 
intentions vis-à-vis the United States, in particular, how this operational 
framework will guide and inform Beijing in the use of military force in 
future wars in the Asia-Pacific.
Notwithstanding the fact that several Chinese A2/AD capabilities do 
appear (or have the ability) to directly target the United States in the 
region, possession of these capabilities does not necessarily confer strategic 
intent—malign or otherwise. It is important to note that any military 
prognosis related to the ASB versus A2/AD debate is concerned more 
with the future military balance and cross-domain warfare in the Western 
Pacific.8 Thus, determining for sure the accuracy of the worst-case sce-
nario, assumptions that underpinned ASB will be decided by the long- 
term potential and evolution of emerging military technologies; military 
doctrine; weapon procurements; and the trajectory of regional strategic 
competition and geopolitical change. This case study, by removing the 
burden of proof associated with determining whether Beijing intends to 
exclude the United States from areas of the Western Pacific, focuses on the 
critical U.S. framing assumptions (or analytical baselines) themselves, 
which have left ample scope for misperceptions confounded by institu-
tional cognitive biases.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it highlights the major driving 
forces underlying U.S. threat perceptions associated with Chinese A2/AD 
capabilities. Second, it unpacks some of the strategic ambiguities and 
uncertainties related to China’s ‘active defense’ core strategic concept, and 
a Chinese doctrinal penchant for the use of early and preemptive strikes. 
Third, it considers the nature, extent, and assumptions driving U.S. 
misperceptions of Chinese strategic intentions to demonstrate how these 
cognitive biases influenced U.S. military policy vis-à-vis China. Finally, it 
ties in the chapter’s central themes to briefly reflect on implications for 
United States–China crisis stability and military escalation control for 
future conflict or crisis, which pits Chinese A2/AD against ASB in the 
Asia-Pacific.
 WASHINGTON’S PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S… 
jamessjohnson@hotmail.com
40 
WashIngton’s heIghtened threat PercePtIons 
and chIna’s exIstentIal a2/ad challenge
Chinese A2/AD capabilities have increasingly been perceived by 
Washington as a potential challenge to U.S. military freedom, putting at 
risk the core features of the U.S. military and defense architecture in East 
Asia—the lynchpin of Washington’s power projection since the end of the 
Cold War. These features have enabled the United States to fulfill its 
regional treaty commitments and sustain a relatively unfettered freedom 
of navigation in the Western Pacific, comprising a vital component of 
America’s global ‘command of the commons’.9 The Department of 
Defense (DoD) has conceptualized Chinese A2/AD capabilities in the 
following way: ‘anti-access’ strategies and capabilities (e.g. precision- 
guided ballistic, and cruise antiship weapons) are designed to delay or pre-
vent an adversary from entering into a region of conflict; ‘area denial’ 
strategies and capabilities (e.g. advanced air defense networks and guided 
rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles) are designed to restrict the freedom 
of action of an adversary once it is in a theater of operations.10 These con-
cepts have been used interchangeably to characterize China’s efforts to 
prevent the United States from intervening militarily in a Taiwan Straits 
contingency.11
A broad survey of U.S. empirical sources relating to Chinese A2/AD 
capabilities reveals several key themes that illustrate how Washington 
conceptualized the A2/AD challenge. Although the A2/AD concept is 
not a Chinese strategic term per se—the term is seldom found in offi-
cial Chinese military sources—several seminal features associated with 
the concept enable this study to establish a critical analytical baseline to 
compare Washington’s A2/AD strategic construct with Beijing’s mili-
tary doctrinal preferences, and broader strategic goals. For this pur-
pose, we can identify eight overarching themes that had an outsized 
impact on U.S. assessments of Beijing’s strategic intentions. This 
approach enables a more robust case to be made for the deterioration 
of United States–China security relations in the Asia-Pacific, caused by 
U.S. misinterpretations of Chinese intentions and compounded by 
cognitive bias, strategic ambiguity, and limited Chinese military trans-





• Beijing’s military modernization is primarily concerned with restrict-
ing access and the freedom of movement to U.S. forward forces 
operating in a ‘contested zone’ in and around China’s periphery.12
• A2/AD ‘strategy’ is predicated on keeping U.S. forces at bay 
primarily by deploying long-range precision cruise and ballistic 
missiles—which the U.S. DoD anticipates will soon be capable of 
reaching U.S. bases in Guam.13
• A2/AD capabilities primarily target U.S. overseas military bases, 
weapons systems, and platforms—especially naval carrier strike 
groups.
• A2/AD capabilities fulfill primarily wartime objectives, but particu-
lar aspects also have peacetime applications—notably cyberspace, 
space, and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.
• A2/AD is institutionalized at a strategic level and integrated into 
Beijing’s broader national security strategic calculus, that is China’s 
comprehensive national power (CNP).
• A2/AD capabilities and guiding doctrines are asymmetric in nature. 
In this context, ‘asymmetry’ is defined relative to U.S. regional mili-
tary primacy. During Beijing’s 2015 Victory Day Parade the Dongfeng 
DF-21D antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) was described by Chinese 
state media as an ‘assassin’s mace for maritime asymmetric warfare’.14
• A2/AD capabilities emphasize advanced long-range missile strike 
capabilities, in particular, the use of ‘asymmetric’ conventional weap-
ons systems to enhance China’s strategic deterrence.15
• The areas in between and surrounding China’s first and second 
island chains (or China’s ‘near seas’) define the geographical scope 
and focus of the A2/AD ‘strategy’ (Fig. 3.1).16
‘actIve defense’ and chInese strategIc ambIguItIes
The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) authorized doctrinal text The Science 
of Military Strategy (SMS) described the ‘active defense’ concept as a cor-
nerstone in strategic theory, guiding the military modernization efforts of 
successive generations of Chinese leaders.17 At the heart of this principle is 
the premise of ‘striking only after the enemy has struck’ and that when it 
does ‘strike’ China will use offensive operations at all levels of war. According 
to the PLA’s first Deputy Chief of General Staff, General Zhang Qinsheng, 
‘active defense’ is ‘on the whole’ strategically defensive, but ‘on the specifics’ 

































































































































potentially offensive—or uses offensive actions to achieve defensive goals.18 
China’s official National Defense White Papers (from 2002 to 2015) also 
made itinerant references to ‘active defense’. The 2008 White Paper, for 
example, described the concept in the following way:
‘Active defense’ features ‘defensive operations, self-defense and striking and 
getting the better of the enemy only after the enemy has started an attack’.19
Similarly, the SMS summarized this approach as follows:
Strategy (or military strategy) in China’s new periods is taking the national 
comprehensive power as its foundation; [the concept of] active defense as its 
guidance; and winning local war under high-tech conditions as its basic 
[starting] point to construct and exercise military strength … for the purpose 
of protecting national sovereignty and security.20
External analysts are familiar with both the Chinese cult of ‘defense’ 
and the ‘active defense’ concept.21 An area of ongoing debate and contro-
versy, however, relates to the strategic ambiguity caused by how the 
Chinese self-defense principle—enshrined within ‘active defense’—can be 
reconciled with a seemingly contradictory doctrinal emphasis on early and 
preemptive attacks. The use of the self-defense principle in the SMS can in 
part be attributed to Beijing’s desire to be able to claim the legal and 
moral high ground in the event where defensive military force is required. 
It is noteworthy that active defense operation ‘does not require China to 
actually suffer a physical blow … “active defense” provides the basis for pre- 
emptive action’.22 For example, the SMS states as follows:
Under high-tech conditions, for the defensive side, the strategy to gain mas-
tery by striking only after the enemy has struck does not mean waiting for 
enemy’s strike passively … the first shot [early or preemptive strike] on the 
plane of politics and strategy must be differentiated from the first shot on the 
plane of tactics … if any country or organization violates the other country’s 
sovereignty or territorial integrity, the other side will have the right to ‘fire the 
first shot’ … military counterattacks may be taken.23
This passage implies that a significant amount of strategic ambiguity 
exists in what Beijing might consider a sine qua non (or ‘red lines’) for 
violating its ‘sovereignty or territorial integrity’. That is, if any red lines 
were (or were perceived to be) breached, what operational doctrine and 
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escalation ladders would guide Beijing in its decision to order ‘first 
shot(s)’ or preemptive strikes? Moreover, although the SMS stressed that 
the use of preemptive or early strikes should not be ‘expansive and extro-
vert offensive … but strategically defensive’ they did not, however (aside 
from detailing several generic potential targets), elaborate on how at an 
operational level these kinds of military campaigns would be managed or 
controlled.24 Chinese strategic-cultural traditions which emphasized the 
element of surprise, choosing ‘the unexpected time, place, and pattern of 
war which the enemy finds most reluctant and difficult to deal with’, com-
pounded these ambiguities.25 Strategic ambiguities of this kind indubita-
bly complicate the challenge for defense analysts in fathoming how active 
defense might be interpreted by Beijing to guide and inform its strategy 
thinking, operational doctrine, force postures, weapons procurements, 
and training requirements.
WashIngton’s caPacIty-based assessments 
and ProjectIng u.s. strategy
U.S. interpretations of China’s A2/AD ‘strategy’ have been heavily depen-
dent upon identifying particular military capabilities that would be required 
to accomplish A2/AD missions. That is, in the formulation of their assess-
ments U.S. defense analysts have tended to identify specific military capa-
bilities that corroborate the operational prerequisites considered necessary 
for an A2/AD ‘strategy’. As a result, these capabilities were often taken as 
explicit proof of the existence of a coherent operational doctrine, and 
homogeneous strategy. In other words, the PLA’s capabilities have served 
as the starting point (or analytical baseline) for U.S. assessments and inter-
pretations of Chinese strategic intentions—with the use of Chinese empiri-
cal sources used to fill in the gaps where expedient. Analyst Anton Lee 
Wishik posited that ‘extrapolations from Chinese capabilities make up a 
vital component of the U.S. A2/AD assessment of China’s military strat-
egy’.26 To be sure, this kind of reverse engineering does not necessarily 
invalidate the conclusions reached by U.S. defense analysts—many of 
which appear reasonable and accurate.27 Rather, the problem lies with the 
underlying assumptions extrapolated from Chinese A2/AD military capa-





While China has acquired—and is actively in the process of developing—
military capabilities that could accomplish A2/AD missions, for now at 
least, the PLA lacks a sufficiently mature operational doctrine to effectively 
integrate and guide an A2/AD ‘strategy’. If such a coherent operational 
doctrine had existed, one would expect to have seen evidence of its impact 
upon military procurements and training requirements, together with 
reports of these activities in official PLA press announcements—if only for 
the purpose of publicly justifying the fiscal outlay for these acquisitions. 
Furthermore, a mature operating doctrine would also be required to guide 
military commanders in use of A2/AD weapons for deterrence signaling, 
which did not appear to be the case.28 For example, the evidence indicated 
that China’s submarine fleet (a core component of A2/AD) was seldom 
deployed for deterrence-signaling operations—with the possible excep-
tion of the surfacing of a Song attack submarine near the U.S. Kitty Hawk 
carrier in 2006.29 In 2015, the DoD reported that the PLA Navy (PLAN) 
commenced its first nuclear-armed submarine (SSBM) deterrence patrol 
(or ‘continuous at sea deterrence’ operations), which signaled to potential 
adversaries (especially the United States) China’s first credible second 
strike capacity.30
Scholar Stephen Biddle argued that military capabilities alone say very 
little about states’ underlying strategic intentions (or military power), 
unless capabilities are integrated into states’ military doctrine, to harness 
its strengths and minimize its weaknesses.31 Scholars have long recognized 
that differences in military doctrine, operating frameworks, and strategic 
cultures can lead to misperceptions and misunderstandings between 
states.32 By placing an undue emphasis on material measures (i.e. numbers 
and technologies) of Chinese A2/AD military capabilities, U.S. defense 
analysts have overlooked Chinese military operational preferences and 
doctrine—which will crucially influence the trajectory of Chinese strategy, 
and indicate (implicitly or explicitly) how and under what conditions 
future warfare will be fought in the Western Pacific.
Capacity-based threat assessments have constituted a long-standing 
methodology applied by the Pentagon; for example, since 2000 the DoD 
has applied this approach in their annual reports to Congress on the 
PLA.33 These include a series of inferences and deductions extrapolated 
from Chinese A2/AD capabilities to determine the nature and likely tra-
jectory of Chinese strategic objectives, and grounded in a United States–
centric analytical framework informed by U.S. military doctrine, 
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organizational and bureaucratic traditions, operating practices, and 
 strategic culture.34 For example, in its 2016 report, the DoD stated the 
following:
China is investing in military programs and weapons designed to improve 
extended-range power projection, anti-access/area denial … [that will] also 
enable the PLA to conduct a range of military operations in Asia beyond 
China’s traditional territorial claims.35
Similarly, the former head of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Willard, 
stated that ‘elements of China’s military modernization appear designed to 
challenge our [U.S.] freedom of action’.36 Finally, in a widely cited and 
‘semi-authorized’ report published by the Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), the authors drew a similar conclusion—
albeit in a more strident tone:
Many of the capabilities the Chinese military is acquiring reflect deliberate 
A2/AD operational approach that is specifically designed to keep [U.S. 
forces] … from approaching close to China. The PRC appears purposefully 
developing and fielding offensive capabilities that challenge U.S. freedom of 
action in all domains.37
Although the language used in these statements (i.e. ‘appears’ and ‘designed’) 
was carefully chosen to soften the diplomatic blow of openly criticizing 
China, the military policy prescriptions that emerged clearly signaled 
to Beijing the following: the United States considered the ‘new’ options 
offered to Beijing from its expanding A2/AD capabilities as an overt 
(offense) challenge, and, in turn, a response to this challenge would come at 
a strategic level. Robert Jervis opined in cases where the offense is dominant, 
especially when the offensive–defensive balance is not clearly distinguish-
able, the security dilemma between states is more intense.38
Several issues have complicated the challenge for U.S. defense analysts 
in their assessments of Chinese A2/AD, which reinforced the (over)reli-
ance on capacity-based worst-case scenario defense planning, exacerbated 
strategic ambiguities, and gave space for misperceptions and cognitive 
biases to grow. First, the lead times associated with the development of 
new and technologically advanced capabilities are relatively long, and new 
programs (e.g. warships and stealth bomber replacements) can often take 




was how Chinese A2/AD might develop in the future. Except for 
contingencies in close proximity to China’s coastline, however, most ana-
lysts anticipate that at least in the near term, U.S. air and sea dominance in 
the Asia-Pacific would remain unchallenged.40 From a theoretical perspec-
tive, the cognitive impact of actors’ expectations of an adversary’s future 
strategic intentions, upon their present perceptions, can be described as 
follows:
The expectations and perceptual mind-set of an actor broadly reflects: ‘esti-
mates of what the world is like [presently] and therefore of what the person 
is likely to be confronted with’, and that these expectations ‘create predisposi-
tions that lead actors to notice certain things, neglect others … [and conse-
quently actors] find it difficult to consider alternatives’.41
Second, the lack of Chinese military transparency and limited access to 
information on several seminal areas of Chinese military affairs include the 
PLA’s command and control structures; stove-piped decision-making pro-
cesses; and dual-use assets. The 2014 DoD report to Congress explicitly 
underscored these concerns:
China’s lack of transparency surrounding it[s] military capabilities and stra-
tegic decision-making has led to increased concerns in the region of China’s 
intentions. The report added that such concerns would likely ‘intensify’ in 
the absence of transparency specifically related to the PLA’s A2/AD mod-
ernization programs.42
Several prominent IR scholars have posited that the extent to which mili-
tary transparency reveals states’ strategic intentions is dependent upon the 
ability to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons; if they are 
not easily distinguishable (especially when ‘dual-use’ technologies are 
involved), states’ intentions will remain uncertain—even if transparency is 
improved.43
In addition to Chinese military opacity, Washington’s China policy also 
restricted defense analysts’ access to potentially high-value information, 
which reinforced the propensity to place undue attention on Chinese 
material capabilities—over its military doctrine and preferences. 
Noteworthy, U.S. restrictions on both National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) and the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP) in collaborating, coordinating, or participating 
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bilaterally with China on space policy significantly reduced the  possibility 
for United States–China cooperation in the space domain.44 Importantly, 
these restrictions denied Washington access to vital military- related infor-
mation on China’s dual-use space industry including the PLA’s standard 
operating procedures, decision-making processes, and organizational 
structures. Improved access to this kind of information may have helped 
address Washington’s significant knowledge gaps in the development of 
Chinese space technologies, and, in turn, could have enabled a more 
robust understanding of Beijing’s strategic intentions in this increasingly 
contested domain. According to Jervis, the failure of actors to actively seek 
new empirical evidence where such information is available and relevant 
constitutes an ‘irrational way’ of processing information, which intensifies 
the security dilemma.45 Moreover, the uncertainty created by the lack of 
information about adversary’s military capacities can exacerbate misper-
ceptions between states, and increase the likelihood of conflict—akin to a 
form of ‘information asymmetry’, that is an insufficient appreciation of an 
adversary’s capabilities and interests.46
The historical record has shown that actors tend to assess an adversary’s 
military capabilities and strategic intentions through an analytical prism 
(or ‘military lens’); shaped by their own military doctrines, organizational, 
bureaucratic traditions, customs, and strategic cultures.47 A wide range of 
complex factors can influence accurate assessments of states’ military capa-
bilities and intentions; and thus, determinations are in large part condi-
tioned by actors’ perceptions of the ‘relative’ military balance. Opacity and 
the inherent ambiguity of weapons in the international system compound 
this analytical challenge, which exacerbates strategic ambiguities and rein-
forces preexisting cognitive biases.48 As a corollary, in all but the most 
unambiguous of sources, new information merely confirms preexisting 
and familiar frameworks of analysis—or the problem of ‘mirror-imaging’.49 
A good case in point of this tendency are extrapolations drawn from the 
Pentagon’s estimates of the strike ranges of Chinese missiles to infer (or 
project) the existence of a Chinese A2/AD ‘strategy’,50 designed to pre-
vent and deter U.S. forces from operating inside of China’s first island 
chain.51 In other words, Chinese weapons that fulfilled the (United States–
defined) operational requirements of A2/AD were taken as explicit proof 
of the existence of a coherent strategy guiding the use of these weapons—





Fig. 3.2 Estimated ranges of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conventional 
anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) ground-based missile capabilities—including the 
DF-21D (or CSS-5) (Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S.  Department of 
Defense. (2011). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic 
of China, 2011. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 31)
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Similarly, defense analysts expressed concern that China’s power 
projection capacity (especially long-range precision-strike missiles [PSMs]) 
could extend out to the ‘second island chain’—circa 3000 km from China 
in a line that connects Guam, Japan, and Papua New Guinea.52 For exam-
ple, the DoD stated that China was ‘seeking the capacity to hold [U.S.] 
surface ships at risk through a layered capability reaching out to [China’s] 
“second island chain”’, offering Beijing ‘pre-emptive and coercive options in 
a regional crisis’.53 This assertion was predicated on the assumption that 
the possession or the development of a capacity to fulfill ‘preemptive and 
coercive’ operations was emblematic of a shift in the trajectory of Chinese 
military doctrine—offensive at both a tactical and strategic level. A central 
argument this chapter makes is that irrespective of the logic or accuracy of 
U.S. ‘A2/AD assessments’ inferences were invariably made before gaining 
a reasonable amount of equivalence with Chinese military doctrine or stra-
tegic concepts. To be sure, a wider range of Chinese sources would have 
enabled analysts to more rigorously apply U.S. A2/AD approximations to 
represent Chinese operational preferences and plans, and, in turn, shift the 
focus away from pure military ‘material’ considerations.
ImPlIcatIons for future mIlItary escalatIon 
control, deterrence, and strategIc stabIlIty 
In the asIa-PacIfIc
The potential implications for future regional crisis stability and escalation 
management as a result of ASB pitted against Chinese A2/AD could be 
exacerbated by several strategic, tactical, and operational features associated 
with these competing concepts: the deployment of offensive- dominant 
capabilities guided by preemptive and early-use operational doctrines; an 
increasing dependence upon (and a tactical preference in the use of) tech-
nologically advanced dual-use military capabilities and systems; the devel-
opment of ‘dual payload’ missile systems, which blurred the traditional 
conventional-nuclear threshold (discussed in Chaps. 5 and 6); a Chinese 
military doctrinal propensity to overstate the effectiveness and utility of 
tactical military signaling, and underestimate the potential escalation risks 
associated with these signals; and finally, a penchant (on both sides) for 
secrecy and strategic ambiguity in the development and accumulation of 
offensive weapons. In aggregate, these features increased the risk that mis-




weaken regional escalation management, and intensify Sino–American 
strategic competition. As IR theorists opined, in cases where incentives (or 
disincentives) exist for each side not to cooperate, both sides will likely 
pursue their own narrow self-interests, and become predisposed to view 
the other as an adversary (or at least a potential one), which leaves both 
sides worse off.54
Given the high escalatory risks associated with launching a conven-
tional attack on a nuclear-armed state, the early ‘deep-strike’ operations 
envisaged by ASB proved particularly controversial. Operations of this 
kind, by potentially increasing China’s vulnerability to U.S. attacks risked 
triggering dangerous escalatory ‘use them or lose them’ pressures in 
Beijing.55 Notwithstanding China’s long-standing ‘no first use’ nuclear 
pledge, however, ‘it would be imprudent to take the policy at face value, 
given [China’s] changing strategic circumstances’.56 That is, Beijing’s fear 
that its command and control structures could be impaired or destroyed 
(especially through U.S. cyberattacks) would likely increase the incentives 
to authorize preemptive and early strikes against U.S. cyberspace and 
space-based assets.57 Simply put, the strategic ambiguities associated with 
ASB–A2/AD offense-dominant capabilities meant that they were perhaps 
only effective if used to attack early on in a conflict—before the other side 
had time to respond with countermeasures.58
ASB critics argued that the concept prescribed an operational approach 
to what was fundamentally a strategic challenge in Asia. Specifically, the 
Pentagon offered very few indications of what Washington’s strategic 
objectives might be (and how they might alter) in the event of a United 
States–China conflict or crisis (or thinking the unthinkable), which defense 
planners need to consider.59 ASB defense analyst Dan Blumenthal ‘put the 
operational cart before the strategic horse … contemplating an attack on a 
nuclear-armed country [China] in depth, it would be wise to know for 
what purpose the U.S. would take such risks’.60 Thus, insufficient calibra-
tion of ASB with Washington’s ‘rebalance’ policy, and more broadly U.S. 
‘grand strategy’, caused a fair amount of consternation and anxiety within 
the U.S. defense community, among America’s Asian-based allies, and, 
above all, in Beijing. To be sure, the uncertainties and strategic ambiguities 
associated with ASB increased the risk that Beijing’s mistrust of U.S. stra-
tegic intentions (already heightened by the ‘rebalance’) could increase.61
According to senior PLA officer Gaoyue Fan, ‘if the U.S. military 
develops Air-Sea Battle … the PLA will be forced to develop anti-Air-Sea 
Battle doctrine and capabilities’.62 Similarly, China’s state-sponsored 
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newspaper The People’s Daily stated that ‘if the U.S. takes the ASB system 
 seriously, China has to upgrade its anti-access capabilities … to deter any 
external interference’.63 Finally, the following passage from the latest ver-
sion of the doctrinal SMS indicates that Beijing’s response to ASB risked 
triggering a conventional weapons arms race:
China needs to [in response to the ASB concept] continue to innovate a 
series of tactics to attack unmanned aerial vehicles, stealth technology, cruise 
missiles, carrier strike groups, and space platforms, and to defend against 
ISR, precision strike, cyber-attacks, space attacks and develop its special 
asymmetrical … style of warfare.64
Therefore, insufficient appreciation by Washington of how Beijing per-
ceives U.S. military policies and postures in Asia (or ‘security dilemma 
sensibility’) increased the risks of creating a self-fulfilling and self- 
reinforcing security dilemma.65 As security dilemma theorists have noted, 
the difficulty states face in putting themselves into the minds of others often 
causes actors to erroneously assume that its intentions (signaled by words 
and deeds) are necessarily interpreted by the recipient as they were origi-
nally intended.66
Two additional factors related to the ASB–A2/AD dynamic could 
exacerbate future crisis stability and escalation management in the Asia- 
Pacific. First, it does not appear as though future ASB operations would 
incorporate a demonstration by the United States of its nuclear retalia-
tory capacity. Several analysts have argued that a demonstration of this 
capacity would be vital to deter a Chinese nuclear counterstrike.67 
However, the success of nuclear-signaling operations aimed at China 
would likely be compromised by Chinese strategists’ continued embrace 
of the Cold War era ‘stability–instability paradox’ logic.68 Following this 
logic, Beijing would likely assume that in the event of a crisis or conflict 
its nuclear deterrent would be sufficient to restrain the United States in 
the use of nuclear weapons, and, in turn, provide China with operational 
flexibility during a conventional conflict. Chinese overconfidence in the 
‘stability–instability paradox’ logic could, however, encourage defense 
planners to underestimate the inherent escalation risks during a conven-
tional conflict.69 Moreover, the opacity surrounding Chinese nuclear pos-
ture, together with the strategic ambiguities surrounding China’s 





Second, the evidence suggests that Chinese strategists have a tendency 
to overestimate the utility of tactical operations to signal (resolve and 
deterrence) and simultaneously underestimate the escalatory risks inher-
ent in the use of such tactics.71 Under crisis conditions, China’s relatively 
underdeveloped (and heavily stove-piped) crisis management theory and 
decision-making mechanisms could compound strategic ambiguities, 
which, in turn, increase the risks of deterrence failure and escalation.72 IR 
scholars have observed that military-signaling tactics tend to be highly 
subjective in nature, and that the effectiveness of these efforts are deter-
mined by a combination of technical, administrative, and perceptual pro-
cesses; a breakdown in any of these interconnected processes could result 
in misinterpretations, miscalculations, and, ultimately, inadvertent or acci-
dental war.73
conclusIon
A central argument this chapter makes is that, irrespective of the rationale, 
accuracy, or reasonableness of U.S. assessments of Chinese A2/AD, infer-
ences made by defense analysts were often decided before achieving suffi-
cient equivalence with Chinese military doctrine and operational 
preferences. Instead, U.S. defense analysts selectively interpreted (or 
cherry-picked) Chinese empirical sources to support preexisting (worst- 
case scenario) and familiar frameworks of analysis, rather than using these 
sources to establish analytical baselines to frame their assumptions. This 
well-established analytical approach overemphasized the capacity of A2/
AD, which in turn reinforced analysts’ bureaucratic cognitive biases and 
‘mirror-imaging’ proclivities. Defense analysts conflated A2/AD capabili-
ties with the operational prerequisites considered by the United States 
necessary to construct and integrate a coherent strategy. The problem, 
therefore, resided with analysts’ underlying critical assumptions, extrapo-
lated from Chinese A2/AD military capabilities to determine the likely 
trajectory of Beijing’s strategic intentions. Thus, greater engagement with 
relevant Chinese sources would have assisted analysts to form empirically 
more robust approximations of Chinese A2/AD, and, in turn, reduce the 
reliance upon pure material assessments. Many of Chinese A2/AD capa-
bilities did appear (or had the ability) to target the military assets of the 
United States in Asia, but possession of these capabilities did not necessar-
ily confer an underlying strategic intention—malign or otherwise.
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This study identified two key factors that complicated the challenge for 
defense analysts in their assessment of Chinese A2/AD, which, in turn, 
reinforced the U.S. propensity for capacity-based methodologies, and 
gave space for misperceptions and cognitive biases to grow. First, the long 
lead times associated with the development of new and technologically 
advanced capabilities meant that the most pressing concern for U.S. 
defense planners was the likely trajectory of Chinese A2/AD. That is, the 
cognitive impact of analysts’ expectations of Beijing’s future intentions 
upon their present perceptions created predispositions, which invariably 
interpreted relevant or new information as merely confirming preexisting 
and familiar frameworks of analysis—or ‘mirror-imaging’. Second, weak 
military transparency and limited information on several key aspects of 
Chinese military affairs (especially dual-use technologies and civil–military 
relations) reinforced the U.S. penchant to place an undue emphasis on 
China’s material capabilities. Another key finding was that, by prescribing 
ASB as countervail to address the A2/AD ‘military problem set’, 
Washington implicitly cast China as a revisionist rising power, which wors-
ened the United States–China security dilemma. Under crisis or conflict 
conditions, several strategic, tactical, and operational features associated 
with ASB versus A2/AD will likely worsen future regional strategic stabil-
ity, reduce incentives for United States–China cooperation, and, in the 
presence of a security dilemma, increase the risk of misperception and 
miscalculation.
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CHAPTER 4
China’s Vision of the Future Networked 
Battlefield: Emerging Military-Technological 
Challenges to the United States
IntroductIon
While much recent analysis has focused on the People’s Liberation Army’s 
(PLA) advanced weapon systems, far less analytical attention has been paid 
to the development of China’s command, control, communications, com-
puters, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architec-
ture, which fuses and augments individual weapon systems into a collective 
whole—a critical enabler and force multiplier of China’s technologically 
advanced war-fighting capabilities.1 In the event China implements anti- 
access/area denial (A2/AD) operations in the ‘near seas’,2 integrated 
C4ISR systems would play a pivotal role in enhancing the PLA’s aware-
ness, coordination, and targeting capacity, which are necessary to seize 
military dominance on the modern battlefield.3 That is, a comprehensive 
and fully networked C4ISR would knit together China’s expanding suite 
of high-tech weapons capabilities, and effectively marshal them to maxi-
mize China’s force projection in ranges, scope, accuracy, and lethality 
within the near seas, and potentially beyond.4
A central argument this chapter makes is that the potential threats 
posed to the United States by C4ISR are heightened (or perhaps only 
exist) in the context of the weapons systems that they enable and enhance, 
that is they are not threatening in their own right. In other words, weap-
ons systems enhanced by C4ISR would likely pose greater threats to an 
adversary than they otherwise would. Specifically, this case study focuses 
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on the intersection of China’s C4ISR and the war-fighting capabilities 
these systems have made operationally viable, in particular, the strategic 
intentions that underlie these efforts.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it utilizes Chinese military 
writings and official national security publications to establish the key stra-
tegic motives and intentions that underlie Beijing’s pursuit of advanced 
C4ISR systems, contextualized as part of a broader effort to develop a 
networked military force, to enable integrated joint operations and win 
future ‘local wars under the conditions of informatization’—or network-
centric warfare. This section includes a discussion on Chinese military 
concepts, doctrines, technological priorities, and efforts by Beijing to 
leverage China’s burgeoning civilian resources to support military 
modernization—inextricably (and explicitly) linked to Beijing’s overall 
national security objectives. These national security priorities have guided 
and informed the development of China’s C4ISR capabilities, which in 
turn will determine the kinds of military missions these systems enable. 
For example, the use of long-range precision-strike munitions for early 
and preemptive strikes; stealth jet-fighters (e.g. the J-20) to bypass enemy 
air-defense systems, and destroy land-based command and control cen-
ters; as well as other emerging technologies to disrupt, disable, and destroy 
C4ISR systems including antisatellite missiles (ASATs), rail guns, and 
‘stealth-defeating’ quantum radars.
Second, it examines the nature of the discourse that emerged within the 
U.S. defense community which conceptualized these systems as specifi-
cally designed to target America’s Achilles’ heel (especially in space and 
cyberspace), which the U.S. military is dependent on to bring to bear its 
force power projection. This section also examines Washington’s military 
countervails to these perceived threats (e.g. the Air–Sea Battle concept 
and the Third Offset Strategy), in particular, the implications of these poli-
cies and postures for future regional strategic stability, and military escala-
tion management.5
Third and closely related, it considers the increasing prominence of 
dual-use space technologies in Chinese military writings (notably space- 
based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) as a critical means to 
project China’s military power. Such a strategy is analogous with the 
possession of a sufficiently networked joint military force capable of locat-
ing, tracking, and targeting U.S. military bases and carrier strike groups 
(CSGs) in the Western Pacific—especially the use of long-range precision 




Finally, the study reflects on the implications of a potentially dangerous 
dynamic, whereby both the United States and China would possess 
increasingly sophisticated C4ISR systems to support advanced offensive- 
dominant capabilities and strategic concepts, designed to deny the other 
side the asymmetric upper hand that these capabilities would enable.7 The 
chapter argues that in future warfare these dynamics will increase the 
incentives to strike first, lower the threshold for the use of military force, 
cause ‘use or lose’ situations, and, compounded by misperception, cause 
deterrence failure and inadvertent cross-domain warfare.8
Key drIvIng Forces BehInd chIna’s PursuIt 
oF MIlItary ‘InForMatIzatIon’
The genesis of China’s C4ISR capabilities can be traced back to the early 
1990s, and can in large part be attributed to the impact several develop-
ments involving the United States had upon Beijing’s threat perceptions: 
the U.S.  Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA); the closely related 
Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) concept9; and above all, demonstra-
tions of U.S. network warfare prowess (e.g. the 1990–1991 Gulf War, the 
1995–1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis, and the 1999 Belgrade embassy bomb-
ing).10 According to scholar David Shambaugh, Chinese analysts were 
especially alarmed by the performance of U.S. forces during Operation 
Desert Storm because
Nearly every aspect of the campaign reminded the PLA high command of 
its deficiencies: electronic warfare, precision guided munitions, stealth tech-
nology; precision bombing … campaign coordination through airborne 
command and control systems … space-based early warning and surveil-
lance in targeting and intelligence gathering.11
Military performances of this kind highlighted the PLA’s outmoded and 
inadequate military capabilities and support systems. Chinese strategists 
concluded that the PLA’s ability to win future modern wars would be 
determined by ‘information technology … the vanguard of the new tech-
nological revolution … [and] information warfare’, that is cyber warfare.12 
PLA analyst Major General Zhang Ling stated that ‘informationized war 
of the future will be second only to nuclear war in terms of firepower’.13 
Underlining the importance of ‘informatization’ to China’s national secu-
rity, President Xi Jinping stated that ‘we should be fully aware of the 
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importance and urgency of internet security and informatization’ and that 
‘without cyber security there is no national security, without informatiza-
tion, there is no [military] modernization’.14 Assessments of this kind 
elevated the goal of winning ‘local wars under conditions of informatiza-
tion’ to a national strategic priority, and prompted significant changes to 
the PLA’s force structure, operational doctrines, and training priorities.15 
These include the application of information technology (IT) in all 
domains and aspects of modern warfare, and to construct a clear battle-
field picture to track, locate, and target an adversary’s (especially the U.S.) 
military assets with long-range precision-guided missiles.16
China’s 2008 National Defense White Paper placed these goals within 
a specific developmental timeframe: by 2010 establish a ‘foundation’ for 
military ‘informatization’; by 2020 achieve ‘major progress’ toward this 
goal; and by 2050, ‘fully’ realize this transformation.17 China’s most recent 
Military Strategic Guidelines prioritized the following areas in the devel-
opment and implementation of C4ISR systems:
• Progress in the development of asymmetric war-fighting capabilities
• Military-technological advancements to meet the demands of future 
warfare
• Leveraging civilian innovation to facilitate and support military 
modernization
• Acquiring, imitating, and reverse-engineering foreign military tech-
nologies as part of a wider ‘leapfrog strategy’18
• Learning from the experiences of advanced militaries (especially the 
U.S.), and in some cases collaborating with them (e.g. artificial 
intelligence [A.I.]), to overcome the PLA’s organizational and tech-
nological shortcomings, and limited combat experience19
By the late 1990s, influenced by U.S. network-centric warfare and sys-
tems of systems theory, Chinese analysts began to recognize the critical 
role integrated operational C4ISR capabilities would play in future war-
fare to enhance overall combat effectiveness across all military domains.20 
The Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW) operational concept 
clearly demonstrated the importance Beijing attached to the synthesis of 
technologically advanced military domains to asymmetrically seize the 
battlefield ‘information superiority’ against an advanced military power.21 




access to information essential to conduct combat operations’ to 
 accomplish China’s ‘information dominance’ strategic objectives.22 For 
example, Chinese strategists have conceptualized the use of C4ISR sys-
tems in a potential offensive Taiwan scenario, whereby networked joint 
forces (or integrated command platforms) would deploy salvos of preci-
sion-strike missiles (PSMs) as a vanguard to destroy Taiwan’s antiaircraft 
defenses.23 According to the authors of the authorized doctrinal Science of 
Military Strategy (SMS),
[s]ystems versus systems conflict activities entail a heavy reliance by both sides 
on information, information systems, informationised weapons and equip-
ment, with a focus on information flow, involving operations on land, sea, 
air, in space, within the electromagnetic spectrum, information, and cognitive 
domains.24
China’s 2015 defense white paper emphasized that the PLA should be 
able to fight and win ‘informationized local wars’. The report stated that 
‘integrated combat forces will be employed to prevail in system vs. system 
[i.e. C4ISR] operations featuring information dominance, precision 
strikes, and joint operations’ to meet the offensive and defensive opera-
tional requirements of modern warfare.25 The white paper also asserted 
that ‘space and cyberspace have become the new commanding heights in 
strategic competition’, and that China will develop sufficient capabilities 
in both domains to protect its strategic interests. Similarly, the most recent 
edition of the SMS explicitly argued that the PLA should integrate space, 
cyber, and EW operations to ‘paralyze enemy operational systems’.26
In 2015, as part of broader military reforms, the PLA Strategic Support 
Force (SSF) was created as a ‘new-type combat force’ to spearhead China’s 
efforts to integrate the PLA’s hitherto siloed space, cyber, and EW domains 
to fight and win future informatized wars.27 Although several unknowns 
exist as to the precise responsibilities of the SSF, there is sufficient evi-
dence to indicate the forces’ basic structure, leadership, unit-level compo-
sition, and trajectory.28 PLA Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo asserted that the SSF 
would provide ‘battlefield support’ (or an ‘information umbrella’) to sup-
port the PLA’s joint forces in the following ways: (1) develop a space- 
based early warning system to support a ‘launch-on-warning’ nuclear 
posture29; (2) control the PLA’s cyber warfare and EW capabilities; and (3) 
maintain dual-use satellites (e.g. Beidou) to enhance the PLA’s space- based 
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ISR capabilities.30 A People’s Daily Online article opined that the SSF’s 
C4ISR systems could enable China to conduct integrated command 
operations as complex as the 2011 U.S. raid on Osama Bin Laden.31
These restructuring efforts were designed to strengthen military joint 
operations in several key ways: to establish a permanent joint C2 structure; 
to integrate C4ISR support networks; to reduce the dominance of the 
PLA’s ground forces; and to promote joint training and logistics.32 It 
remains to be seen, however, whether the PLA is able to overcome its 
historical organizational shortcomings, in particular, its deep-seated 
interservice rivalry, poor communications and information sharing caused 
by endemic stovepiping, and minimal experience (especially during live 
combat) with modern military technology.33
Improvements to the PLA’s interoperability created new challenges for 
U.S. forward forces operating in Asia. In particular, the effective integra-
tion of C4ISR with China’s long-range (conventional and nuclear) PSMs 
with other A2/AD kinetic capabilities (e.g. submarines, stealth jet- fighters, 
air defenses, ASATs, and missile defense systems) could pose a serious 
threat to U.S. carrier strike groups and strategic hubs in the Western 
Pacific, for example, during a maritime strike on Taiwan, or the blockade 
of critical sea lanes in the South China Seas.34 Thus, a more integrated 
joint PLA war-fighting force may fundamentally shift the regional military 
balance, which is already rapidly moving in Beijing’s favor. According to 
the authors of an internal PLA magazine, China must prepare to fight to 
safeguard its military superiority and ‘central leadership’ in the South 
China Sea, which, given the shifting military balance and the perceived 
inability (and unwillingness) of the United States to contest, other states 
would be unable to challenge.35 Moreover, a fully networked war-fighting 
force may also increase the costs of war for potential regional adversaries 
(i.e. Japan, Vietnam, Philippines, or South Korea) to such an extent that 
leaders may conclude that (even with U.S. military support) it would be 
futile to resist China with force, and instead, they may choose to band-
wagon with Beijing.
As part of a broader strategic objective to accomplish full military 
‘informatization’, Beijing has actively leveraged China’s civilian technol-
ogy and governmental agencies.36 A recent United States–China Economic 
and Security Review Commission report stated that the PLA ‘is heavily 
reliant upon China’s commercial I.T. sector to aid research and develop-
ment into dual-use and military grade microelectronics and telecommu-




issued several defense white papers that make replete references to the 
 importance of this symbiotic relationship, in particular, in the develop-
ment of military-use cyber, space, and EW capabilities. For example, the 
2011 Space White Paper explicitly framed China’s military–civilian space 
activities as part of a broader strategic effort to protect ‘national security’, 
and to build up its national ‘comprehensive strength’.38
At a recent address during the annual parliamentary session, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping called for deepening military–civilian integration (or 
in Chinese lexicon ‘civil–military fusion’), while emphasizing the strategic 
importance of technical innovation for the PLA’s military modernization 
including training, recruitment, weapons innovation, and strategic plan-
ning. Xi stated that ‘military innovations should take a central role in pro-
ducing indigenous military wares; and that the governments from the 
state to the local levels should promote integration between the civilian 
and the military sectors’.39 Recent evidence suggests that despite contin-
ued bureaucratic obstacles the PLA has already begun to establish mecha-
nisms to implement ‘civil–military fusion’ in the military-technological 
domain.40 For example, in late 2016, Beijing created the Military–Civil 
Integration Intelligent Equipment Research Institute, to focus on research 
areas including intelligent robotics, A.I., unmanned systems, and military 
‘brain science’.41
the World’s FIrst ‘QuantuM PoWer’?
In 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum satellite, Micius, which 
clearly demonstrated Chinese advances (albeit nascent) in quantum infor-
mation science.42 It also underscored Beijing’s prioritization of innovation 
in critical technologies to strengthen China’s national security, which sev-
eral Chinese analysts have equated with the strategic impact of nuclear 
weapons.43 President Xi Jinping emphasized the strategic importance of 
quantum technologies to national security, and, in particular, in the con-
text of cyber security.44 This high-level focus evinced clear recognition by 
Beijing of the potential strategic implications quantum technologies could 
augur for the future networked battlefield.45
It has been reported that China has developed potentially ‘unhackable’ 
quantum cryptography to secure military communications, and is pursu-
ing quantum-computing capabilities to encrypt standard forms of military 
communication networks, as well as a range of disruptive technologies 
with military applications (e.g. ‘stealth-defeating’ quantum radars).46 
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Although it is difficult to substantiate the development status or trajectory 
of China’s quantum capabilities, Chinese strategists appear confident that 
quantum communications are deployable for ‘local wars’ in the near seas.47 
In contrast, the U.S. military has yet to make significant investments in the 
development of quantum communications systems, under the apparent 
assumption that this technology would not significantly enhance U.S. 
communication security.48 If China were to become the world’s first quan-
tum power, it would challenge U.S. technological dominance in all forms 
of information-centric networked warfare, in particular, stealth capabili-
ties, global intelligence gathering, and military satellite networks.49 A 
White House official recently warned that America’s information-centric 
‘ways of war’ were increasingly under siege from China’s quantum tech-
nology advances, and threatened to offset (or neutralize) U.S. military- 
technological lead.50
The Pentagon’s Third Offset Strategy was designed to address the per-
ceived asymmetric challenges posed by Chinese military-technological 
advances (including quantum computing), and to sustain U.S. military 
primacy. Several analysts have posited that China’s quantum technology 
could expose U.S. military communications to new vulnerabilities during 
peacetime, which during a conflict or crisis might shift the asymmetric 
information balance decisively in Beijing’s favor.51 Simply put, even lim-
ited deployments of quantum technologies could radically shift the future 
military balance in Asia. To be sure, such a shift may potentially present a 
far greater challenge to U.S. power projection compared with China’s 
previous ‘assassin mace’ (or silver bullet) capabilities (e.g. ASATs, antiship 
precision munitions, cyber, space, and EW).52
asyMMetrIc threats to aMerIca’s soFt Belly 
In the Western PacIFIc
U.S. defense analysts frequently cited Chinese sources that emphasized 
the tactical advantages of targeting a superior adversary’s C4ISR capabili-
ties early on (and preemptively) in a conflict, striking at the enemy’s ‘eyes, 
ears, brain and nervous system’.53 Chinese analysts tended to conceptual-
ize an adversary’s C4ISR systems as one of the easiest and most vulnerable 
targets on the modern battlefield.54 That is, while Chinese analysts recog-
nized the critical role C4ISR plays in enabling U.S. military power they 




precision-missile strikes in expeditionary warfare—a tactical weakness 
China could exploit.55 Furthermore, they assumed that in the initial phase 
of war, the United Sates would target the PLA’s C4ISR, and, thus, a 
strong incentive existed for Beijing to preemptively escalate a conflict, to 
neutralize U.S. military superiority, and to secure escalation dominance.56 
In a recent testimony to U.S. Congress, then commander of the U.S. Air 
Force Space, Commander General John Hyten, stated that potential 
adversaries (China and Russia) are ‘developing kinetic, directed-energy, 
and cyber tools to deny, degrade and destroy our [U.S.] space capabili-
ties’. In response, Hyten asserted that the DoD had developed counter-
measures to disrupt an adversary’s counter-space weapons (especially 
Chinese ASATs), for example, hardening U.S. satellites against antijam-
ming technologies.57
Recent evidence indicated that the PLA successfully mapped and 
penetrated U.S.  Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network 
(NIPRNET), which the military depends on for much of its sensitive 
unclassified intelligence gathering.58 Underscoring the perceived gravity 
of this threat, commander of the U.S. Cyber Command Admiral Michael 
Rogers stated that ‘cyber operations from China are still targeting and 
exploiting U.S. government and defense’ computer networks.59 In 2017, 
the DoD reported that China continued to use its cyber capabilities to 
access networks and extract information from the U.S. defense sector to 
build a more accurate picture of U.S. defense networks, logistics, and 
capabilities, which Chinese defense planners could exploit during a crisis 
or conflict.60 In response to this challenge, the Pentagon launched a new 
cyber-warfare military force for the U.S. Pacific Command, CyberPAC.61
chIna’s dual-use sPace technologIes War-FIghtIng 
Force MultIPlIers
The United States has increasingly viewed China’s dual-use space technol-
ogy (especially contextualized with space-based ISR satellites) as a critical 
force multiplier for the PLA’s offensive ‘counter-space’ capabilities.62 
According to the U.S. DoD, China has continued to develop and field 
‘dual-use’ space-based ISR systems that ‘could be applied to counter-space 
missions’.63 Former U.S.  Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA) Ronald Burgess Jr. stated that space-based ISR support China’s 
‘growing ability to deny, degrade the space assets of potential adversaries’, 
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and to enhance its broader range of conventional capabilities.64 Similarly, 
U.S. deputy commander of U.S. Strategic Command Vice Admiral Charles 
Richard recently warned that ‘while we’re not at war in space, I don’t 
think we can say we are exactly at peace either’, and that ‘with rapidly 
growing threats to our space systems … we must prepare for a conflict that 
extends into space’.65
Several U.S. defense analysts posited that the kinds of satellites China 
would need to operate beyond the near seas, and successfully target U.S. 
carrier strike groups and bases (with long-range precision-strike missions), 
would be heavily reliant upon dual-use space-based ISR capabilities.66 For 
example, China’s Gaofen-4 dual-use remote-sensing satellite series—first 
launched into geosynchronous orbit in 2016—was thought to be specifi-
cally designed to supply the PLA’s PSMs with ISR support, especially anti-
ship munitions (analyzed in Chap. 5). Additionally, China’s recent 
intercontinental ballistic missile tests benefited from C4ISR support pro-
vided by Yuanwang space-tracking naval ships.67 External analysts extrap-
olated from these C4ISR advances a capacity to cue the PLA’s A2/AD 
offensive missile forces (e.g. antiship ballistic and cruise missiles) in ranges 
out to China’s ‘second island chain’—approximately 2000  km from 
China’s coastline.68 According to the DoD, however, it is ‘unclear’ whether 
China possessed the technical capacity to collect accurate real-time infor-
mation to successfully target U.S. carriers strike groups and bases with 
precision-strike munitions ‘beyond the first island chain’.69
Underscoring these technical challenges, the U.S.  Office of Naval 
Intelligence (ONI) asserted that building a detailed air and maritime pic-
ture of China’s near seas (approximately 875,000 square nautical miles) is 
a ‘daunting task’. Furthermore, the addition of the Philippine Sea—a key 
interdiction body of water in any future Taiwan or South China Sea con-
tingency—would add 1.5 million square nautical miles to the already vast 
area China would need to monitor.70 Washington’s main concern, there-
fore, is that once these technical impediments are successfully navigated, a 
fully networked A2/AD in extended ranges, scope, and lethality may 
embolden Beijing to behave more assertively and aggressively in defend-
ing and securing its regional interests and unresolved territorial claims. 
For example, the DoD warned that a layered networked war-fighting 
capability reaching out to the second island chain would give China new 
‘preemptive and coercive options’ in a regional crisis (i.e. in the East and 
South China Seas, and the Taiwan Straits).71 China’s response to the 




signaled to Washington a more confident and emboldened China, 
 consummate with an increasingly credible war-fighting capacity. A Chinese 
Ministry of Defense (MoD) spokesperson stated that it would be ‘futile’ 
and ‘doomed’ for Taiwan to contemplate using military force to prevent 
unification with Mainland China—irrespective of U.S. military support.72
As Chap. 2 described, the security dilemma between states is more 
intense when technologically advanced capabilities incorporate dual-use 
features, offensive and defensive weapons are not easily distinguishable, 
and the offensive is perceived to dominate.73 Thus, when it is relatively 
cheaper and easier for states to emphasize a defensive (or nonthreatening) 
military posture, and this posture is clearly distinguishable from an offen-
sive one, the security dilemma is less intense, and the prospects of avoiding 
conflict increase.74 In the case of China’s dual-use space industry, there 
was little Beijing could have done to remove from the minds of U.S. 
defense planners the possibility that Chinese space assets would not be used 
in future military operations targeting the United States. That, in turn, 
intensified the United States–China security dilemma, and reinforced the 
Pentagon’s penchant for worst-case scenario assessments of China’s strate-
gic intentions (discussed in Chap. 3).75
Washington could not be certain that China’s dual-use Beidou 
navigation satellites would not be integrated into the PLA’s weapons 
guidance systems to enable coercive and preemptive strikes. Former 
U.S.  Strategic Command head James Cartwright warned that more 
advanced U.S. long- range PSMs would be required to protect U.S. missile 
defense systems from Chinese ground-based ASAT lasers.76 In 2015, the 
U.S. intelligence community claimed that a high-altitude (circa 30,000 
km) Chinese rocket test was a disguised ASAT test.77 To be sure, this 
rocket test demonstrated that the U.S. military’s hitherto geostationary 
orbit sanctuary (where many high-value U.S. intelligence satellites reside) 
could no longer be taken for granted.78 Beijing could not be adequately 
assured that the U.S. military would not deploy its missile defense capa-
bilities to destroy China’s satellites, and threaten its nuclear retaliatory 
capability.79 Chinese analysts frequently cited U.S. space policies and tests 
(e.g. the 2008 SM-3 missile test against an errant satellite) as evidence that 
China must continue to pursue the development of space weapons.80
U.S. restrictions on collaborating and coordinating with China on 
space policy—by National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)—
further dimmed the prospects for future United States–China cooperation 
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and strategic stability in space.81 Importantly for the United States–China 
security dilemma, these restrictions denied defense analysts access to vital 
information related to the development of China’s dual-use space indus-
try, including the PLA’s evolving standard operating procedures, decision- 
making processes, and organizational structure. To be sure, improved 
access to this kind of information may have helped address Washington’s 
knowledge gaps in the development of Chinese space technologies, and, 
in turn, facilitated a more robust understanding of Beijing’s strategic 
objectives in this increasingly contested and competitive domain.82
International relations (IR) scholars have observed that uncertainties 
created by the lack of information of an adversary’s military capabilities 
can exacerbate misperceptions between states, and increase the likelihood 
of war.83 Moreover, in cases where incentives (or disincentives) exist for 
each side not to cooperate, both sides will likely pursue their own narrow 
self-interests, and become predisposed to viewing the other as an adver-
sary—or a potential one. The 2011 U.S. National Security Space Strategy 
(NSSS) stated that the space battlefield has become increasingly ‘con-
gested, contested and competitive’, and that, in response, the United 
States must maintain its ‘space dominance’ by denying the use of space 
assets to others—especially China and Russia.84 Similarly, the head of 
U.S. Air Force’s Space Force Structure Plans for the Space and Cyberspace 
Superiority Division, Lieutenant Colonel Kyle Pumroy, stated that in 
response to growing threats from China (and Russia) in the space domain, 
the United States ‘[m]ust invest in more survivable, resilient [defensive 
and offensive] capabilities, and train on how to fight against those threats 
for when the high-end space attack comes’.85
IMPlIcatIons For unIted states–chIna crIsIs staBIlIty 
and escalatIon ManageMent
China’s increasing military dependence on C4ISR to fulfill its regional 
strategic objectives has created a potentially dangerous and destabilizing 
dynamic86: China and the United States have accumulated increasingly 
sophisticated C4ISR systems (and related technologies), calibrated to deny 
the other side the tactical upper hand in the use of the weapons these sys-
tems enable and enhance.87 In response to this perceived heightened 
threat environment, the Pentagon has pledged to ‘accelerate initiatives to 
counter an adversary’s … ISR and space-enabled precision strike’ capabili-




The Third Offset Strategy was explicitly calibrated to strengthen U.S. 
deterrence if ‘potential competitors reach parity with us [the U.S.] in 
certain areas’.89 Then U.S.  Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work 
stated that this was done to ‘maintain [U.S.] space capabilities, through all 
phases of conflict, regardless of [asymmetric] actions to deny us the ulti-
mate high ground’. Work’s comments were widely interpreted as signaling 
to America’s competitors (especially China and Russia) a renewed emphasis 
on offensive solutions to defend U.S. military dominance in the increasingly 
contested and competitive military-technological advanced domains.90 
Chinese sources indicate that analysts perceived this initiative as a continu-
ation of the Pentagon’s preexisting (offset) strategy (i.e. Air–Sea Battle 
and the Defense Innovation Initiative) aimed at China, reflective of ‘Cold 
War thinking’, and destabilizing for future United States–China relations 
and regional peace.91 In response to this (perceived) emerging military-
technological arms race, Chinese analysts and strategists prescribed an 
acceleration of the development of emerging military technologies (e.g. 
quantum computing; rail guns; stealth technologies; robotics; and auton-
omous systems), together with the integration of civilian and military 
technologies to gain a decisive edge.92
Scholars have long warned of the dangers of states’ overdependence on 
military technology to increase ‘security’.93 Robert Jervis observed that 
the security dilemma is at ‘its most vicious when commitment, strategy or 
technology dictates that the only route to security lies through expansion’ of 
military power.94 This logic relates closely to the common misperception 
held by policy-makers that the accumulation of military capabilities neces-
sarily leads to increased security—the opposite is very often the case.95 
U.S. efforts to counter (or offset) the perceived asymmetric threats posed 
to its long-standing military-technological leadership have often proven 
ineffective.96 Instead, and paradoxically, Washington’s article of faith in 
discovering an allusive technological ‘silver bullet’ has presented other 
states (notably China and Russia) with increased opportunities and incen-
tives to find ways to exploit U.S. military dependencies on these technolo-
gies—especially cyber and space. Thus, China only needs to find relatively 
low-cost and technically viable countervails to the Pentagon’s latest 
weapon systems to pose a challenge to U.S. forward forces operating in 
Asia—without the need to achieve parity (or symmetry) with the United 
States. In a future military contingency involving Taiwan, for example, 
advances in China’s war-fighting capabilities has meant it is highly 
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improbable that the United States would be able to use its aircraft carriers 
strike groups in the manner in which they were dispatched during the 
1996 Taiwan Crisis.97
The prospects for regional crisis stability and escalation control in future 
networked warfare have been worsened by the tendency of Chinese 
analysts and strategists to underestimate the potential collateral damage, 
escalation risks, and unintended consequences associated with the use of 
military-technological capabilities—especially in cyberspace. The evidence 
suggests that Chinese strategists tend to assume that because these weap-
ons exist, they can be deployed in the same way as other conventional 
capabilities.98 It is noteworthy that there has been very little discussion in 
Chinese military writings on the various shortcomings and limitations 
associated with the U.S. experience with RMA. For example, Chinese ana-
lysts have frequently conceptualized cyber warfare as a relatively low-cost 
and easy (asymmetric and low-risk) way to degrade and destroy an adver-
sary’s C4ISR systems.99 Chinese overconfidence in the utility of military- 
technological capabilities could lower the threshold for future conflict, 
and, in extremis, risk-inadvertent or accidental cross-domain warfare.100 
For example, inexperienced commanders of China’s unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) on tracking and monitoring missions in the disputed 
South China Seas might overreach and engage in escalatory risk-taking, 
which could inadvertently trigger military escalation.101
Under crisis and wartime conditions routine military operations become 
inherently vulnerable; thus, it is a mistake to regard military-technological 
advances as a means to overcome the Clausewitzian ‘fog and friction’ of 
war.102 In the case of cyber warfare, the absence of clearly defined escala-
tion ladders and thresholds could increase the perceived time pressures to 
react early and preemptively, and, in turn, reduce the search for alterna-
tives to military force.103 Moreover, a response to a cyberattack may not 
necessarily be confined to cyberspace.104 As the commander of the 
U.S. Cyber Command noted, ‘there is no international consensus on a 
precise definition of a use of force, in or out of cyberspace’ for deterrence 
purposes.105 In the case of space, little evidence exists of Chinese discus-
sion or strategic thinking on the vulnerability of high-value space-based 
ISR satellites, and the difficulty of replacing these vital assets—few states 
maintain meaningful stockpiles of these capabilities.106 Jervis warned that 
‘when weapons are highly vulnerable, they must be employed before [or 





This chapter makes the following key arguments. First, the research found 
Beijing’s pursuit of C4ISR capabilities was best understood as part of a 
broader Chinese national security narrative, which links the development 
of C4ISR to Beijing’s broader strategic calculus. China’s efforts to 
become the first ‘quantum power’ clearly demonstrate the critical link 
between Beijing’s national security goals and the prioritization of innova-
tion in military-use technologies. This high-level focus reflects recogni-
tion of the myriad potential applications and strategic implications of this 
nascent technology on the future battlefield, and, above all, to counter 
U.S. military superiority and shift the regional military balance further in 
China’s favor.
Second, Washington’s main concern was that once the various technical 
and organizational shortcomings were overcome, a fully networked war- 
fighting force would afford Beijing new options in the use of these offen-
sive weapons for preemptive and coercive missions—especially the use of 
long-range PSMs. Specifically, holding U.S. carrier strike groups and bases 
in the Western Pacific is risky because of asymmetric cross-domain joint 
operations. Moreover, the possession of these capabilities could embolden 
Chinese leaders to behave more assertively and aggressively to defend (and 
secure) Beijing’s expanding regional interests and unresolved sovereignty 
claims too, and, in turn, neutralize U.S. military-technological strategic 
advantages and achieve escalation dominance in future warfare. In short, 
China’s mutually reinforcing A2/AD offensive capabilities, fused by C4ISR 
systems, perceptibly heightened U.S. threat perceptions. That is, the 
United States considered China’s force multiplied war-fighting capabilities 
collectively as far more threatening compared to the sum of their parts.
Third, the critical role Chinese dual-use space technologies played in 
completing the complex kill-chain sequencing associated with long-range 
conventional precision munitions amplified U.S. threat perceptions.108 
Additionally, recent U.S. regulatory and fiscal restrictions on United 
States–China space cooperation further weakened the prospects for ame-
liorating the deteriorating security dilemma in this strategically competi-
tive and increasingly contested domain.
Fourth, as the United States and China continue to accumulate ever- 
sophisticated offensive capabilities (to deny the other side the perceived 
asymmetric upper hand), the mutual vulnerabilities of their respective 
C4ISR systems will inevitably increase. As a corollary, in future warfare 
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both sides will likely respond symmetrically to the threats posed by an 
adversary, to protect their own systems and neutralize the war-fighting 
capabilities of the other. Under crisis or wartime conditions, a destabiliz-
ing dynamic of this kind will likely increase the incentives for both sides to 
strike first and preemptively, which, in turn, may lower the threshold for 
conflict (especially in cyberspace), and create dangerous ‘use-or-lose’ 
dynamics. Moreover, the apparent tendency of Chinese analysts to under-
estimate the potential for collateral damage, and the unintentional escala-
tory risks associated with the use of emerging military technologies, could 
compound these risks.
Several implications and future research topics follow from the findings 
in this chapter. First, it remains to be seen how effective China’s newly 
commissioned SSF military service will be in overcoming the PLA’s orga-
nizational and technical weaknesses, and successfully integrate China’s 
war-fighting capabilities to fulfill the requirements of joint operations on 
the modern battlefield—especially beyond China’s near seas. Second, and 
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CHAPTER 5
‘Guam Express’ and ‘Carrier Killers’: China’s 
Asymmetric Missile Threat to the United 
States in the Pacific
IntroductIon
Since 1945, Washington’s Asia-Pacific strategy has been predicated on 
forward-based forces (to deter adversaries and reassure U.S. regional allies 
and partners), and using its regional strategic hubs to project military 
power—especially Guam.1 The question facing the United States is how to 
counter the challenge to its hitherto unfettered power projection in the 
Pacific posed by China’s rapidly maturing precision-strike missile (PSM) 
regime, which could presage the emergence of a new military- technological 
paradigm—or a leveling of the military-technological battlefield.2 If the 
United States is unable to maintain its de facto monopoly in the develop-
ment and synergism of PSMs, its ability to project power in the Asia- 
Pacific will likely diminish, and U.S. military assets in the region will 
become increasingly vulnerable.
Former U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Eric McVadon described China’s anti-
ship ballistic missile (ASBM) capability as the ‘strategic equivalent of 
China’s acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964’.3 Similarly, defense analysts 
have argued that heightened U.S. threat perceptions as a result of this new 
capability could portend a fundamental shift in the future trajectory of the 
military balance of power in the region—away from the United States and 
its allies in favor of Beijing. Such a shift (or even the perception of one) 
will increase the risk of military miscalculation, rapid (and potentially 
unmanageable) military escalation; deterrence failure; and, ultimately, 
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inadvertent and accidental war.4 This chapter contextualizes China’s 
antiship (cruise and ballistic) missiles (ASMs) augmented and integrated 
with the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) broader anti-access/area 
denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which have increased Beijing’s ability to hold 
U.S. forces at risk in future regional warfare, in particular, as part of the 
multi- axis strikes against U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) and bases in the 
Western Pacific.5
In future warfare, Chinese ASMs will force U.S. defense planners to 
decide whether they would be prepared to risk dispatching U.S. CSGs 
into the range ring of these missile systems—at least 1500 km.6 Viewed as 
part of a broader effort by China to track and target U.S. surface fleets—
augmented by sophisticated command, control, communications, com-
puters, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (C4ISR) 
systems (described in Chap. 4)—ASMs have important implications for 
future military escalation management and deterrence in the region. The 
extent to which China is able to master the complex operating ‘kill chain’ 
(required to successfully maneuver ASBMs in the critical terminal guid-
ance phase against moving targets at sea)7 could make the difference 
between deescalating and escalating a crisis—especially given a Chinese 
doctrinal preference to deploy ASBMs for both precision strike, and tacti-
cal warning signaling.8
During its 2015 Victory Day Parade Beijing officially revealed two 
ASBM variants: (1) a conventionally armed road-mobile medium-range 
ballistic missile (MRBM), Dongfeng DF-21D, officially described by 
Chinese state media as an ‘assassin’s mace for maritime asymmetric war-
fare’ able to strike ‘targets on water’; and (2) a solid-fuel road-mobile (and 
potentially nuclear-capable) intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) 
follow-up, the Dongfeng DF-26, which China began fielding in 2016.9 
The DF-26 is China’s first conventionally armed ballistic missile capable of 
reaching Guam, and if paired with a nuclear warhead, it will be China’s 
first missile capable of conducting long-range nuclear precision strikes 
against U.S. naval targets in the Western Pacific.10 The extended range of 
the DF-26 prompted foreign observers and neitzens to label this ASM 
China’s ‘Guam Express’ (or ‘Guam Killer’), derived from the ‘Carrier 
Killer’ label used to describe its predecessor. Noteworthy, the public 
parading of China’s ASBMs implied that these weapons were operational 
and already integrated into the PLA Rocket Force’s inventories.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, engaging closely with Chinese 




developing ASMs as part of a broader strategic effort to build a regional 
precision missile force. It considers the prominence of domestic-political 
interests and, specifically, the centrality of U.S. policies and regional opera-
tions in Asia, and Beijing’s strategic thinking. This examination includes 
discussion on Chinese approaches to ‘strategic deterrence’, to understand 
how ASMs became one of the mainstays of China’s deterrence posture. 
Second, it assesses the nature of Washington’s heightened threat percep-
tions caused by these potentially ‘game-changing’ weapons. Next, it high-
lights U.S. knowledge gaps in the development of Chinese ASMs, and 
examines evidence of qualitative arms racing in the proliferation of PSMs. 
The study concludes with an assessment of U.S. responses to address this 
challenge (Air–Sea Battle, the Third Offset Strategy, and the expansion of 
U.S. missile defense and long-range precision-strike programs). Finally, it 
considers the key implications of this emerging missile regime for regional 
stability, military escalation management, and arms control—including 
the possible reexamination of the 1987 United States–Soviet intermediate- 
range nuclear force (INF) treaty.11
Key drIvers BehInd chIna’s asMs: taIwan 
and Beyond
According to authoritative Chinese doctrinal sources, Beijing’s pursuit of 
the world’s first ASBM capability began as early as the mid-1990s.12 
Subsequently, Chinese analysts have conceptualized this capacity as a 
mainstay ‘asymmetric’13 (i.e. relatively low-cost and high-impact weapons) 
to locate, track, and target U.S. CSGs within China’s ‘near-sea’ region.14 
The key strategic drivers underlying Beijing’s pursuit of ASMs can be 
divided into three broad categories, and consistent with China’s core 
‘active defense’ strategic principle (described in Chap. 3), the use of offen-
sive military force in order to achieve defensive strategic goals.
The first is the defense and protection of China’s ‘core interests’ includ-
ing China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, vital military assets and 
platforms, and space-based and cyber assets. Of these ‘core interests’ 
(interpreted by external analysts as a casus belli to defend those interests), 
deterring Taiwan from declaring formal independence from the mainland 
remains paramount.15 Chinese strategists consider ASMs (especially the 
DF-21D) as an optimal weapon to wield in the event of U.S. military 
intervention in a Taiwan Strait contingency, to ensure that the terms of 
Taiwan’s future reunification are favorable to Beijing. Chinese military 
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writings have made replete references to the ability of ASMs to deter the 
U.S. military from encroaching on China’s core sovereign and territorial 
‘interests’ in the Asia-Pacific.16 For example, former PLA Navy Senior 
Captain Duan Xiaoxian stated that ASMs would only be used ‘to deal with 
Taiwan independence forces and those who sought to support them’.17 Thus, 
Chinese strategists conceptualized ASMs as part of Beijing’s broader stra-
tegic goal, in conjunction with China’s broader A2/AD capabilities, to 
develop an effective conventional deterrence capacity to keep the United 
States out of the Taiwan Straits, and, simultaneously, to manage the threat 
perceptions of America’s regional allies and partners.18
The authoritative The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (SSAC) 
described in detail how ASBMs might be deployed as an ‘assassin’s mace’ 
asymmetric weapon to ‘achieve command of the seas … [against] military 
intervention by a powerful enemy’ (i.e. the United States),19 which implied 
Chinese strategists conceptualized U.S.  CSGs as the main target for 
ASBMs. At a conceptual level, the SSAC explicitly highlighted ways 
ASBMs could be used against CSGs including firing warning salvos (or 
‘shots across the bow’) in front of CSGs for military deterrence and signal-
ing purposes; destroying carrier-based aircraft with sub-munitions; deploy-
ing nuclear-generated electromagnetic pulses against the sensors systems 
controlling missile defense Aegis destroyers; and, finally, attacking CSGs 
command and control systems with electronic warfare capabilities—which 
could render them redundant.20 From Chinese open sources, however, it 
remains unclear whether in the event of a crisis or conflict the primary 
mission of ASBMs would be to directly attack U.S. carriers or to use them 
instead as a precursor (or opening salvo) to other forms of A2/AD kinetic 
attacks (e.g. submarine, land- and air-launched antiship cruise missiles, 
and air-launched land-attack missiles).21
Second, domestic-political factors have played a prominent role in 
China’s pursuit of ASMs. Above all, Beijing considered its ability to defend 
China’s ‘core interests’ as critical to sustaining the legitimacy of the 
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rule. To be sure, the PLA’s core man-
dates, strategic guidelines, and military modernization priorities clearly 
reflect this overarching political objective.22 Chinese strategists have 
increasingly perceived Washington’s network of regional military alliances, 
bases, and recent U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific (especially 
U.S. navy freedom of navigation operations in the South China Seas) as 
affirmation of America’s intention to strategically encircle China.23 For 




bases at Guam, given its proximity to China’s core interests, with especial 
concern and consternation (e.g. deployments of U.S. fighter jets, subma-
rines, aircraft carriers, and missile defenses).24 To be sure, heightened 
Chinese threat perceptions prompted a renewed emphasis on the develop-
ment of a range of asymmetric strike capabilities designed to counter 
(or blunt) U.S. military strength, and, in turn, deter, deny, and overwhelm 
future U.S. military intervention in the region.25
Furthermore, the possession of ASMs conferred a deep sense of national 
pride and symbolized the advancement of China’s military prowess, con-
summate with its great power status aspirations.26 This symbolism was 
particularly potent given the perceived ability of ASMs to put at risk U.S. 
aircraft carriers, to overwhelm U.S. missile defense interceptors, and, in 
particular, to threaten America’s regional ‘strategic hubs’.27 Specifically, 
the ASBM program has attracted a fair amount of attention from the 
Chinese blogosphere and popular media outlets, which clearly reflected a 
general sense of national pride generated by these capabilities. In short, 
this asymmetric capability offered Beijing an attractive strategic option to 
expand China’s force power projection, and enhance China’s strategic 
deterrence, without the political risks associated with large troop deploy-
ments, or the enormous costs of building a fleet of aircraft carriers.28
Third, (as Chap. 4 described), the goal of developing a regional (and 
eventually a global) long-range precision-strike capability closely aligns 
with China’s broader military-strategic objective of achieving full military 
‘informatization’ by 2050. From this broader strategic perspective, the 
development of ASMs can be best understood as comprising a single 
(albeit important) component of China’s wider efforts to fully mobilize its 
aerospace, I.T., and space industry for the purposes of fielding a long- 
range precision-strike capability. What remains unclear from Chinese 
military writings, however, is the extent to which Beijing’s pursuit of 
ASMs was driven by these kinds of ‘technological imperatives’, in particu-
lar, whether Chinese leaders adequately appreciated the potential strategic 
ramifications of deploying ASMs in the Asia-Pacific.29
Noteworthy, Chinese open sources that debated the feasibility and 
tactical aspects of ASMs generally omitted several key issues, which exac-
erbated U.S. uncertainties and strategic ambiguities associated with these 
weapons30: What would the PLA’s ASM operational and launch doctrines 
include? How would the PLA use ASMs in preemptive strike campaigns? 
Would Beijing launch ASMs as a single salvo (as a warning signal), or 
employ them as part of multiple-strike salvo operations, and compensate 
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for the potential inaccuracy of these missiles?31 How would the PLA coor-
dinate and execute multiple-strike salvos, and what kind of doctrine would 
guide these missions?32 U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work 
underscored the asymmetric challenge posed to U.S. CSGs and bases in 
the region from China’s ‘relatively cheap’ long-range precision missiles. 
Work warned that as Chinese technologies catch up with the United States 
in the ‘guided munitions warfare regime’, America must demonstrate the 
ability to win the emerging missile ‘salvo competition’, which will ‘under-
write [the United States] conventional deterrence in the twenty-first 
century’.33
In sum, the central challenge U.S. defense planners faced was how the 
possession of ‘fully operational’ ASMs might alter Beijing’s perception of 
its external strategic environment and the military balance vis-à-vis the 
United States,34 and whether such a shift would embolden Chinese lead-
ers to behave in a more aggressive and expansionist manner in future 
regional flashpoints.35 That is, if Beijing believed it possessed the means 
to hold Guam and U.S. CSGs at risk, it may be more predisposed to the 
use of military force during a crisis, which in turn would seriously impair 
the ability of the United States to assure its regional allies, and deter 
Chinese military escalation.36 Simply put, and irrespective of the various 
technical challenges associated with the use of long-range precisions mis-
siles, the mere possession of these weapons could increase the likelihood of 
United States–China conflict. Moreover, in future warfare Washington 
would need to rely more on its nuclear arsenal, to deter the possibility of 
not only a Chinese nuclear attack, but also long-range conventional ones 
(Fig. 5.1).37
asyMMetrIc challenges to the u.s. ‘achIlles’ heel’ 
In the western PacIfIc
From the mid-2000s, U.S. DoD analysts began to publicly discuss the 
potential threats posed by China’s incipient ASM capability.38 In 2008, the 
DoD stated that Chinese ASBMs were ‘designed to strike ships at sea, 
including aircraft carriers’.39 By 2011, the DoD reported that ASBMs had 
achieved initial operational capacity (IOC), and that China, ‘continues to 
field’ this weapon in small numbers (in ranges of at least 1500 km),40 sup-
ported and enhanced by C4ISR targeting systems and maneuverable 
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time since the 1920s the U.S. faces a direct threat to the platform [aircraft 
carriers] that has represented the core of its naval power projection’.42
This new asymmetric challenge prompted U.S. defense planners (per-
haps for the first time) to seriously consider how effective ASBMs might 
be under combat conditions against U.S. missile defenses, and, in turn, 
the implications for the future U.S. deterrence posture in Asia. The DoD 
recently highlighted the potential risks posed to U.S. ballistic missile 
defenses from ASBMs:
The PLA is ‘developing and testing several new classes and variants of offen-
sive missiles [such as the DF-21D ASBM] including hypersonic glide vehicles 
… and developing other methods to counter [U.S.] ballistic missile 
defenses’.43
In response, the United States has developed, tested, and deployed a range 
of countermeasures; specifically designed to break the complex ‘kill chain’ 
associated with these weapon systems.44 Former U.S.  Chief of Naval 
Operations Admiral Greenert outlined a variety of ‘soft-kill’ (or passive) 
and ‘hard-kill’ (or active) countermeasures designed to ‘break as many 
links as possible’ in the ASBMs’ ‘kill chain’, to ‘spoof’, ‘confuse’, and ‘ter-
minate’ the C4ISR systems and launch platforms that supported this 
weapon.45
Statements from senior U.S. military commanders signaled (at least 
publicly) a high level of confidence in the ability of these countermeasures 
to effectively manage the ASBMs’ problem set. For example, former 
U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Roughead stated that ‘I 
really do think it [China’s ASBM] is not the “game-changer” people have 
played it up to be’ and that the United States has ‘systems that can counter 
weapons like [the DF-21D]’. Similarly, former Commander of the 
U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet in Asia Vice Admiral Van Buskirk 2011 asserted 
that ASBMs are ‘not the Achilles’ heel of our aircraft carriers or our navy 
… it is [only] one [of the] weapons, one technology that is out there … 
but we will carefully monitor and adapt to it’.46
Notwithstanding the operational effectiveness of U.S. countermea-
sures, if China deployed ASBMs as part of an integrated multi-axis A2/
AD campaign in the Western Pacific, the risks posed to U.S. surface fleets 
would be substantial—especially during the early stages of a regional con-
flict.47 According to analyst Roger Cliff, even if the United States was able 
to effectively exploit ASBMs’ operational weaknesses, by diverting or 




it would still create significant challenges for the U.S. military, in particu-
lar, if ASBMs were launched in conjunction with ASCMs against U.S. 
military assets.48 That is, Beijing could tactically use ASBMs to divert the 
United States’ attention and resources away from a potentially more for-
midable (and likely preemptive) multi-axis attack,49 for example, combin-
ing Chinese attack submarines and airborne capabilities.50 Therefore, 
rather than viewing ASMs as a stand-alone weapon, the U.S. defense ana-
lysts—similar to their Chinese counterparts—conceptualized these asym-
metric weapons as only one (albeit significant) component of China’s 
mutually reinforcing A2/AD tool kit, which complicated U.S. regional 
defense planning. As analyst Toshi Yoshihara described,
ASBMs may not need to produce mission kills against the [United States’] 
surface fleet to complicate U.S. plans. They only need to reach the fleet’s 
defensive envelope for the Aegis BMD to engage the incoming threats … 
forcing the defender to expend valuable ammunition. … Even inaccurate 
ASBMs could compel the Aegis to exhaust its weapons inventory, leaving it 
defenseless against further PLA actions.51
The Pentagons’ most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) also 
highlighted these concerns: ‘the QDR prioritizes investments that support 
our interests and missions, with particular attention to … stand-off strike 
platforms and weapons, technology to counter cruise and ballistic mis-
siles’52: for example, new carrier-based (E-2D) early-warning systems, 
long-range surface-to-air missiles, the F-35C fighter jet, electromagnetic 
rail guns, and directed energy weapons (DEWs).53
In addition to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles offered Beijing an 
enhanced degree of operational and tactical flexibility in multi-axis mis-
sions. Cruise missiles can be launched from a variety of platforms (ground, 
sea, and air) and ranges, and their low flying altitude and limited radar 
signature makes them particularly stealthy and difficult to defend against—
especially when used in conjunction with ballistic missiles in preemptive 
strikes.54 Analyst Robert Haddick described China’s new supersonic 
ASCM as the ‘most dangerous anti-ship missile China has produced’, and 
how this ASM posed a greater threat to the United States compared to the 
much discussed DF-21D ASBM.55 These tactical advantages, together 
with significant qualitative improvements made to these weapon systems, 
created an additional cause for concern for U.S. defense planners56; and 
reinforced the perception that the U.S. risks losing its lead in the rapidly 
evolving Asia-Pacific ‘salvo competition’.57
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MIssIle ‘salvo coMPetItIon’ and QualItatIve arMs 
racIng In asIa58
During this period of an increasingly competitive precision-strike regime, 
the evidence suggests the emergence of the kind of action–reaction poli-
cies and arms-racing dynamics associated with an intense security dilemma. 
China’s pursuit of ASMs perceptibly increased the strategic emphasis 
Washington placed on the expansion of its ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
program in the Asia-Pacific region.59 From a Chinese perspective, U.S. 
regional missile defense policies exacerbated Beijing’s threat perceptions, 
and arguably expedited the development of its offensive missile forces.60
The United States consistently maintained that its BMD program was 
not designed to alter the strategic balance with ‘major nuclear-armed 
states’ (including China), but rather aimed at defending the United States 
from ‘rogue nations’ (North Korea and Iran).61 The Pentagon’s most 
recent Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), however, explicitly elu-
cidated the potential risks associated with Chinese ballistic missiles (includ-
ing ASBMs).62 Moreover, the timing of U.S. Terminal High-Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) deployments to Guam was in large part calibrated by 
the Pentagon (albeit not officially) to countervail China’s expanding long- 
range precision-strike capabilities.63 In 2013, the DoD stated that China 
‘is working on a range of technologies to attempt to counter U.S. and other 
countries’ ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems’.64 Despite the DoD’s 
tacit acknowledgment of the logic underlying the ‘security dilemma’, 
however, little evidence emerged to suggest that Washington was per-
suaded by this logic to formulate measures to ameliorate the United 
States–China security dilemma.65 As Chap. 2 described, at the heart the 
security dilemma is the inability of states to ‘recognize that one’s own 
actions could be seen as menacing, and the concomitant belief that the 
others hostility can only be explained by its aggressiveness’.66
IMPlIcatIons for crIsIs staBIlIty & MIlItary 
escalatIon In the asIa-PacIfIc
Four interrelated features of ASMs increase the risk of crisis instability and 
military escalation.
First, missile warhead ambiguity associated with ASMs increases the risk 
of escalatory ‘use or lose’ dynamics.67 That is, the intended target of long- 




armed ballistic strike for a nuclear-armed one, and in turn inadvertently 
trigger nuclear retaliation.68 For example, a conventional ASBM attack on 
U.S. CSGs could also be interpreted by U.S. defense planners as a nuclear- 
generated electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack against U.S. onboard 
missile defenses sensors, or even as a precursor to a nuclear attack—tactics 
consistent with Chinese military doctrine.69 Moreover, recent reports that 
China has developed ‘dual-payload’ (armed with conventional and nuclear 
warheads) ballistic missiles will likely increase the dangers associated with 
ASMs and warhead ambiguity, in particular, if future missiles are aug-
mented with hypersonic boost-glide variants.70 Finally, if China’s dual- 
payload missiles are stored in close proximity to their other conventional 
missile forces (which is currently not thought to be the case), the implica-
tions for regional strategic stability would be especially deleterious.71
Second, an equally pressing tactical issue is ambiguities related to mili-
tary targets (especially targets for U.S. long-range precision missiles), 
which received far less analytical attention compared to warhead ambigui-
ties.72 That is, Beijing might misinterpret a U.S. conventional precision 
strike against China’s conventional missile command and control centers 
and launch platforms (envisioned by Air–Sea Battle), as an attempt to deny 
or degrade Beijing’s control over its nuclear second-strike capacity (dis-
cussed in Chap. 6).73 Furthermore, the increasingly comingled—conven-
tional and nuclear—features of Chinese missile force structures, doctrines, 
and strategic concepts amplified the risk that a U.S. attack targeting the 
PLA’s conventional structures is misinterpreted by Beijing as a first strike 
against its nuclear deterrent.74
Third, (as Chap. 4 described), the U.S.  DoD anticipated that the 
China’s rapidly evolving C4ISR architecture will soon be able to effec-
tively integrate (and shorten) the ASM’s complex ‘kill chain’ sequence. To 
be sure, qualitative advancements of this kind will likely increase the oper-
ational and tactical attractiveness of ASMs as an asymmetric weapon of 
choice against U.S surface fleets, and, in turn, may lower the threshold in 
the use of this weapon. Furthermore, recent reports of the development 
of several enhancements to China’s missile forces will improve the surviv-
ability, accuracy, and lethality of ASMs for a broader range of missions, 
including preemptive strikes; tactical military signaling; and strategic 
deterrence operations.75 To be sure, any perceived shift in the trajectory of 
Chinese military doctrine and force postures as a result these kinds of 
technological advances would galvanize the domestic-political momentum 
in Washington, advocating additional investments to U.S. missile (offen-
sive and defensive) capabilities in the Asia-Pacific.76
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Fourth, the Chinese military doctrinal preference for preemptive (and 
early) strike tactics could make Beijing more predisposed to using ASMs 
during a regional crisis or conflict, to seize the early initiative, sustain 
China’s military dominance, and preserve the credibility of China’s ‘stra-
tegic deterrence’.77 Moreover, given that U.S. military countermeasures 
to Chinese A2/AD were similarly calibrated to strike early and preemp-
tively against China’s military targets (especially C4ISR systems), the pro-
clivity for Chinese strategists to view ASMs as indispensable asymmetric 
tools for strategic deterrence will likely increase.78
Washington’s concerns related to Chinese ASMs were compounded by 
the tendency of Chinese strategists to overestimate the efficacy of employ-
ing missiles for military signaling purposes, and, simultaneously, to under-
estimate the potential escalation risks associated with such tactics—especially 
in the event that tactical signals are poorly executed or misinterpreted by 
the intended recipient.79 Chinese analysts have generally assumed that in a 
regional crisis or conflict, involving the United States, China’s nuclear 
deterrent would be sufficient to ensure that escalation risks are contained 
at a conventional level.80 An overconfidence in the ability to control escala-
tion might prompt Beijing to countenance the use of conventional mis-
siles (including ASMs) as ‘fire-breaks’ (between conventional and nuclear 
warfare), which it would not expect an adversary to breach. Assumptions of 
this kind may cause China to underestimate the escalation risks inherent in 
the use of conventional weapons during a conflict—or the ‘fog of war’.81
Theoretical studies on military signaling have observed that these 
tactics tend to be highly subjective in nature; a combination of technical, 
administrative, and perceptual processes determine their efficacy. A break-
down in the various interconnected processes involved (i.e. technical, 
administrative, and perceptual) can cause misinterpretations, miscalcula-
tions, and, ultimately, inadvertent and accidental war.82 In the case of 
United States–China military relations, the effectiveness of these  ‘processes’ 
would likely be complicated by Washington’s poor understanding of 
Chinese military decision-making processes, civil–military relations, oper-
ational doctrine, and China’s incipient crisis-management structures.83
Chinese strategists conceptualized the employment of fully operational 
ASBMs for a variety of ‘warning shot’ deterrence-signaling tactics against 
U.S. CSGs.84 U.S. defense analysts have identified two approaches con-
ceptualized by Chinese strategists in the use of ASBMs for deterrence sig-
naling (or ‘warning shots’) against U.S.  CSGs, which could risk 




The first is the use of ASBMs for ‘shots across the bow’ (or other ‘near 
miss strike’). Analyst Owen Cote argued that such a technically challeng-
ing operation would still have a relatively wide margin of error due to the 
time required for ASBMs to complete its complex ‘kill chain’ sequence, 
before the terminal guidance phase.86 Thus, the use of ASBMs for ‘shots 
across the bow’ would require a very high level of precision with minimal 
room for error, and could therefore easily trigger a potentially unmanage-
able escalatory spiral—especially in the event of targeting errors. Second, 
Chinese military doctrine also conceptualized the use of ASMs to signal 
revolve (or restraint) under crisis conditions. For example, ASBMs could 
target specific parts of a U.S. aircraft carrier, considered less likely to destroy 
the ship. However, this kind of signaling, perhaps even more so than a 
‘shot across the bow’ tactics (but for similar technical reasons), would risk 
a fatal (if unintentional) blow to a U.S. carrier and significantly increase 
the likelihood of inadvertent military escalation.
China’s ASMs (especially the dual-payload DF-26) have also contrib-
uted to recent debates in Washington on the durability and viability of the 
1987 INF Treaty.87 These debates were driven by recent Russian violations 
of its treaty commitments, together with the apparent inability of the 
United States to effectively respond to Chinese deployments of ground- 
based intermediate-range (ballistic and cruise) missiles in Asia.88 As a 
result, several defense analysts proposed adjustments to the INF Treaty 
that would permit U.S. ground-based intermediate-range missile deploy-
ments to Asia (or an ‘Asia option’).89 Other observers have questioned the 
logic of this approach, and argued instead that any modification to the 
INF regime would worsen regional strategic stability, and therefore the 
United States should maintain the status quo.90 Recent evidence indicated 
that qualitative and quantitative advancements to Chinese PSMs have 
prompted other regional actors to contemplate the development of similar 
(offensive) capabilities.91 For example, Japan expressed an interest in 
exploring the development of a long-range strike capability similar to the 
U.S. Tomahawk (or land-attack cruise missile [LACM]) system.92
Simply put, the continued regional proliferation of PSMs will likely 
exhort Washington to reconsider the strategic trade-offs involved in the 
deployment of ground-launched theater-range missile systems in the Asia- 
Pacific to enhance its deterrence posture vis-à-vis Beijing, and, in turn, 
reaffirm the continued credibility of U.S. regional treaty commitments.93 
Related questions of strategic importance to reflect upon include whether 
America’s regional allies would agree to host U.S. theater-range missile 
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systems; whether these states might consider developing their own missile 
systems to mitigate the strategic challenge posed by China; and whether 
they could be coaxed to participate in a regional arms-control dialogue.94
conclusIon
This chapter makes the following key arguments. First, notwithstanding 
the actual operational feasibility of China’s ASMs (or the peaceful assur-
ances from Beijing), the mere possibility that these asymmetric weapons 
may be used by China as part of multi-axis (and likely preemptive) strikes, 
in conjunction with the PLA’s broader A2/AD capabilities against 
U.S. CSGs and bases in the Western Pacific, perceptibly amplified U.S. 
threat perceptions. Specifically, that China’s rapidly maturing precision- 
strike regime could presage the emergence of a new military-technological 
paradigm, and a fundamental shift in military balance in Asia, in turn 
increasing the risk of regional (especially qualitative) arms racing and 
future United States–China conflict.
Second, the Chinese doctrinal preference in the use of ASMs for both 
precision strike and tactical warning signaling missions could augur delete-
rious implications for future military escalation and deterrence in the Asia- 
Pacific. Moreover, the penchant for U.S. defense analysts to overemphasize 
the quantitative and technical features of Chinese ASMs compounded 
Washington’s knowledge gaps in its understanding of Chinese operational 
concepts and strategic thought (i.e. ‘active defense’), which in large part 
were shaped and informed by perceived threats posed from U.S. military 
policies and postures (especially U.S. missile defense programs) in the 
region. To be sure, the failure on both sides to acknowledge the central 
driving forces underlining the others’ threat perceptions and strategic 
thinking (or a failure of empathy) increased the risk of future misunder-
standings and misperceptions in this competitive strategic domain.
Third, and related, in prioritizing investments in military systems and 
operational concepts designed to counter (or offset) the challenge posed 
by an emerging missile salvo competition with China, the risk of danger-
ous escalatory ‘use or lose’ dynamics increased. In future warfare in the 
Pacific, these dynamics could lower the threshold in the use of ASMs, as 
Chinese defense planners are forced to decide whether to use ASMs in 





Finally, several aspects related to Chinese long-range precision missiles 
could worsen regional crisis stability, complicate escalation management, 
and increase the risk of military miscalculations and accidental (or inadver-
tent) conflict: (1) warhead and targeting ambiguities associated with 
ASMs, compounded by dual-payload missiles and the development of 
hypersonic variants; (2) the increasing comingling of China’s conventional 
and nuclear capabilities, strategies, and doctrines; (3) the shortening of 
the ASM’s complex ‘kill chain’ sequence enabled by sophisticated C4ISR 
systems; and (4) the tendency of Chinese strategists to overestimate the 
efficacy of ASMs for military signaling, and underestimate the escalation 
risks associated with these tactics.
This book argues about how strategic competition and action–reaction 
policy dynamics characterized United States–China security relations dur-
ing the Obama era. The nature of the arms race in the long-range precision- 
strike domain, however, is not the sort postulated by Cold War era IR 
scholars. Rather, the dynamics that emerged in the Asia-Pacific during this 
period were far more multipolar and qualitative in nature, where domestic- 
political considerations played a prominent role. Moreover, the absence of 
a broader multilateral framework for conventional or nuclear arms control 
(such as an INF or Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) regime) 
could accelerate the pace of the proliferation of PSMs. To be sure, how the 
new Trump administration approaches the strategic challenges in this 
domain will have important implications for future arms control, escala-
tion management, strategic stability, and in turn the credibility and dura-
bility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments in the Asia-Pacific.
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CHAPTER 6
Chinese Evolving Approaches to Nuclear 
‘War-Fighting’: An Emerging Security 
Dilemma?
IntroductIon
The existing literature that relates to Chinese nuclear capabilities and 
doctrines has tended to emphasize stability and nonbellicosity in Chinese 
approaches to nuclear deterrence and military escalation, encapsulated by 
the long-standing ‘minimum deterrence’ and no-first-use (NFU) policies.1 
In general, the literature has painted a relatively benign, static, and iso-
lated (from China’s conventional war-fighting capabilities) picture of the 
evolution of Chinese thinking on strategic deterrence, which risks under-
estimating the increasingly dynamic, integrative, and flexible features of 
this shifting security paradigm.2 That is, by overemphasizing the gradualist 
and passive aspects of China’s ‘official’ nuclear posture scholars and pol-
icy-makers may overlook the possibility that as many of the barriers (tech-
nological, military-organizational, and arms control) to a ‘limited nuclear 
war-fighting doctrine’ are removed, the doctrine–capabilities gap between 
China’s nuclear capabilities and the modest war-fighting ambitions and 
the aspirations of Chinese strategists will finally be reconciled.3
This study argues that Chinese thinking on nuclear strategy includes 
positions in favor of a more flexible and robust nuclear posture, which has 
yet been endorsed in official documents, and is indicative of an underlying 
receptivity to innovation (especially technological) in this area. A ‘formal’ 
doctrinal shift (or even the perception of one) would closer align China’s 
nuclear posture and forces with its more offensively configured  conventional 
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stance. The chapter provides a much-needed analysis on the key areas of 
intersection and divergence in Chinese thinking on strategic (conventional 
and nuclear) deterrence, as well as the increasing commingling of Chinese 
conventional and nuclear capabilities and doctrine to support a limited 
‘war-fighting’ strategic posture.4 In particular, it highlights the increasing 
convergence of China’s conventional and nuclear missile forces to fulfill 
the requirements of an integrated strategic deterrence posture, predicated 
on targeting an adversary’s military assets (especially counterforce targets) 
with nuclear weapons asymmetry, preemption, and a preference for limited 
strategic ambiguity—‘the threat that leaves something to chance’.5 ‘War-
fighting’ in the context of nuclear weapons has often been treated as 
meaning ‘damage limitation’ or pursuit of a disarming first- strike capabil-
ity. For the purposes of this discussion, the author defines a ‘war-fighting’ 
doctrine as victory denial; military escalation control; or coercing an end 
to a conflict on acceptable terms, potentially including the use of tactical 
(or ‘theater’) weapons preemptively to achieve limited deterrence 
objectives and the use of nuclear weapons for victory-denial purposes at all 
stages of warfare.
China’s nuclear deterrence posture has for decades been defined by 
‘minimal deterrence’, de-mated and de-alerted nuclear warheads, and an 
NFU policy. In contrast, China’s conventional deterrence posture has 
been characterized by Western defense analysts as being based on war- 
fighting, preemption, asymmetry, and supported by the development of 
offensive-dominant capabilities. The closer alignment of these force pos-
tures would serve to accomplish China’s regional military objectives, 
informed at a strategic level by the active defense strategic concept 
(described in Chap. 3), and at a tactical level, by the use of asymmetric 
weapons in preemptive strikes for high-intensity warfare.6 To be sure, any 
major modifications to the composition of Chinese nuclear forces to meet 
the operational requirements of war-fighting doctrine would be viewed by 
Washington as a fundamental challenge to the military balance in the Asia- 
Pacific region.
This chapter argues that the security dilemma concept provides a 
compelling explanation for understanding the emerging (albeit under- 
researched) discourse that relates to the evolution of Chinese capabilities 
and doctrines associated with a ‘limited’ nuclear war-fighting posture.7 
This theoretical lens enables a robust elucidation of several important 




Chinese doctrine and nuclear escalation philosophy, which punctuates 
offensive military operations in the conventional domain with ‘tactical’ 
(or nonstrategic) ones in the nuclear domain?8 What are the key drivers 
underlying Beijing’s countenance of a nuclear war-fighting doctrine? 
Finally, is this shift emblematic of Beijing’s broader revisionist ambitions 
(inferred by many U.S. defense analysts) to replace the United States in 
the Asia- Pacific as the regional hegemon?9
Responses to these questions, in particular, to the critical assumptions 
underlying these assessments, will have significant implications for future 
United States–China deterrence, U.S. extended deterrence, security 
assurances, and regional strategic stability. The existence of a United 
States–China security dilemma in the conventional military arena is fairly 
well established in recent international relations (IR) scholarship (includ-
ing this book); however, such a dynamic in the nuclear realm has so far 
appeared relatively limited, but would be especially be destabilizing and 
difficult to mitigate.10 This chapter argues that during the Obama era the 
ingredients for an intense security dilemma were already present in this 
domain, and are likely to worsen.11
For the purposes of evaluating U.S. past and current thinking on 
Chinese nuclear capabilities and intentions, this case study has used a 
broad range of unclassified reports published by the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) and U.S. Congress. In addition, it has selectively used 
research from prominent Western-centric think tanks, and U.S. defense 
experts and scholars—or the so-called U.S. defense community.12 The 
relative opacity surrounding China’s official nuclear policies and posture 
has made it empirically challenging for external analysts to know with con-
fidence the nature of Beijing’s intentions in the nuclear domain, in par-
ticular, Chinese thinking on the use of nuclear weapons during crisis or 
wartime conditions.13 More recently, however, Chinese analysts and strat-
egists have become relatively more open to discussing a wider range of 
nuclear issues with external observers.14 To this end, this study makes 
extensive use of Chinese official national security publications and authori-
tative Chinese-language open sources.15
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it examines evidence that inti-
mates the reconciliation of the Chinese nuclear ‘capabilities–doctrine’ 
debate, which emerged in the late 1980s.16 The removal of many of the 
military-technological, organizational, political-ideational, and arms- 
control constraints (i.e. the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
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Weapons) impeding the implementation of a limited war-fighting doctrinal 
concept has cleared the path toward a substantially more powerful, 
survivable, mobile, flexible, and accurate nuclear weapon capability for 
employment at all stages of the escalation ladder—especially for counter-
force missions.
Second, it considers the evolution of Chinese approaches to integrated 
strategic deterrence, which combines conventional (space and cyberwar-
fare) and nuclear capabilities and concepts, to deter and deny victory to a 
superior adversary in high-intensity local ‘informatized’ warfare. The 
chapter examines how these approaches have been conceptualized by 
Chinese strategists, and from the latest evidence, proffers ways in which 
these views might be incorporated into assessments by Beijing of its future 
nuclear posture. In particular, it argues that China’s increasingly 
commingled and diversified strategic missile forces have already been 
incorporated into a limited war-fighting posture.
Moreover, China’s renewed interest in the development of tactical 
theater weapons has, in conjunction with its conventional forces, enhanced 
the credibility of its nuclear deterrence, and enabled the kinds of early and 
preemptive strike tactics consistent with a limited war-fighting posture.17 
This approach increasingly strains the credibility of Beijing’s official 
rhetoric, which depicted China’s nuclear posture as inherently restrained, 
in contrast to its conventional forces. This chapter argues that Beijing’s 
characterization of its declaratory nuclear posture became increasingly out 
of step with the evolution of Chinese force structure and Chinese military 
writings; thus, the lip service paid to this stance by the majority of external 
observers needs to be adjusted to reflect the more nuanced realities.
Finally, it reflects on the implications of a Chinese nuclear limited war- 
fighting posture for the trajectory of the United States–China nuclear 
balance and regional strategic relations, in particular, the prospects for a 
destabilizing security dilemma in the nuclear domain.18 It argues that the 
ambiguities and opacity associated with China’s nuclear policies and war- 
fighting doctrines will likely reinforce Washington’s reliance upon worst- 
case scenario capacity-based defense planning to infer Beijing’s—invariably 
malign—intentions (analyzed in Chap. 3). In turn, these security dilemma 
dynamics could lower the nuclear threshold, increase the risk of United 
States–China deterrence failure, and cause a war-fighting posture of the 
kind supported by Chinese proponents of a more robust nuclear stance, to 




chIna’s reappraIsal of nuclear ‘War-fIghtIng’
The existing literature that relates to China’s nuclear posture has tended 
to emphasize stability and continuity of Chinese nuclear deterrence, 
underpinned by the mainstay minimum deterrence and NFU policies. 
However, this status quo bias has overstated the static and passive nature 
of Chinese nuclear thinking, and understated the increasing dynamism, 
flexibility, and integrated (with China’s conventional forces) features of 
China’s nuclear posture. That is, quantitative-based net assessments of 
China’s nuclear arsenal have failed to adequately appreciate (or anticipate) 
the impact several recent qualitative changes to the People’s Liberation 
Army’s (PLA) nuclear force structure has had on how Chinese strategists 
conceptualized ‘deterrence’—especially the increasing alignment of the 
PLA’s offensive-dominant conventional war-fighting posture, with its 
nuclear weapons and operating doctrines.20 Although only a few Chinese 
strategists have explicitly advocated a shift in the function of nuclear weap-
ons, from minimal deterrence to war-fighting, these minority views have, 
however, reflected broader pressures to assimilate Western nuclear strate-
gies into traditional Chinese approaches to nuclear thinking.21
In his analysis of Chinese-language archives on nuclear policy during 
the mid-1990s, scholar Alastair Iain Johnston argued that Chinese strate-
gists never genuinely accepted a minimum deterrence posture.22 Johnston 
opined that since the late 1980s Chinese strategists have developed a con-
cept of ‘limited deterrence’ (or limited ‘war-fighting’) to describe the kind 
of nuclear posture China should aspire to, once the conditions are oppor-
tune. The concept was designed to deter both nuclear and conventional 
warfare, and in the last resort, compel the adversary to back down, to 
secure ‘escalation dominance’—in other words, escalate to de-escalate. 
According to some Chinese strategists, the successful implementation of a 
limited war-fighting posture requires sufficient amounts of accurate, sur-
vivable strategic missile forces (capable of penetrating an adversary’s mis-
sile defenses) to ensure a second-strike capacity; tactical theater missiles to 
target soft military targets (or ‘asymmetric escalation’ capabilities)23; mis-
sile defense systems; and space-based early-warning systems to de-escalate 
future regional warfare.24 Moreover, Chinese strategists have consistently 
(and explicitly) differentiated between the requirements of a ‘minimum’ 
deterrence and a ‘limited’ war-fighting posture, the latter clearly associ-
ated with the use of nuclear weapons for victory denial at all stages of 
warfare—especially against a conventionally superior military adversary.
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Recent evidence suggests that far from fading into obscurity or being 
eschewed by Beijing’s official rhetoric, Chinese strategic thinking on 
limited war-fighting has continued to shape and inform China’s nuclear 
modernization efforts.25 These Chinese publications suggest, therefore, 
the emergence of a pent-up interest in an expanded role for China’s 
nuclear weapons, which has yet to be integrated into China’s formal doc-
trine. Furthermore, the apparent contradictions inherent in a nuclear pos-
ture that simultaneously argues for restraint and victory-denial nuclear 
war- fighting will likely be reconciled, as the gap between the aspirations of 
Chinese strategists and what the PLA’s strategic forces are capable of 
doing narrows.26
In short, qualitative improvements to Beijing’s nuclear force structure 
over the past two decades have given China the ability to use nuclear 
weapons (and preemptively) in regional wars, which implies a much 
broader and discriminate use for nuclear weapons than envisaged by pro-
ponents of minimum deterrence or assured retaliation.27 Some external 
observers have argued that China could adopt a tiered (or more nuanced) 
approach to its nuclear posture. That is, China should continue to adhere 
to minimum deterrence and NFU for its ‘strategic’ nuclear force, while 
adopting a limited war-fighting posture for its ‘nonstrategic’ (nuclear and 
conventional) missile forces. However, the research suggests that such a 
dichotomous approach to deterrence is not consistent with Chinese think-
ing on ‘integrated strategic deterrence’, which encompasses the PLA’s 
space, cyber, and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.28
Over the past two decades, many of the impediments that prevented a 
de facto limited war-fighting posture have been removed. Unimpeded by 
these constraints, Beijing’s strategic thinking on future regional warfare 
will likely more accurately reflect the new (and more flexible) options it 
has amassed in both the nuclear and conventional domains, to optimize 
the synergies which exist between these domains, for limited local high- 
intensity ‘informatized’ warfare. Former PLA Second Artillery com-
mander Zhao Xijun stated that a ‘flexible application’ of deterrence across 
conventional and nuclear domains, and from a strategic to tactical level of 
warfare is ‘indispensable for effective and credible deterrence’.29 China’s 
2008 National Defense white paper and most recent Military Strategy 
reiterated this conceptualization of deterrence.30
The major obstacles that have prevented (or constrained) the adoption 
by China of a nuclear war-fighting posture include military-technological, 





Western literature is rich in discussion of the role technology and innova-
tion have played in China’s nuclear modernization.31 In particular, observ-
ers have emphasized the diversification from liquid-fueled to solid-fueled 
systems and from silo-based to road-mobile systems, and the introduction 
of multiple independent targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) for China’s 
strategic missile forces.32 The impact of these military-technological 
advances for China’s nuclear operating doctrines intimated a clear depar-
ture from a minimum deterrence posture toward a more offensive- 
dominant and integrated war-fighting doctrine.33 Or, put another way, 
military-technological advancements across a range of capabilities and 
domains has meant that China’s nuclear posture in aggregate can no lon-
ger be accurately conceptualized independently of its broader conven-
tional capabilities and concepts.34 Rather, these domains (especially space, 
cyber, and missile defense) have been inexorably synthesized into a force 
structure, which incorporates war-fighting tools designed to deter both 
conventional and nuclear wars.35 That is, Chinese offensive-dominant 
space, cyber, and conventional precision-strike capabilities have been inex-
orably fused into China’s nuclear deterrence posture (for integrated stra-
tegic deterrence)—a trend that is likely to continue as new and increasingly 
sophisticated capabilities are fielded. As Columbia University’s Robert 
Jervis has argued, in cases where the offense is dominant, especially when 
the offensive–defensive balance is not clearly distinguishable, the security 
dilemma between states is more intense.36
During a military parade in 2015 Beijing revealed its new intermediate- 
range ballistic missile (IRBM) Dong-Feng 26 (DF-26), a dual-payload 
weapon capable (albeit untested) of targeting land and maritime targets in 
ranges out to Guam. According to the U.S. DoD, China began to field the 
DF-26 in 2016, offering Beijing ‘its first precision strike capability against 
theater (or counter-force) targets’—for war-fighting missions in regional 
conflicts.37 Furthermore, improved space-based intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities could allow China to shift from an 
assured retaliation posture (i.e. the ability to absorb a first strike) to one 
analogous with a launch-on-warning stance, which would have significant 
implications for the PLA’s existing operating doctrines.38 In 2017, the 
Pentagon for the first time reported that China aspired to develop a 
launch-on-warning nuclear posture, to enable a ‘more rapid response to 
enemy attack’, and that China is developing a space-based early-warning 
capability to support such a posture.39
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China’s most recent Military Strategy white paper, which proposed 
enhancements to the PLA’s nuclear ‘strategic early warning and command 
and control systems … to deter other countries from using or threatening 
to use nuclear weapons against China’,40 suggests (albeit not explicitly) 
that a shift toward a launch-on-warning stance for enhancing China’s 
nuclear deterrence that retains the option for a first-strike capacity is under 
consideration—a view that has also resonated within China’s strategic 
community.41 Similarly, the authors of the latest authoritative doctrinal 
Science of Military Strategy (SMS) explicitly stated that China would not 
need to wait to absorb a nuclear attack before it launched a counterstrike, 
which forms part of the discussion on the merits of a launch-on-warning 
posture.42 It is noteworthy that neither of these texts reflects on the poten-
tial escalation risks associated with a launch-on-warning posture, in par-
ticular, the possibility of accidental launches caused by false (or 
misunderstood) signals, technical issues, or errors of judgment, all of 
which could trigger dangerous ‘use it or lose it’ dynamics.43
Several recent technological innovations will likely expedite a new 
emerging generation of offensive-dominant strategic missiles across the 
entire nuclear triad, which will have profound implications for the trajec-
tory of Chinese nuclear posture and policies.44 These enhancements have 
given Beijing new options to threaten the use of nuclear weapons below 
the strategic level—at a tactical level against counterforce targets.45
First, China has enhanced the survivability and lethality of the PLA’s 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with road-mobile launchers 
and MIRVs (e.g. the refitted DF-31A and the new DF-41 ICBMs).46 In 
2016, amid rising tensions with the United States in the South China 
Seas—and three days before former U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter 
scheduled a visit to USS Stennis in the region—China tested its new road- 
mobile DF-41 ICBM with two MIRVs.47 Analyst Rick Fisher opined that 
this test indicated the DF-41 was in its final testing phase ahead of deploy-
ment, and, with the capacity to deliver as many as ten MIRVs, would 
further complicate the task of U.S. missile defense interceptors in the 
region.48
Second, China operates four (a fifth is believed to be under construc-
tion) second-generation ballistic nuclear-powered missile submarines 
(SSBNs), armed with short-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs) (known as JL-1 and JL-2) that were successfully tested in 2012.49 
According to the Pentagon, ‘China will probably conduct its first SSBN 




credible second-strike nuclear capacity’,50 which will have significant 
implications for how China handles (and potentially mates) its submarine 
nuclear warheads during peacetime operations.51
Third, in 2016 the DoD reported for the first time a potential nuclear 
role for Chinese long-range bombers (the H-6K), which in 2012 were 
deployed on debut deterrence missions.52 Moreover, major upgrades to 
Chinese onboard command, control, communications, computers, intel-
ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems for the HK-6K 
enabled long-range nuclear precision-strike missions—a capacity that only 
the United States, Russia, and France have possessed since the Cold War.53 
China is also reported to be developing a small number of nuclear-capable 
air-launched land-attack cruise (ALCM) missiles (the CJ-20) to launch 
from its refitted HK-6K bombers.54 The deployment of nuclear-capable 
ALCMs would signal that China is developing a new air-launched war- 
fighting strike capacity to augment its ballistic tactical weapons and core 
strategic forces.
Finally, recent advances in hypersonic boost-glide technology could 
significantly enhance the maneuverability and speed of China’s nuclear- 
capable (and conventional) high-precision missiles for regional preemptive 
strikes, in particular, to penetrate U.S. missile defense systems.55 To be 
sure, whether Chinese hypersonic weapons will be armed with nuclear 
payloads will strongly indicate how Beijing intends to integrate these vari-
ants into future PLA operational doctrines.56 Robert Jervis warned that 
the security dilemma is ‘most vicious when commitment, strategy or tech-
nology dictates that the only route to security lies through expansion’ of mili-
tary power.57
In sum, these military-technological advancements have enhanced the 
accuracy, speed, precision, ranges, maneuverability, and survivability of 
Chinese nuclear weapons in a manner that appears incongruous with the 
requirements of minimum deterrence. This approach suggests that China 
is less willing to accept qualitative inferiority with the United States (and 
to a lesser extent India and Russia) in the nuclear arena required for mini-
mal deterrence, and is increasingly convinced of the deterrence value of a 
limited war-fighting posture to ensure a robust second-strike capacity and 
control escalation.58 Moreover, the pace and extent of these qualitative 
advances appear to have outpaced changes to China’s military doctrine, 
that is the formal conceptual structures that supposedly guide the 
 development and operation of forces. As a corollary, even in the absence 
of formal changes to China’s nuclear doctrine, the integration of its nuclear 
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weapons and operations with nonnuclear capabilities in offense-dominant 
domains, together with the ongoing qualitative advances associated with 
China’s nuclear modernization, risks intensifying the security dilemma 
with the United States, including (most worryingly) in the nuclear domain 
itself.
Military-Organizational
In 2015, China announced a major military reorganization, which 
included a new nuclear missile command structure. Most notably, the 
PLA’s Second Artillery Force (PLASAF), responsible for China’s strategic 
missiles, was replaced by the new PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). This reor-
ganization formally elevated Chinese strategic forces to an equal footing 
with the PLA’s army, navy, and air force services.59 Chinese President Xi 
Jinping stated that the Rocket Force is a ‘core force of strategic deter-
rence’ to uphold national security, enhance the PLA’s nuclear deterrence 
and counterstrike capacity, build a long-range precision-strike capability, 
and buttress China’s position as a major military power. De facto it appears 
that Xi Jinping has embraced a war-fighting doctrine for the Rocket Force. 
Xi stated that the core mission of the Rocket Force was to
[e]nhance credible and reliable nuclear deterrence and counter nuclear 
strike capability in accordance with the strategic requirements of nuclear 
and conventional missiles and of full-area war deterrence … and strive to 
build a powerful modernized rocket force.60
Xi also called on the Rocket Force to enhance China’s nuclear deterrence 
and counterstrike capacity, in particular, using medium- and long-range 
precision-strike missiles (PSMs) to ensure a credible and reliable nuclear 
deterrent.61
Notwithstanding the claims of China’s Ministry of National Defense 
that the creation of the Rocket Force would not alter China’s nuclear poli-
cies, the official sanctioning of this new military service symbolized the 
convergence of Beijing’s expansive conceptualization of ‘strategic deter-
rence’, with the necessary qualitative advances in the PLA’s strategic forces 
to fulfill the requirements of nuclear war-fighting.62 Moreover, this inter-
section occurred without the political dogma and ideational constraints 
faced by earlier generations of Chinese military leaders. In short, the pro-




enhancements to its capabilities, has finally aligned China’s (nuclear and 
conventional) war-fighting tools and the aspirations of its military leaders, 
with a command structure and the political will necessary to formalize a 
doctrinal shift.
What remains unknown, however, is how Chinese thinking and opera-
tional doctrines will evolve to reflect the inexorable linkages that have 
formed between China’s integrated strategic deterrent capabilities and its 
reorganized military structure. For example, although Chinese strategists 
have frequently discussed cross-domain warfare to deter adversaries and 
control escalation they have rarely considered the risks associated with 
these tactics, including how weaknesses in one domain could be offset by 
the strengths in another and, related, how capabilities in one domain 
might be used to deter (or control escalation) conflict in another.63 To be 
sure, questions such as these will become more pressing as China diffuses 
its burgeoning cross-domain war-fighting capabilities across its reconfig-
ured military services.64 It also remains unclear from existing sources how 
Chinese strategists expect the trajectory of these reforms to impact China’s 
ability to coordinate its disparate war-fighting tools and, in turn, how a 
more powerful and dynamic strategic missile force structure might enable 
a broadening of Chinese war-fighting posture into other domains (espe-
cially space and cyber).65
Arms Control
Though little is known of the precise link between Beijing’s official posi-
tion (especially its decision-making processes) on arms control, and the 
evolution of China’s nuclear limited war-fighting doctrinal preferences, 
the evidence suggests these positions have reinforced one another.66 Thus, 
Beijing’s attitude toward nuclear arms control and disarmament is best 
viewed through the lens of China’s broader strategic objectives: to safe-
guard its security; to frustrate nuclear blackmail (especially from the 
United States); to deter others from initiating a first strike; and to prevent 
U.S. missile defenses from neutralizing China’s retaliatory capacity.67 
While Beijing remains committed to its obligations under Article VI of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and has maintained (if very lukewarm) 
support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile 
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations, it has consistently placed 
the onus on the United States and Russia to take the initiative, before it 
would contemplate engaging in nuclear disarmament dialogue.68
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China’s series of defense white papers have iterated the concept of a 
‘lean and effective’ nuclear force; however, this concept does not impose 
specific numerical constraints on China’s nuclear arsenals. From a Chinese 
perspective, lean implies a modest force posture, and underscores Beijing’s 
desire to avoid a costly arms race in the nuclear arena; while effective per-
mits qualitative improvements to enhance the survivability, accuracy, 
lethality, and credibility of China’s strategic deterrence, and, above all, to 
counter the United States’ ballistic missile defense (BMD) system.69 
According to Major General Yao Yunzhu, ‘to keep the arsenal effective, 
China has to modernize it to ensure credibility after a first nuclear strike’—
or a second-strike capacity. To be sure, a ‘lean and effective’ nuclear force 
aligns with the basic requirements of minimal deterrence.70 However, one 
of the problems with ‘minimal deterrence’ is that it requires an accurate 
understanding of the level of damage an adversary finds unacceptable, 
which will inevitably change over time; a ‘credible’ deterrent today may 
not be perceived so in the future. As Chinese scholar Li Bin has empha-
sized, ‘China’s promise to not get involved in arms races does not rule out 
… security dilemmas’.71 Moreover, a limited war-fighting capacity does 
not require parity (or symmetry) with other nuclear powers (the United 
States and Russia) to be effective. Rather, the doctrine is asymmetric in 
nature, and, as a corollary, China only requires sufficiently credible war- 
fighting capabilities to deter and deny victory to an enemy.
Chinese strategists have often (and ambiguously) declared a general 
commitment to minimum deterrence, while simultaneously advocating 
first-strike and preemptive warfare, in the nuclear and conventional 
domains.72 For example, the doctrinal Science of Second Artillery Campaigns 
(SSAC) stated the following:
The most important type of future regional wars will be conventional con-
flicts under conditions of nuclear deterrence, deterrence and actual war- 
fighting will exist at the same time, and their function and effectiveness will 
be mutually complementary.73
This apparent contradiction can be explained by the confluence of Chinese 
conceptualizations of conventional and nuclear war-fighting and deter-
rence, which contrast with external observers’ overly passive and static 
perceptions of Chinese deterrence.74
Therefore, the only remaining arms control policy preventing a formal 




commitment.75 Over the past decade, however, Chinese strategists have 
questioned the strategic logic underpinning China’s adherence to NFU, 
which has raised concerns that Beijing could place conditions on this com-
mitment, or even do away with it entirely.76 Chinese strategists have dis-
cussed several broad scenarios under which Beijing might attach caveats to 
its NFU policy, which also tacitly countenanced first nuclear strike tac-
tics.77 Most controversially, nuclear weapons could be considered in retali-
ation against a conventional attack on Chinese strategic nuclear forces, 
and, in particular, to counter U.S. BMD and long-range precision forces.78 
To be sure, Beijing’s long-held hostility toward missile defense systems led 
to the prioritization of initiatives specifically designed to increase the sur-
vivability and penetrability of China’s nuclear forces to survive a first strike 
(e.g. solid-fueled road-mobile missiles, MIRVed warheads, and SSBMs).79 
Several external observers have argued that the Chinese defense commu-
nity, in highlighting internal debates on the conditions China could place 
on its NFU pledge, deliberately stoked ambiguity to strengthen Chinese 
deterrence.80 To be sure, the lack of clarity surrounding Chinese internal 
debates will continue to undermine the credibility of China’s adherence to 
NFU, while keeping the option open for Beijing to formalize its de facto 
limited war-fighting posture.81
chInese evolvIng approaches to ‘strategIc 
deterrence’
Chinese conceptualization of deterrence (or the Chinese term weishe) is 
best understood as a form of coercion, which includes elements of both 
‘deterrence’ and ‘compellence’.82 In short, nuclear deterrence and com-
pellence are often indistinguishable.83 That is, there is the threat of mili-
tary force to coerce an adversary to comply with a particular set of 
demands, combined with a capacity to inflict precise and targeted damage, 
a demonstration of the willingness to use this capacity, and a tactical pref-
erence for military signaling, to convey the means and will to carry out 
these threats.84
Chinese thinking on deterrence has also been influenced by a strategic- 
cultural tradition that emphasizes minimalism, ambiguity, flexibility, and 
patience. Chinese strategists have frequently drawn upon historical  military 
discourses and strategic theories (e.g. Mao’s Theory of People’s War, and 
active defense) to inform and authenticate their thinking on deterrence, 
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and the relationship between threats and capabilities.85 China’s 2015 
Victory Day Parade represented a very public demonstration of Beijing’s 
growing confidence in its enhanced strategic deterrence, above all, vis-à-
vis the United States. For example, Chinese state media officially described 
the PLA’s new dual-payload DF-26 IRBM as a ‘new weapon for strategic 
deterrence’.86
Evolving Chinese conceptions of strategic deterrence (or in Chinese 
lexicon ‘integrated strategic deterrence’) share similarities with the U.S. 
‘peace through strength’ concept, which is a multifaceted and holistic ver-
sion of deterrence.87 As doctrinal SMS highlighted,
[t]he comprehensive employment of all types of strategic deterrence to give 
full play to deterrence as a whole for serving national military strategy … an 
integrated strategic deterrence is formed … [with] conventional force as the 
mainstay, nuclear force as the back-up and reserve force as the support.88
The inexorable blurring of the PLA’s conventional and nuclear (and offen-
sive and defensive) capabilities, by shortening the time frame for crisis 
decision-making, and compressing the (albeit poorly defined) United 
States–China nuclear escalation ladder, will likely pose increasing risks to 
future United States–China strategic stability in Asia.89 Moreover, under 
crisis conditions these risks could exacerbate existing United States–China 
misperceptions and misunderstandings, which are baked into the compet-
ing doctrines and operational concepts on both sides: for example, US 
air–sea battle (ASB; renamed Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in 
the Global Commons), and China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) 
strategy (discussed in Chap. 3).
evolvIng chInese thInkIng on tactIcal theater 
Weapons and MIssIle defense
Since the 1980s, Chinese strategists have expressed a clear preference for 
tactical nuclear weapons (especially dual-capability ballistic and cruise mis-
siles) as a way to build rungs on the ‘nuclear ladder’, and to enhance the 
credibility of China’s nuclear deterrence against superior adversaries. 
Chinese-language sources have indicated that China has possessed the 
ability to develop low-yielding tactical nuclear weapons since the 1970s. 
However, no clear evidence has emerged to corroborate reports that 




cles.90 Similarly to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense 
planners during the Cold War era, Chinese defense planners have viewed 
the possession of a range of nuclear options (including tactical weapons) 
as strategically advantageous to avoid a Solomonic choice: using strategic 
nuclear weapons preemptively (precluded by NFU) or remain vulnerable 
to a nuclear first strike.91 Moreover, Chinese strategists have envisioned 
augmenting tactical nuclear weapons with conventional asymmetric capa-
bilities (e.g. antiship ballistic and cruise missiles, antisatellite weapons 
[ASATs], and cyber warfare), to target a superior adversary’s command 
and control structures, and evade its missile defenses.92
Chinese military writings have generally avoided explicitly detailing 
under what circumstances (and against what kind of adversaries) China 
may consider deploying tactical nuclear weapons.93 That said, given the 
types of military targets described by Chinese analysts, and that the target 
would likely be nuclear-armed, we can infer that China’s tactical nuclear 
weapons (especially dual-capable missiles) would feature prominently in 
the formulation of a limited war-fighting deterrence posture.94 For exam-
ple, China possesses several nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles (IRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) (e.g. the 
road-mobile DF-21 and the new DF-26), which, according to Beijing, can 
perform medium- to long-range precision attacks on both land and large- 
to medium-sized maritime targets in estimated ranges of 3000–4000 km; 
that is, they are capable of targeting US bases in Guam and US aircraft 
carriers operating in the Western Pacific (discussed in Chap. 5).95
In terms of doctrine, former Second Artillery deputy commander 
Lieutenant General Zhao Xijun opined that China should not only have 
‘strategic nuclear forces but also campaign and tactical nuclear forces’ to 
ensure the credibility of its deterrent posture at all levels of war.96 Moreover, 
Zhao’s comment that Chinese tactical weapons can carry a nuclear war-
head or special warhead according to the needs of the task and strike tar-
gets implied that the capabilities for this purpose already exist.97 Although 
Zhao’s comments do not represent official military strategy, his views are 
nonetheless indicative of an increasingly expansive conceptualization of 
strategic deterrence advocated by Chinese strategists, to ensure a credible 
deterrence posture at all levels of warfare on the modern battlefield.
For example, evidence suggests that, in spite of Washington’s reassur-
ances, the decision to deploy Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) systems in South Korea have heightened Beijing’s fears and 
directly influenced its regional strategic calculations.98 Since this decision 
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was announced in 2015 China has perceptibly intensified efforts to develop 
hypersonic (and possibly nuclear-capable) variants for its short- and 
intermediate- range ballistic and cruise missiles, to penetrate US layered 
missile defense systems.99 Furthermore, THAAD systems have been the 
target of regular cyber-espionage attacks attributed to Chinese IP 
addresses. Chinese-language open-source evidence indicates that Chinese 
strategists have increasingly viewed proposals from the Obama administra-
tion to modernize its nuclear triad (especially proposals for new air- 
launched nuclear-capable cruise missiles) as the continuation of the ‘basic 
characteristics of a war-fighting strategy’.100 These developments, together 
with other US military countermeasures and offsetting concepts, will 
likely convince Beijing of the tactical advantages and strategic necessity of 
‘formally’ adopting a limited nuclear war-fighting doctrine, to prepare for 
future regional informatized warfare.
IMplIcatIons of a chInese nuclear lIMIted War- 
fIghtIng posture
If U.S. defense planners concluded that developments to the PLA’s 
war- fighting capabilities (e.g. space-based ISR systems to enable a ‘launch-
on- warning’ posture) could harbinger a radical shift in the trajectory of 
Chinese approaches to strategic deterrence, the implications for United 
States–China strategic relations, U.S. regional extended nuclear assur-
ances, and nuclear deterrence in future warfare would be profound.101 
Moreover, China’s propensity for strategic ambiguity and opacity in the 
nuclear domain, in particular, the intended purpose of its (offensive) war- 
fighting capabilities, will likely reinforce the Pentagon’s preference for 
worst-case scenario capacity-based assessments, which in turn inform and 
guide U.S. countermeasures (discussed in Chap. 3).102
As a corollary, fearful that security gains by the United States will come 
at China’s expense, the formalization of a nuclear war-fighting posture 
may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Recent evidence indicates that 
Chinese strategists have viewed the expansion of China’s (offensive and 
defensive) capabilities as both reasonable and necessary responses to coun-
ter (and deter) U.S. military policies and postures in the region, designed 
to contain China’s power and influence in Asia, and undermine its nuclear 
deterrence.103 For example, Chinese strategists have viewed recent U.S. 




air-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile, with especial consternation.104 
Structural-realist IR scholars have described how spirals of mistrust can 
develop between states, even in situations where both sides are ‘security 
seekers’ (described in Chap. 2)105:
For you to know that you yourself mean him no harm, and that you want 
nothing from him save guarantees for your own safety; and it is never possi-
ble for you to realize or remember properly that since he cannot see the inside 
of your mind, he can never have the same assurances of your intentions that 
you have … neither party see the nature of the predicament he is in, for each 
only imagines that the other party is being hostile and unreasonable.106
Moreover, in cases where incentives (or disincentives) exist for each side 
not to cooperate, both sides will likely pursue their own narrow self- 
interests, and become predisposed to viewing the other as an adversary, 
which under the presence of the security dilemma leaves both sides 
worse off.107
The evidence suggests that Chinese strategists acknowledge the trade- 
off created by the strategic ambiguities surrounding Beijing’s nuclear poli-
cies and postures. That is, there is the risk that this approach could easily 
backfire, and prompt Washington to enrich and improve its military poli-
cies and postures to counter these uncertainties: for example, the Third 
Offset Strategy, ASB, U.S. naval freedom of navigation operations in the 
South China Seas, proposals to modernize the U.S. nuclear triad, and the 
expansion of U.S. missile defenses in Asia.108 Equally, a failure by 
Washington to more rigorously appreciate the evolving nature of Chinese 
thinking on strategic deterrence and escalation philosophy will increase 
the risk that in a strategic environment highly susceptible to crisis instabil-
ity, the United States might be unable to effectively deter acts of aggres-
sion by China (e.g. aggressive assertions of sovereignty in South China 
Seas or the Taiwan Strait).109
Cold War–era scholarship on nuclear deterrence observed that in situa-
tions where a conventionally weaker state with a secure second-strike 
capacity faces a more powerful adversary, conflict will more easily (and 
inadvertently) cross the nuclear threshold—especially if theater tactical 
weapons are present.110 In the case of the Sino–American strategic rela-
tions, the Chinese belief (described in Chap. 5) that its nuclear deterrent 
will necessarily prevent a conventional conflict from escalating into a 
nuclear one may compound these dynamics.111 That is, Chinese strategists 
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have tended to overestimate China’s ability to effectively manage the 
escalation process, and underestimate the inherent risks of unintentional 
escalation.112 Moreover, Chinese strategists have tacitly suggested that if 
the United States were to use nuclear capabilities to signal deterrence and 
resolve situations (e.g. nuclear-capable bombers), Beijing would likely 
escalate the situation with nuclear deterrence signaling, including missile 
tests, SSBN deployments, raising the alert status of Chinese nuclear forces, 
and ultimately adjusting China’s nuclear policies.113
conclusIon
This study makes four overarching arguments. First, the existing literature 
that relates to Chinese approaches to nuclear deterrence paints an overly 
static and passive picture that understates the dynamic and integrated fea-
tures of China’s burgeoning cross-domain war-fighting tools. Thus, the 
characterization of China’s nuclear posture by external observers (demon-
strated by the continued lip service paid to minimum deterrence and 
NFU) risks misaligning the PLA’s commingled capabilities and doctrines 
to support a de facto limited war-fighting posture.
Second, evidence from Chinese-language sources suggest that Chinese 
thinking on limited war-fighting, rather than being eschewed by Beijing in 
favor of a minimal deterrence (or assured destruction) posture, has contin-
ued to influence the evolution of China’s nuclear modernization. 
Moreover, Chinese literature on nuclear thinking includes positions that 
favor a more flexible and robust nuclear posture than has yet been endorsed 
in official documents or reflected in China’s formal doctrine, which indi-
cates an underlying receptivity for innovation in this domain. Simply put, 
unimpeded by many of the constraints imposed on previous generations 
of Chinese strategists, and driven by the ongoing qualitative changes to 
the PLA’s force structure, China’s incongruous nuclear posture will likely 
be reconciled, aligning the PLA’s nuclear forces with its offensive- 
dominant conventional stance for high-intensity, asymmetric (or ‘asym-
metric escalation’), and preemptive future warfare. Several unknowns and 
strategic uncertainties remain, however: How closely will China’s nuclear 
and conventional domains be aligned, and at what levels? Could there be, 
for example, a greater degree of alignment at the theater level (the PLA 
possesses dual-capacity MRBMs and IRBMs), but less so at the strategic 
level (China’s ICBMs are nuclear-armed)? In addition, how will hyper-
sonic weapons and glide vehicles affect this dynamic, in particular, if 




Third, Chinese evolving conceptualization of strategic deterrence 
reflects a multifaceted cross-domain version of deterrence, which lends 
itself to the blurring of traditional conventional–nuclear and offensive–
defense lineation. This inexorable blurring, by shortening the decision- 
making time frame (during a crisis) and compressing the nuclear escalation 
ladder, will increase the incentives (on both sides) for preemptive tactics. 
Thus, even in the absence of radical changes to China’s nuclear doctrine, 
technological advances to China’s nuclear posture, combined with the 
integration of its nuclear capabilities with nonnuclear ones in offense- 
dominant domains, risk intensifying security dilemma dynamics with the 
United States, including in the nuclear domain itself. This interpretation 
of the thesis does not, however, contend that Beijing has adopted or will 
formally adopt an actual nuclear war-fighting doctrine, but rather that the 
trajectory of China’s military modernization and integration is taking 
them to a place with many of the same potential risks and strategic 
implications.
Finally, several factors could lower the nuclear threshold and expedite 
the formalization of limited war-fighting nuclear posture, which in turn 
triggers a self-reinforcing spiral to an intense security dilemma in the stra-
tegic domain: (1) the convergence of China’s expanding suite of war- 
fighting capabilities with Chinese strategists and analysts evolving thinking 
on ‘strategic deterrence’; (2) the commingled nature of the PLA’s nuclear 
and conventional forces and doctrines; (3) sanguine Chinese attitudes 
toward the risk of inadvertent and accidental nuclear conflict; (4) the 
opacity and ambiguity that surrounds China’s nuclear posture and capa-
bilities; and (5) heightened threat perceptions in Beijing caused by U.S. 
military policies and operations in the region.
Several implications and future research topics follow from the findings 
of this case study. First, research would be beneficial on how the Chinese 
security community views the United States–China relationship in the 
nuclear domain. In particular, who on the Chinese side is leading a funda-
mental rethink; is it being challenged; and, if so, in what ways and to what 
degrees of success? How are these views changing in response to U.S. mili-
tary policies and posture in Asia? Finally, how will the PLA’s ‘new’ capa-
bilities likely affect the trajectory of Beijing’s thinking about its nuclear 
options in future warfare?
Second, external analysts will need to closely monitor the development 
of China’s commingled capabilities (e.g. space-based ISR), in particular, 
indications of changes to the PLA’s operational doctrines prompted by 
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these developments. Third, it is too early to conclude whether the PLA 
will emerge from its recent major overhaul as a stronger and more 
coordinated joint war-fighting force. What, for example, will be the 
precise responsibilities of the new Rocket Force for China’s overall nuclear 
assets, will the new service’s command be confined to land-based missiles, 
or will they extend to China’s sea- and air-based nuclear-capable 
missiles?
In the final analysis, on the future modern battlefield where the bound-
aries between war and peace (and conventional–nuclear and offense–
defense) lines are increasingly blurred; where an aggressor is likely to 
resort to early and preemptive tactics to assert escalation dominance; and 
where states rapidly accumulate, synthesize, and diffuse progressively 
advanced war-fighting tools, interstate security dilemmas will become 
more frequent, intense, intractable, and destabilizing.
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The security dilemma concept can assist both scholars and policy-makers 
to rationalize how two predominantly security-seeking states can, without 
harboring malign intentions toward each other, formulate policies and 
strategies, and accumulate weapons that nonetheless reduce the security 
for both. As Chap. 2 described, the existence of a security dilemma between 
states is both a conditional and unintentional phenomenon. That is, it can 
only exist between states that both desire (or seek) security, without the 
intention of threatening others.
A key theme running through this book is the fundamental inability of 
state actors to see ‘into the minds of others’. Moreover, even if other states 
‘currently harbor no aggressive designs there is nothing to guarantee that 
they will not later develop them’.1 As a corollary, and irrespective of the 
actual nature of Beijing’s strategic intentions vis-à-vis the United States, 
the Obama administration could not completely exclude the possibility 
that as China’s power projection capacity in the Asia-Pacific increased, so 
its future strategic intentions could become more expansionist and aggres-
sive in nature. To be sure, if U.S. policy-makers believed Beijing was intent 
on pursuing a revisionist foreign policy, then Washington would likely 
perceive Beijing’s words and deeds as more threatening than they otherwise 
might be.
This final chapter proceeds as follows. First, it summarizes and appraises 
the book’s overarching arguments and the implications of these findings 
for United States–China and regional strategic stability, and future warfare. 
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Second, grounded in the experience of the case studies chapters, it 
contextualizes the book’s main findings and themes including the danger 
of conflating states’ military capabilities and strategic intentions; an inte-
grative analytical approach to viewing several military domains; and con-
ceptualizing the idea of ‘weapons ambiguity’ (especially dual-use 
capabilities) with the United States–China security dilemma. Next, it 
reflects on the ramifications of the diffusion and synthesis of emerging 
technologies into broader war-fighting capabilities and the prospects for 
preventing a Sino–American technology-driven arms race. Finally, it closes 
with some thoughts on the future trajectory of United States–China 
security relations and the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific under 
the new Trump administration.
Key Arguments, Findings, And themes
This book, by extending the empirical base that has applied the security 
dilemma to elucidate contemporary United States–China security rela-
tions and addressing several key conceptual gaps in the existing literature, 
makes an important contribution to the scholarly discourse. Specifically, it 
affirms the continued relevance of the dilemma concept to explain the 
deterioration of United States–China security relations during the Obama 
presidency. The book validates and corroborates the presence of a security 
dilemma in the formulation of Washington’s military policies and postures 
vis-à-vis Beijing in the Asia-Pacific.
Chapter 3 found that defense analysts frequently conflated Chinese 
anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities with the operational prereq-
uisites considered (by the United States) necessary to construct, and 
effectively integrate, a military strategy. Furthermore, the critical assump-
tions—extrapolated from Chinese A2/AD capabilities—underlying U.S. 
assessments were invariably determined before gaining sufficient equiva-
lence with Chinese military doctrine and operational preferences. As a 
result, analysts often identified specific military capabilities as explicit proof 
of the existence of a coherent and homogeneous strategic canon under-
pinning these capabilities.
The case study identified two factors that complicated U.S. assessments 
of China’s A2/AD capabilities, which reinforced the propensity for 
capacity- based methodologies, exacerbated strategic ambiguities, and 
gave misperceptions and cognitive biases space to grow. First, the long 




advanced capabilities created a propensity for ‘mirror-imaging’. Second, 
China’s poor military transparency (especially dual-use capabilities) 
reinforced analysts’ penchant to place an undue emphasis on purely 
material capabilities. Finally, in prescribing air–sea battle (ASB) to address 
the A2/AD ‘military problem set’ Washington implicitly cast China as a 
revisionist power, which led to action–reaction policies and spirals of 
mistrust and arms racing—closely associated with an intense and intracta-
ble security dilemma. In future warfare in the Pacific, these dynamics will 
likely reduce the incentives for United States–China cooperation, and 
increase the dangers of misperceptions and military miscalculation.
Chapter 4 contextualized China’s command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (C4ISR) 
‘system of systems’ with its cyber, space, and electronic warfare (EW) 
capabilities and made the following arguments. First, Beijing’s pursuit of 
C4ISR is best understood as part of a broader Chinese national security 
narrative, which links the development of C4ISR into Beijing’s broader 
strategic thinking. For example, China’s aspiration to become the first 
‘quantum power’ clearly demonstrated the intersection of Beijing’s 
national security goals and the prioritization of innovation in military-use 
technologies, above all, to counter U.S. military superiority and shift the 
regional military balance in China’s favor. Second, it found that 
Washington’s main concern was that once various technical and organiza-
tional limitations were overcome, a fully networked war-fighting force 
would afford Beijing new options in the use of the military’s expanding 
offensive weapons for preemptive and coercive cross-domain operations—
putting at risk U.S. carrier strike groups and bases in the Western Pacific. 
Moreover, the possession of these capabilities might embolden Beijing to 
behave more assertively and aggressively to defend and secure its expand-
ing regional interests and unresolved sovereignty claims.
In sum, the United States considered Chinese C4ISR-enabled and 
enhanced A2/AD capabilities as collectively far more threatening com-
pared to the sum of its parts. Third, U.S. threat perceptions were 
compounded by the vital role China’s dual-use space technologies played 
in completing the complex kill-chain sequencing associated with long-
range conventional precision munitions. As Sino–American mutual 
vulnerabilities to C4ISR capabilities increase, the incentives to strike first 
and preemptively rise, dangerous ‘use-or-lose’ situations are more likely to 
emerge, and, ultimately, the threshold for future conflict may be lowered. 
Precisely how this emerging military-technological paradigm (especially 
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quantum technologies, cyber warfare, space-based ISR, directed energy 
weapons, and artificial intelligence [A.I.]) will affect the future character 
of war and the military balance in Asia, where traditional boundaries 
between war and peace, and lines between conventional and nuclear and 
offense and defense are increasingly blurred, remains to be seen.
Chapter 5 found that notwithstanding the actual operational feasibility 
of China’s antiship missiles (ASMs), the mere possibility that these asym-
metric weapons could be used by China as part of preemptive multi-axis 
strikes against U.S. military assets in the Pacific amplified U.S. threat per-
ceptions. Moreover, China’s maturing precision-strike regime might pres-
age a new military-technological paradigm shift, which could fundamentally 
alter the military balance in Asia and increase the risks of regional arms 
racing and conflict. Second, Chinese doctrinal preference in the use of 
ASMs for both precision strikes and military signaling purposes could have 
deleterious implications for future military escalation and (conventional 
and nuclear) deterrence in the Western Pacific. Third, by prioritizing 
investments in military systems designed to counter emerging missile salvo 
competition with China, the United States risks generating highly escala-
tory ‘use or lose’ situations. Finally, the chapter highlighted several aspects 
of China’s long-range precision-strike missile (PSM) program that could 
worsen regional crisis stability, complicate escalation management, and 
increase the chances of misperceptions and military miscalculations. Above 
all, it emphasized the warhead and targeting ambiguities associated with 
ASMs, and the increasing comingling of the People’s Liberation Army’s 
(PLA’s) conventional and nuclear capabilities, strategies, and operating 
doctrines.
Chapter 6 argued that the literature pertaining to Chinese thinking on 
nuclear deterrence is overly static, passive, and isolated, and understated 
the increasingly dynamic and integrated features of the PLA’s rapidly 
maturing cross-domain war-fighting tools. As a corollary, the continued 
lip service paid by analysts to minimum deterrence and no-first-use (NFU) 
risks misaligning China’s commingled capabilities and doctrines, to sup-
port a de facto ‘limited war-fighting’ posture. Second, it found that Chinese 
views on limited war-fighting have continued to influence and shape 
Beijing’s nuclear modernization efforts. Unimpeded by the constraints 
imposed on previous generations of Chinese strategists, China’s nuclear 
posture will likely be more closely aligned with its offensive-dominant 
conventional stance for high-intensity, asymmetric, and preemptive future 




deterrence’ (or ‘integrated strategic deterrence’) reflects a distinctly 
multifaceted cross-domain version of deterrence, which lends itself to the 
blurring of traditional conventional–nuclear and offensive–defensive lines.
Under crisis conditions, this blurring, by shortening the decision- 
making timeframe and compressing the nuclear escalation ladder 
(especially if China adopts a launch-on-warning posture), could increase 
the incentives on both sides to strike preemptively, and worsen United 
States–China and regional strategic stability. Several unknowns remain, 
however, in the development of Chinese commingled war-fighting capa-
bilities: How might ‘new’ capabilities affect Beijing’s thinking about its 
nuclear options in future warfare? Will the PLA emerge from its recent 
major overhaul as a stronger and more coordinated joint war-fighting 
force? Finally, will the promotion of the new PLA Rocket Force, tasked 
with enhancing China’s strategic deterrence, expedite the transition 
toward the formal adoption of a war-fighting posture? The next section, 
firmly grounded in the experience of the four case studies, revisits and 
contextualizes the books’ main findings and themes; without merely 
repeating them.
The Danger of Conflating States’ Military Capabilities 
and Strategic Intentions
A central finding from the four studies is the proclivity of U.S. analysts in 
their assessment of Chinese military capabilities to conflate an operational 
capability as explicit proof of the existence of a homogeneous underlining 
strategic intention, that is the intended purpose of a particular military 
capability. This book makes an important contribution to the literature in 
the following ways. First, it extends the existing empirical base that relates 
to the nature and key drivers of Beijing’s strategic intention vis-à-vis 
Washington in the Asia-Pacific, which in turn validates the presence of an 
intense security dilemma. Second, it contextualizes these findings with 
relevant sources to highlight the incidence of U.S. misunderstandings and 
misperceptions in the presence of a security dilemma. Third, it considers 
the implications for future United States–China security relations of the 
failure to treat the distinction between a state’s capabilities and intentions 
with the requisite attention.
Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 found that analysts’ capacity-based assessment 
of Chinese A2/AD capabilities directly fed Washington’s threat 
 perceptions, making policy-makers predisposed to viewing America’s 
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words and deeds as fundamentally benign and defensive, and China’s, 
axiomatically malign and offensive. Specifically, the Pentagon’s assess-
ments of Chinese capabilities and intentions often overlooked or neglected 
important (or new) information that did not fit in with their preexisting 
beliefs. In turn, information was often cherry-picked from a small set of 
Chinese sources and used where expedient to fill in U.S. knowledge gaps 
of Chinese military affairs. Moreover, in reconciling these knowledge 
gaps, analysts frequently applied inferences and deductions derived from 
preexisting (and familiar) U.S. analytical frameworks to determine the tra-
jectory of Beijing’s intentions—or the problem of ‘mirror-imaging’. 
Defense analysts seldom used Chinese sources to corroborate their capac-
ity-based inferences. This kind of reverse engineering did not necessarily 
invalidate the conclusions reached by U.S. defense analysts, many of which 
appeared reasonable and empirically sound. Rather, the problem lies with 
the critical assumptions, extrapolated from Chinese A2/AD capabilities, 
and used to determine Beijing’s strategic objectives. This analytical 
approach, and in particular the assumptions underlying these assessments 
exacerbated strategic ambiguities, allowed misperceptions and cognitive 
biases to grow, and intensified the United States–China security dilemma.
By the end of the Obama presidency, China had undoubtedly acquired 
(or was in the process of developing) the requisite military capabilities 
to accomplish A2/AD missions in the Asia-Pacific. The evidence sug-
gests, however, that the Chinese military lacked a sufficiently mature 
military doctrine to effectively integrate and guide the type of coherent 
and homogeneous strategic framework (or Chinese ‘grand strategy’) 
inferred by U.S. analysts. The historical record has shown that in the 
absence of a mature operational doctrine to maximize military power, 
inferences derived from military capabilities alone say very little about 
states’ intentions.2
The United States–China Security Dilemma and an Integrative 
Analytical Approach to View Military Domains
A major finding of this book is that in approaching the causality and inten-
sity of the United States–China security dilemma an integrative (or cross- 
domain) comparative analytical approach yielded a particular set of 
dynamics that may not have otherwise existed, in particular, the impact of 





The case studies compared and contrasted the individual and combined 
effects of several Chinese military domains upon U.S. threat perceptions, 
and found that the collective impact of these domains intensified the secu-
rity dilemma in ways that independent assessments did not. For example, 
the collective impact of U.S. assessments of the Chinese A2/AD ‘military 
problem set’ significantly influenced the development of ASB by the 
Pentagon. To be sure, the emphasis ASB placed on enhancing U.S. naval 
and air force interoperability, and the subsequent reallocation of U.S. mili-
tary resources to support this concept, clearly demonstrated the outsized 
impact Chinese A2/AD had upon Washington’s strategic calculations in 
the Asia-Pacific region.
Chapters 4 and 5 examined the interplay of two individual military 
domains (C4ISR systems and ASMs) with deteriorating United States–
China security relations under the Obama administration. The research 
found that in cases where defense analysts contextualized individual mili-
tary domains with China’s broader A2/AD capabilities (in multi/cross- 
domain integrated joint combat operations), threat perceptions and 
strategic ambiguity noticeably increased. Analysts’ conceptualized Chinese 
C4ISR as a critical means to augment the PLA’s rapidly expanding suite of 
offensive-dominant advanced weapons—especially long-range precision- 
strike munitions. To be sure, analysts arguably only considered China’s 
C4ISR capabilities as threatening in conjunction with the various advanced 
weapons these systems could enable and enhance, and not independent of 
them. Similarly, ASMs deployed in conjunction with China’s mutually 
reinforcing A2/AD capabilities (cruise missiles, submarines fleets, and 
cyber weapons) could create synergies on the future networked battlefield, 
which presented new strategic challenges to U.S. carrier strike groups and 
military bases in the Western Pacific.
‘Weapons Ambiguity’ and the United States–China 
Security Dilemma
As Chap. 2 described, the security dilemma is more intense in situations 
where the offense–defense line is blurred, the offensive is (or is perceived 
to be) more dominant, and especially in situations where new and techno-
logically advanced weapons are involved.3 Chapter 2 identified the ambig-
uous nature of military force (for coercion and self-defense), and, in 
particular, the types of weapons used for this purpose as a central feature of 
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the security dilemma. Therefore, just as Washington cannot be certain that 
China’s dual-use Beidou navigation satellites will not be integrated into 
the PLA’s missile guidance systems, Beijing cannot be adequately assured 
that in future warfare the United States will not use its missile defense 
capabilities to destroy Chinese satellites, or threaten its nuclear retaliatory 
capability. Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 found that under the Obama adminis-
tration United States–China security relations were characterized by a par-
ticular interplay of strategic, tactical, and operational features, which 
exacerbated strategic ambiguities and uncertainties for defense planners 
on both sides.
• The development of a range of offensive-dominant technologically 
advanced weapons, guided by preemptive and early-use operating 
doctrines
• The intrinsic dual-use features of several emerging military technolo-
gies, for example, space, cyber security, A.I., quantum computing, 
and autonomous systems
• The accumulation of dual-payload strike munitions that obscured 
traditional conventional–nuclear delineations
• A Chinese propensity for secrecy, selective transparency, and (delib-
erate) strategic ambiguity in the development of offensive weapons, 
concepts, and deterrence policy
Chapter 4 found that strategic ambiguities associated with the inherent 
dual-use features of Chinese space technologies amplified U.S. threat per-
ceptions and complicated the challenge for analysts in determining (1) the 
intended use of the PLA’s expanding suite of offensive counter-space 
capabilities; (2) how these offensive capabilities will be integrated into the 
PLA’s operational doctrines; (3) the nature and likely trajectory of Chinese 
military–civilian integration (or ‘civil–military fusion’) in the development 
and control of China’s expanding space assets, in particular, its space- 
based ISR satellites; and finally, (4) the opacity surrounding Beijing’s stra-
tegic objectives in this increasingly strategically competitive and contested 
domain. The research found that although ‘dual-use’ features of China’s 
space industry (as powerful force multipliers of China’s counter-space 
capabilities) were not exclusive to this domain, they were particularly pro-
nounced and entrenched, and thus more identifiable as an intensifier of 




Chapter 5 found that Chinese evolving approaches to ‘strategic deter-
rence’ increased the ambiguity and alacrity in Washington surrounding 
Beijing’s pursuit of a long-range precision-strike capability, above all, the 
potential asymmetric threats posed to U.S. missile defenses, carrier strike 
groups, and strategic hubs in the Pacific.5 The research found that the 
perceived asymmetric threats posed by China’s rapidly maturing PSM 
regime could portend, in extremis, a military-technological paradigm in 
the Asia-Pacific that could harbinger a dangerous qualitative and multipo-
lar arms race in PSMs.
In the case of Chinese ASMs, two additional features amplified these 
security dilemma dynamics. First, the warhead and targeting ambiguities 
associated with antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) could trigger a danger-
ous escalatory spiral that might lead to inadvertent or accidental conflict.6 
Second, the recent development by China of ‘dual-payload’ ballistic and 
cruise missiles (e.g. the Dong-Feng 26 IRBM) could exacerbate the dan-
gers associated with ASMs, especially if these missiles are augmented with 
hypersonic boost-glide variants, stored in close proximity with the PLA’s 
broader conventional arsenals, and mated with nuclear warheads and 
delivery systems—for tactical missions.7 These risks would become starker 
if Beijing shifted from a ‘de-alerted’ nuclear posture to a launch-on- 
warning one, which was found to be a distinct possibility in Chap. 6—for-
mally promulgated or otherwise. As a corollary, the increasingly 
commingled and overlapping features of Chinese (conventional and 
nuclear) missile capabilities, force structure, deterrence posture, and doc-
trine has increased the risk that a conventional missile strike targeting 
Chinese conventional structures (as envisioned by ASB) is misinterpreted 
by Beijing as a first strike against its nuclear deterrent.
Chapter 6 found that the strategic ambiguities and opacity surrounding 
China’s nuclear posture and force structure reinforced Washington’s reli-
ance on worst-case scenario defense planning. Above all, there is the fear 
that Beijing could place conditions on its long-held NFU pledge to 
enhance its deterrence, and the increasing convergence of China’s conven-
tional and nuclear missile forces—predicated on asymmetry, preemption. 
These dynamics in a future crisis or conflict could compound United 
States–China misperceptions, lower the nuclear threshold, risk deterrence 
failure, and ultimately make the formalization by China of a nuclear war- 
fighting posture a self-fulfilling prophecy.
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mitigAting A united stAtes–ChinA teChnology- 
driven Arms rACe
As Chap. 2 described, international relations (IR) theorists of various 
types generally agree that the security dilemma is an inescapable condition 
in world politics, which and at best can only be ameliorated or mitigated.8 
Broadly defined, defensive-realist IR scholars posit that a variety of ‘mate-
rial regulators’ can reduce the intensity of the dilemma, which may improve 
the prospects for cooperation (i.e. arms control measures and moderate 
military policies) and strategic stability between states. The ‘material regu-
lators’ most relevant to conceptualize the emerging weapons technologies 
and systems analyzed in this book (i.e. cyber warfare, EW, PSMs, counter- 
space, and C4ISR systems) include the offense–defense balance, and, in 
particular, sharpening the delineation between offensive and defensive 
capabilities and doctrines; the prevailing military balance; and, closely 
related, the asymmetric distribution of military power.9 The research sur-
veyed in Chaps. 3, 4, 5, and 6 demonstrated that the prospects for mitigat-
ing the emerging United States–China technologically driven arms race 
appear bleak for the following reasons.
First, the offense–defense line in cyberspace is inherently obscured. 
Network intrusions (or hacking), for example, are equally useful for defen-
sive as for offense operations. Thus, a cyber espionage could be inter-
preted (accurately or otherwise) as a precursor for an offensive preemptive 
cyberattack.10 As the former head of the U.S. National Security Agency, 
General Michael Hayden, opined that ‘operationally and technologically 
cyber espionage is not distinguishable from cyberattack’.11 Chapter 3 
explained that in cases where the offense–defense line is blurred, states’ 
intentions are harder to fathom, creating space for misperceptions and 
worst-case scenario defense planning, which worsens the security dilemma. 
In the cyber domain, the prevailing conventional wisdom is that the 
offense has the advantage—or is offensive-dominant. That is, it is much 
easier and cheaper to create malicious codes than to develop effective 
counters, which reinforces the doctrinal preference for preemptive and 
first strikes, and increases the risks of cross-domain (and possibly inadver-
tent) military escalation.12 To be sure, there is little agreement between 
states on what is the appropriate balance between offensive and defensive 
cyber capabilities.
Second, and closely related, the opacity surrounding U.S. and Chinese 




proven particularly difficult to verify, thus complicating further the ability 
of policy-makers to determine the others’ intention. Furthermore, given 
the diverse range of actors (state and nonstate) involved in cyberspace, the 
absence of well-defined international norms governing cyberspace (and 
‘cyber warfare’), the increasing sophisticated and integrated nature of 
C4ISR military systems, and the implications of emerging technologies for 
the survivability of states’ nuclear weapons (i.e. hardening and conceal-
ment), the risks of arms racing increase.13
Third, as C4ISR systems become further integrated with U.S. and 
Chinese war-fighting capabilities, and as both sides’ vulnerabilities to these 
systems increase, these risks will be amplified. In future conflicts, a nonki-
netic cyberattack may be used in conjunction with kinetic (conventional or 
nuclear) military force: for example, C4ISR-enabled precision-guided 
munitions or a blinding denial of service cyberattack on U.S. communica-
tion satellites as a precursor to an antisatellite missile (ASAT) strike. 
Chinese analysts at the National Defense University (NDU) recently 
reported that even though U.S. military satellites operate independently 
of the wider Internet infrastructure advancements in network, intrusion 
technology (i.e. quantum computing) means that EW capabilities can be 
used as a ‘springboard’ to attack hitherto secure U.S. military command 
and control networks.14
In sum, the diffusion and synthesis of emerging technologies into 
broader war-fighting capabilities, together with the challenges posed by 
cross-domain (or ‘multidomain’) warfare to traditional—war and intra- 
war—deterrence models, and the proliferation of C4ISR-dependent 
weapons which continues to shift the asymmetric distribution of military 
power (or the ‘information center of gravity’) in China’s favor will likely 
further reduce the chances of successfully restraining a United States–
China technology-driven arms race, and intractable security dilemma. To 
be sure, if the present trajectory in several strategic defense innovations 
holds, China will soon challenge the U.S. lead in several emerging military- 
technological strategic fields (e.g. A.I. and quantum computing).15 That, 
in turn, will likely accelerate the Pentagon’s drive to innovate offsetting 
initiatives and concepts, and reduce the prospects for finding solutions to 
restrain a technologically driven arms race triggered by ‘great power 
competition’.16
Finally, in the case of the rapidly maturing PSM regime in the Western 
Pacific, Chap. 5 found that the emerging arms-racing dynamics in this 
domain are multipolar and qualitative in nature, and characterized by 
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prominent and potentially problematic domestic-political considerations. 
Moreover, the absence of a broader multilateral framework for conven-
tional (or nuclear) arms control in the Asia-Pacific (such as an INF or 
START regime) will likely accelerate the proliferation of PSMs. To be 
sure, how the new Trump administration conceptualizes and approaches 
the strategic challenges posed by this domain will have significant implica-
tions for future regional arms control, strategic stability, and, more broadly, 
the credibility of U.S. regional extended deterrence commitments.
united stAtes–ChinA seCurity relAtions 
At A dAngerous CrossroAds
During its initial months, the new Trump administration’s approach to 
China reflected the new President’s unpredictable, uncertain, and erratic 
approach to American foreign policy. Donald Trump’s ‘American First’ 
slogan prompted vigorous debate about Washington’s benevolent over-
sight of the post-1945 ‘liberal world order’, suggesting an experiment in 
retrenchment-based realism, an insular shift in U.S. grand strategy, and a 
radical shift away from America’s decades-old security commitments; in 
extremis, it was a fundamental reallocation of global security burdens and 
power to other states—notably Russia and China.17 At the time of writing, 
however, these early fears have been assuaged by an apparent volte-face in 
Trump’s foreign policy stance, which suggested continuity rather than a 
radical shift in U.S. grand strategy, evinced by the reaffirmation of U.S. 
security commitments and strategic assurances to its allies—including 
those in Asia.18 Observers noted that despite Trump’s firebrand campaign 
rhetoric (e.g. threatening to label China a currency manipulator, to dis-
mantle U.S. alliance structures, tolerate nuclear proliferation, make strate-
gic concessions to Russia, and welcome the North Korean leader to the 
United States), the new administration’s approach proved surprisingly 
orthodox and conventional in substance, if not capricious in style.19
Illustrative of the capricious (and transactional) nature of Trump’s 
statecraft, the pendulum of United States–China relations has already 
swung to the extremes. Early on, observers feared that a more hawkish 
posture toward Beijing over trade policy, Taiwan, and the South China 
Seas would cause increased tensions in the region, unsettle U.S. allies, and 
decrease strategic stability. During his confirmation hearing, U.S. Secretary 




 countenance military force to deny (or block) Chinese access to the 
artificial islands it has built in the disputed Spratlys. This hawkishness, 
however, quickly reverted to a more traditional stance. For example, 
Trump embraced the ‘One China’ policy, demurred from declaring China 
a currency manipulator, and in an apparent quid pro quo to secure Beijing’s 
support in tackling the North Korea crisis, reports indicated that the 
White House refused to give the green light to the U.S. Pacific Command’s 
request to conduct further freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in 
the South China Seas.20
The brief honeymoon in United States–China relations culminated in a 
display of bromance between Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping at Mar-a- 
Lago in April 2017, which, despite the shadow of U.S. military strikes in 
Syria, struck a pragmatic tone (in a similar vein to their predecessors), and 
emphasized the importance of the multifaceted bilateral relationship in 
regional and global affairs.21 Shortly after this meeting, however, the pen-
dulum swung sharply in the opposite direction. Evidence of this shift 
included the resumption of U.S. naval FONOPs in the South China Sea, 
criticism of Beijing for its perceived reluctance to restrain Pyongyang’s 
nuclear ambitions, the approval of new sanctions on Chinese banks con-
ducting business with North Korea, and, much to Beijing’s chagrin, a new 
arms package for Taiwan.
Notwithstanding the brief lull in tensions in the South China Seas after 
the historic arbitral ruling at The Hague in 2016, to date, U.S. policies 
and opposition to China’s excessive maritime claims and militarization of 
artificial islands have remained broadly unchanged. In his keynote speech 
at the 2017 Shangri-La Dialogue, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis under-
scored continuity in America’s most fundamental security commitments in 
the Asia-Pacific. Mattis’s speech was carefully calibrated to reassure U.S. 
regional allies and deter China from unilaterally challenging the status 
quo; he reaffirmed Washington’s ‘enduring commitment’ to the security 
of the region, and condemned China for its ‘disregard for international 
law, its contempt for other nations’ interests, and its efforts to dismiss 
non-adversarial resolution of issues’.22
Though it is too early to talk of a ‘Trump Asia Strategy’, the new 
administration’s reaffirmation of U.S. strategic commitments, together 
with a more hawkish approach to Beijing, suggests that in the near-term 
Washington’s ‘China Policy’ will unlikely undergo a radical overhaul.23 
Rather, early evidence suggests a shift toward orthodoxy in managing 
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United States–China security relation, and thus more continuity than 
change from the balance that the Obama administration sought to strike 
through its ‘pivot’ policy (see Chap. 1). That is, it will combine engage-
ment with Beijing and a continued emphasis on U.S. military preeminence 
in Asia, to simultaneously reassure U.S. allies and deter China. However, 
then as now, the effective assertion of U.S. preeminence in Asia requires a 
clear reaffirmation of America’s willingness (not merely its ability) to use 
force in the region to defend its strategic interests.
Whether regional consternation caused by Trump’s capriciousness 
prompts states to engage in ‘self-help’ strategies (i.e. hedging, bandwag-
oning, and balancing) will ultimately depend on how states’ perceive the 
resilience of America’s long-term orchestration of power and commit-
ments to the region, and, juxtaposed to this, the existential threat posed 
by a rising China—poised to fill any vacuum caused by a U.S. strategic 
deficit.24 Given the logic of the ‘Hobbesian trap’, the danger exists that 
states fearful of becoming outnumbered, abandoned, or encircled by a ris-
ing power (i.e. China) might forge alliances and accumulate weapons to 
contain the growing menace.25 Unfortunately, the nonbinding (and 
vague) framework for a Code of Conduct (CoC) agreed by the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China in May 2017 will unlikely 
provide a basis for resolving future tensions in the South China Seas.26 
Recent unilateral actions taken by several ASEAN states to safeguard their 
respective claims in the South China Seas suggest that these dynamics have 
already begun to shape regional geopolitical realities.27 To be sure, if both 
Washington and Beijing do not carefully manage these sources of anxiety 
they will likely create self-fulfilling spirals of mistrust and arms racing, in a 
strategic environment highly susceptible to instability and security 
dilemmas.28
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